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I. INTRODUCTION
I think there is little meaningful difference between a good
United States Supreme Court brief and a law review article. Both
work products have a point of view. Each must deal with counter-
evidence and counter-arguments in a fair and intellectually satisfy-
ing way. While their writing styles may differ, their substance and
essence are closer than one might think - or so it seems to me.
Over the years, some of my law review articles originated as
briefs or other litigation products and vice versa. In crafting law
journal articles, I always try to write with an eye to the busy litigator
(or judicial clerk) who might find my scholarship of some use. To
put it crudely, I try to write "plagiarizable" scholarship.
In the past, I have not typically attempted to publish un-
mediated pleadings and correspondence in a law journal. I do so
here for several reasons. First, Joseph Spaziano's case is unique to
me for reasons I shall set out below. Second, when I wrote the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari' reproduced here, I was self-con-
sciously writing for an audience not limited to the nine United
States Supreme Court Justices who would decide whether Mr.
Spaziano lived or died. I knew as I was writing these pleadings that
they were likely to be the last I would file in court on behalf of Mr.
Spaziano or any condemned person. They were written for theJus-
tices, of course, but they were also written for Joseph Spaziano and
his family. In them, I try to set out where and why in this case the
criminal justice system failed. Third, some of the materials repro-
duced here are unavailable in any other public forum, and they
may be of importance to those who would not normally be privy to
them (e.g., the Statement to Florida Governor Lawton Chiles2 has
not previously been made available to the general public; the Flor-
ida Supreme Court oral argument of September 7, 19951 was offi-
cially audiotaped by Florida State University, but was not officially
transcribed; the United States Supreme Court refused to file the
original certiorari petition4 because it exceeded the Court's new
I See infra pp. 343-416 and notes 83-110.
2 See infra pp. 284-89 and notes 46-48.
3 See infra pp. 290-313 and notes 49, 50.
4 See infra pp. 343-416 and notes 83-110.
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page limit;5 the Florida Supreme Court refused to file the recusal
motion6 because it previously ruled that I "effectively withdrew" as
Mr. Spaziano's representative;7 Judge Eaton's Order Mandating a
New Trial8 is unreported.')
For me, the most important reason for publishing unmediated
pleadings is the uniqueness of Joseph Spaziano's case. These
pleadings address significant aspects of the case - significant for
us, at any rate. By the time you read these words, Joseph Spaziano
may be dead. These pleadings are merely words, but words cannot
convey the magnitude of this case.
It may be near impossible to fully appreciate the unbelievable
events that have taken place throughout Mr. Spaziano's case. Be
that as it may, I have nonetheless included in subsequent sections
several documents that have come to be in the last year or so. I
think it best to experience this nightmare as Mr. Spaziano has,
through legal (and not so legal) memoranda. You see, some things
are more easily quantified. One can write of a 1996 plane crash in
the Florida Everglades that took 109 lives10 or a 1992 hurricane
that wiped out a trailer park in Homestead, Florida.11 How does
one quantify nearly twenty years on Florida's death row for crimes
one did not commit? How does one quantify five death warrants?
How does one quantify being strapped into an electric chair to pay
for someone else's crime? The meaning of life is that it eventually
ends.
In 1986, Neil Skene asked whether the Florida Supreme Court
"knows what it's doing" when it reviews death cases.' 2 Skene's dev-
astating answer to his own question was "no."' 3 According to my
own personal experience with Florida's death court of last resort,
much of Skene's critique rings as true today as when first published
almost a decade ago.
5 The rules of the Supreme Court provide that every typed and double spaced
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari shall not exceed sixty-five pages. Sup. CT. R. 33.3.a.
6 See infra pp. 417-37 and notes 111-19.
7 See Spaziano v. State, 660 So. 2d 1363 (Fla.) (per curiam), modified, (1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 722 (1996).
8 See infra pp. 438-44 and notes 120-26.
9 While Judge Eaton's Order is unreported, it was recently published. See Michael
Mello, Postscript-Death and His Lawyers, 20 VT. L. Rxv. 945 (1996).
10 Robert D. McFadden, 109 Feared Dead as Jet Crashes in Everglades, N.Y. TIMES, May
12, 1996, at B1.
I I Catherine S. Manegold, Hurricane Rips Through Florida and Heads Into Gulf, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 25, 1992, at Al.
12 Neil Skene, Review of Capital Cases: Does the Florida Supreme Court Know What Its
Doing?, 15 STETSON L. REv. 263 (1986).
13 Id. at 354.
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Whereas Skene's field of inquiry was global, mine is far more
modest. In this article, I address only one discrete, albeit impor-
tant, aspect of the Florida Supreme Court's review of capital cases;
how the court dealt with a death row claim of factual innocence in
the case of Joseph Spaziano.
14
In this day of federal judicial deregulation of death, the per-
formance of state courts becomes the critical field of inquiry. A
perverse aspect of how the State of Florida decides who dies is this;
secrecy. It is ironic that the Sunshine State's highest court ap-
proaches death row claims of innocence in shadows. Mr. Spazi-
ano's case is the most recent instance of the Florida Supreme
Court's penchant for secrecy in deciding who dies. Secrecy, how-
ever, has long been a narrative theme in Florida's capital punish-
ment system. In a line of cases including Ford v. Wainuright,15
Spaziano v. State,16 Gardner v. Florida,17 and Brown v. Wainwright,'8
14 Spaziano v. State, 545 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1989); Spaziano v. State, 489 So. 2d 720
(Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986); Spaziano v. State, 393 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1981),
petition for post-conviction relief remanded, 660 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 722 (1996); Spaziano v. State, 393 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1981), habeas corpus denied sub
nom., Spaziano v. Dugger, 584 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1991), denial of post-conviction relief affd
sub nom., Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
911 (1995); Spaziano v. State, 393 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1981), appeal after remand, 433 So.
2d 508 (Fla. 1983), cert. granted, 464 U.S. 1038, affd, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), habeas corpus
denied sub nom., Spaziano v. Dugger, 557 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 1990), post-conviction relief
denied sub nom., 570 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1990); Spaziano v. State, 393 So. 2d 1119 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1037 (1981), reh'g denied, 454 U.S. 1165 (1982).
15 477 U.S. 399 (1986). After Florida sentenced the defendant to death, Ford v.
State, 374 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980), the United States
Supreme Court held that Florida procedure in capital cases was deficient, for Florida
did not allow the defendant to rebut evidence of state-appointed psychiatrists and did
not allow the defendant to offer evidence of his insanity.
16 468 U.S. 447 (1984). In sentencing Mr. Spaziano to death, Spaziano v. State,
433 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1983), cert. granted, 464 U.S. 1038, affd, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), the
Florida Supreme Court relied on confidential information regarding his prior felony
convictions. The United States Supreme Court found it acted in error because Mr.
Spaziano was left out of the process and was never given an opportunity to respond to
the evidence.
17 430 U.S. 349 (1977). After Florida sentenced Gardner to death, Gardner v.
State, 313 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1975), cert. granted, 428 U.S. 908 (1976), vacated, 430 U.S.
349 (1977), the United States Supreme Court found his due process was violated
when the Florida Supreme Court withheld confidential information during the resen-
tencing hearing. The Court found the information would have persuaded the jury to
sentence Gardner to life in prison rather than death.
18 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1000 (1981). The appellant accused
the Florida Supreme Court of withholding information that was not admitted at trial
and never made its way into the trial record. This information included psychiatric
evaluations, prior convictions, etc. The appellees were left not knowing what informa-
tion was used in the review process when the court determined sentencing in this
capital case.
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the Florida Supreme Court shrouded the death decision in secrecy.
The Florida Supreme Court's penchant for secrecy raises an
obvious question: What is the State of Florida trying to hide? In
Joseph Spaziano's case, Florida was hiding evidence of innocence.
The State's secrecy in Spaziano revealed evidence exculpatory in
the extreme; a videotaped recantation by the State's central witness
against Mr. Spaziano at his capital trial.19
I have written elsewhere aboutJoseph Spaziano's case.2" I am
convinced he is innocent.2' However, his "innocence" was irrele-
19 See infta note 21.
20 See Michael Mello, Death and His Lawyers: Why Joseph Spaziano Owes His Life to the
Miami Herald - and Not to any Defense Lawyer or Judge, 20 VT. L. REv. 19 (1995) [herein-
after Mello, Death and His Lawyers]; Michael Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Convic-
tion Attorney Crisis on Death Row, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 513 (1988); Mello, Postscript-Death
and His Lawyers, supra, note 9; Ruthann Robson and Michael Mello, Ariadne's Provi-
sions: A 'Clue of Thread' to the Intracacies of Procedural Default, Adequate and Independent
State Grounds, and Florida's Death Penalty, 76 CAL. L. REv. 87 (1988); Michael Mello,
The Hypnotized Witness and the Condemned Man (Oct. 1996) (on file with the New
York City Law Review).
21 The facts of Joseph Spaziano's case have been detailed elsewhere. See Mello,
Death and His Lawyers, supra note 20. However, since it is the facts of his case that
prove his innocence, some backround is necessary.
Mr. Spaziano was accused of murdering Laura Lynn Harberts, a
vibrant young woman whose body was discovered in a garbage dump in
Seminole County, Florida, on August 21, 1973. She was identified by
dental records, and was last seen alive on August 5, 1973.
Beverly Fink was Laura Harberts' roommate in Orlando. Accord-
ing to Ms. Fink, the last time she saw Ms. Harberts was on a Sunday
afternoon, about August 5, 1973. The previous night, Ms. Fink and her
boyfriend, Jack Mallen, were preparing to leave their apartment. At
that time, Ms. Harberts was on the phone and, as Fink and Mallen were
leaving, Ms. Harberts said, "Hold on a minute, Joe," and then waived
goodbye. Ms. Fink stated she and Mallen returned to the apartment
about 2:30 or 3:00 a.m. and Ms. Harberts was asleep on the couch.
Later that same night, someone knocked at the door. Ms. Harberts
asked Jack Mallen to go to the door but not to open it, and tell whoever
it was to go away; it was too late at night, and she did not want to talk to
him. Mr. Mallen complied with the request and the person went away.
Ms. Fink further testified that she had spoken briefly with Mr. Spaziano
once sometime in July 1973, when he came by the apartment on a week-
end afternoon and asked to talk to Ms. Harberts. According to Ms.
Fink's recollection, the man said he had met Ms. Harberts in Eola Park.
After talking for a few minutes, the man left.
On cross-examination, Ms. Fink testified that Ms. Harberts was not
dating Mr. Spaziano, and there was another 'Joe" who worked at the
hospital with Ms. Fink and Ms. Harberts. Ms. Fink could not say which
'Joe" Ms. Harberts was referring to on the phone the night before she
was last seen.
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William Coppick and Michael Ellis testified that approximately two
years prior to Ms. Harberts' disappearance, Mr. Spaziano lived in a
trailer in the same general area where Ms. Harberts' body was found.
Mr. Coppick also testified that Mr. Spaziano told him about finding
some bones, but Mr. Coppick did not say where or exactly when the
alleged conversation took place. Mr. Ellis further stated that Mr. Spazi-
ano took him to the general area where the body had been found. He
concluded that Mr. Spaziano went to get some marijuana "stashed"
there. Again, Mr. Ellis was unsure of the date when this took place.
The State's chief witness was an acquaintance of Mr. Spaziano
named Anthony Dilisio [sic], who was sixteen years old at the time of
the events in question. He testified that he accompanied Mr. Spaziano
to a dump, for the ostensible reason, according to Dilisio [sic], that Mr.
Spaziano could show him some women that he had raped and tortured.
Dilisio [sic] testified that he saw two female bodies in the dump. He did
not at the time report what he had seen to the police.
Dilisio [sic] testified he never believed Mr. Spaziano and that he
thought Mr. Spaziano was bragging to impress him. Dilisio [sic] further
indicated that he idolized Mr. Spaziano and that he wanted to ride
motorcycles with him. Dilisio [sic] said he did not report what he had
seen because he wanted to become a member of the Outlaw Motorcycle
club.
Tony Dilisio [sic] was the State's case. The prosecutor told the trial
court during a motion to preclude Dilisio's [sic] testimony that "if we
can't get in the testimony of Tony Dilisio [sic], we'd absolutely have no case
here whatsoever - So either we're going to have to have it through Tony, or we're
not going to have it at alL" And as the State argued to the jury in closing
argument, if they did not believe Mr. Dilisio [sic], they had to acquit Mr.
Spaziano. The closing argument proved prophetic. After lengthy delib-
eration, the jury stated that it was having trouble reaching a verdict.
The jury was told to continue deliberations and was told by the court
that it was their duty to try to agree upon a verdict (a so-called "dynamite
charge"). They tried again and reported they still did not believe they
could reach a verdict. The court gave a more emphatic "dynamite
charge," late in the evening, and a verdict of guilty was returned within
minutes. The only evidence that could have possibly convicted Mr.
Spaziano was Mr. Dilisio's [sic] testimony, and the reason for the juror
uncertainty was accurately portrayed by the State: They "struggled so
diligently with Mr. Dilisio's [sic] testimony."
In contrast to the difficulty the jury had in reaching its guilty ver-
dict, it reached an almost immediate sentencing verdict of life imprison-
ment. This verdict suggests strongly that the jury was attempting to use
the life verdict as its only available safeguard against the overall weak-
ness of the evidence. If it had believed the State's evidence, the jury
would have believed that Mr. Spaziano had committed a brutal crime.
Yet the jury voted for life.
What was not revealed to the jury that convicted Mr. Spaziano, or to
the judge that sentenced him to death, was that there was a strong likeli-
hood that the singularly devastating Dilisio [sic] testimony was manufac-
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tured. Mr. Dilisio [sic] did not "remember" his story until he was under
police hypnosis ....
** *
At trial, counsel for Mr. Spaziano attacked Dilisio's [sic] testimony
by using traditional tools of cross-examination. He stressed that Mr.
Dilisio [sic] was an admitted drug user before, during, and after the
alleged dump incident. Dilisio [sic] admitted that while on LSD he
sometimes hallucinated, especially when he combined marijuana and
LSD. In closing argument, counsel urged the jury to feel sorry for
Dilisio [sic] but not to believe him. He suggested that Dilisio [sic]
might have honestly been confused, either by drugs or by the police.
This strategy of discrediting Mr. Dilisio [sic], was central to any hopes of
a defense victory in this case, but in pursuing it counsel failed to employ
his most potent weapon. Counsel did not reveal the fact that Dilisio
[sic] never "recalled" the alleged incident at the dump until after he
went to a police hypnotist.
I have a juror affidavit that says that the jury recommended life
imprisonment rather than death because they weren't so certain that he
was guilty at all .... They knew he was an Outlaw (his club colleagues
attended the trial, in full biker regalia), and they were squeamish about
letting him loose .... So the jury found him guilty of first degree mur-
der, but voted ... against the imposition of death. There was a catch,
however: [T]he trial judge didn't know the reason for the jury's life rec-
ommendation, and Florida law does not permit a judge to factor such
lingering doubt into a capital sentencing decision....
** *
The post-trial investigation did more than reveal the hideous unre-
liability of Dilisio's [sic] hypnotically-warped testimony. As mentioned
previously, the victim - Laura Harberts - had a roommate, Beverly Fink.
At trial, Ms. Fink testified that Ms. Harberts had received a telephone
call from 'Joe" just before the time of her disappearance. The State
implied and argued that the telephone call was from Joe Spaziano.
Although Mr. Spaziano was able to argue that the call may have been
from any other 'Joe," including Joe Suarez, the exhibitionist whom
Laura Harberts dated from time to time, the jury was clearly led to be-
lieve that the fact that the caller may have been Mr. Spaziano was an
incriminating piece of circumstantial evidence. Yet, we now know from
recently disclosed police files that the police had determined that the
caller was indeed Joe Suarez and that the [S] tate failed to disclose this
fact. In addition, Joe Suarez denied to the police that he had been with
the decedent on August 5, 1973. Yet, in an undisclosed documented
interview, the police were able to conclude that Suarez was with the
decedent on the night of her disappearance.
During the investigation, the State believed that Laura Harberts'
killer was Lynwood Tate, although none of the documents suggesting
Mr. Tate's guilt were disclosed to the defense at trial. Mr. Tate was
given several polygraph tests about his role in the killing, which he
failed. He was a known rapist and all of the investigators involved con-
cluded that Tate had committed the murder. Tate told the investigators
"on several occasions" that "he didn't know whether he committed the
murder" and "that if he did, he would like to know it." At one time, "an
indication was made [by Tate] that there was a possibility that he may
266 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1:259
vant to those whose opinions mattered - the judges and governors
who decided whether he lived or died.22 He is a victim of lies, in-
competent counsel, police collusion and a court's cowardly reluc-
tance to admit error and reverse itself. Additionally, he is a victim
of a "clemency" board that dispenses mercy based on polling data;
that hears only from those who want executions carried out more
swiftly than ever; that regards all claims of innocence as equally
dubious; and that sees electrocution of human beings as the last
proof that the Florida government can do something right. Mercy
is not strained, it is vaporized. Justice lives elsewhere.
This is my last capital case. In the end, it was two small details
that became the final straws for me. First was the United States
Supreme Court's page limit.23 It is a petty thing, and its pettiness is
the point. The Justices' law clerks could not be bothered to read
an extra forty-five, double-spaced pages about why Florida was on
the verge of executing an innocent man. This obscene pettiness is
ironic given the Court's alleged belief that "death is different."
24
Second, and one of the most bizarre twists of the Florida Supreme
Court's vile performance in Mr. Spaziano's case, was its unilateral
decision to fire me as his lawyer. This decision was applauded by
have done this and did not know it." Most important, the police located
an eyewitness, Mr. William Enquist, who positively identified Tate as the
individual he observed at the scene of the crime with several women
near the time of the killing. None of the documents containing this
information were disclosed to the defense at trial.
The State also failed to disclose the contents of an interview with
Mr. Dilisio [sic] conducted in October 1974 (about six months before
the first disclosed interview). Although only police notes confirm this
interview (as opposed to a transcript or tape), it appears that this was
the first police interview with Dilisio [sic] where the subject of the
murders in the dump arose. The police notes indicate that all Mr.
Spaziano had ever (allegedly) said to Dilisio [sic] was, "[M]an, that's my
style." The report does not indicate that Mr. Spaziano admitted to the
murder or that he gave any other information to Mr. Dilisio [sic], but
he only supposedly claimed that it was his "style." Of course, six months
later, in the first recorded statement of Dilisio [sic], the story had radi-
cally changed. By the time of the trial, Dilisio [sic] claimed even more
extensive statements were made by Mr. Spaziano. Yet, defense counsel
did not have available the contents of the first interview ....
Mello, Death and His Lawyers, supra note 20, at 28-33 (citing Michael Mello, Draft of
Editorial: Save an Innocent Man, the Courts Refuse (June 4, 1995) (on file with au-
thor) (emphasis in original)).
22 Mello, Death and His Lawyers, supra note 20; Mello, The Hypnotized Witness and
the Condemned Man, supra note 20.
23 SuP. CT. R. 33.3.a., supra note 5.
24 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
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the Orlando Sentinel,25 the St. Petersburg Times, 26 and - most pain-
fully to me - the Miami Herald.27 The Florida Supreme Court's
determination to fire me from this case was readily apparent. After
the Florida Supreme Court modified its September 8, 1995 deci-
sion,28 Mr. Spaziano filed numerous motions in the days that fol-
lowed. On September 20, 1995, I received a letter from the
Supreme Court of Florida, Office of the Clerk. It said in its
entirety:
Your letter to Joseph Spaziano, Motion to Hold Evidentiary
Hearing in Abeyance Pending (1) Resolution of the Counsel
Question and (2) the Filing and Disposition of a Timely Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, and Motion to Treat Previously Filed Re-
hearing Motions as Petitions for Habeas Corpus, and for Ex-
traordinary Relief have been received via our FAX on
September 14, September 15 and September 18, respectively.
These have not been docketed and will not be forwarded to the
Court.
The Court has authorized me to direct you not to FAX any-
more pleadings or letters in re: the Spaziano case since you are
no longer counsel in the case.
Our FAX is to be used for death warrant cases and emer-
gencies only.
2 9
When Mr. Spaziano moved to recuse four justices of the Flor-
ida Supreme Court, that court issued the following Order:
The Motion to Recuse Four Justices of the Florida Supreme
Court, Appendix A, and the Supplement to Renewed Notice of
Appearance filed in the above cause by Michael A. Mello are
hereby stricken as they were filed by an attorney not authorized
by this Court to appear for appellant.
30
The Florida Supreme Court's Orders reveal two things. First,
they expose the length to which the court will go to deprive Mr.
Spaziano of his constitutional right to effective assistance of coun-
25 Justice for Spaziano, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 25, 1995, at A12.
26 Lucy Morgan, Spaziano Report to Remain Secret, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 26,
1995, at 4B.
27 Less 'Panic'for Spaziano, MiAMi HERALD, Sept. 13, 1995, at 10A.
28 Spaziano v. State, 660 So. 2d 1363 (Fla.) (per curiam), modified, (1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 722 (1996). See infra pp. 341-42 and notes 78-82.
29 Letter from Sid J. White, Clerk, Supreme Court of Florida, to Michael Mello,
Professor of Law, Vermont Law School (Sept. 20, 1995). The text of this letter ap-
pears in its original form. It has not been altered in any way (original on file with the
New York City Law Review).
30 Spaziano v. State, No. 67,929 (Fla. Jan. 5, 1996). The text of this Order appears
in its original form. It has not been altered in any way (original on file with the New
York City Law Review).
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sel. As the Supreme Court of Florida knows - and as Mr. Spazi-
ano reaffirmed in a Retainer Agreement, signed and notarized on
December 21, 1995 and provided to the Florida Supreme Court -
I am Mr. Spaziano's appellate attorney. The legality of the court's
ruling is the precise question presented in Mr. Spaziano's United
States Supreme Court Certiorari Petition. Second, the Florida
Supreme Court's Orders confirm that it would not "authorize"31 -
to use the court's own term - me to represent Mr. Spaziano in the
appeal that was certain to follow from the evidentiary hearing. But
for the intervention of Holland and Knight, 2 Governor Chiles
would likely have signed a new death warrant on January 10, 1996.
Thus, Mr. Spaziano would have been unrepresented, and executed
without any appeal at all.
The Florida Supreme Court's Orders crystallize the essence of
this case. The Orders are a breathtakingly raw and naked exercise
of brute judicial power, without even the pretense or the trappings
of legality. The Florida Supreme Court's lawless dictates cite no
authority, perhaps because there is none to cite. Federalism 33 is
based on trust. In this case, the Florida Supreme Court has proven
itself unworthy of such trust.
The Florida Supreme Court, that angel of oblivion, has a his-
tory of evading and defying the United States Supreme Court's
constitutional commands.34 However, never before has the Florida
Supreme Court's arrogance of power been so obvious. The most
recent Florida opinions in Spaziano demonstrate that the Florida
Supreme Court has learned nothing from Gideon v. Wainwrigh
3 5
31 Id.
32 Holland and Knight is Florida's largest and richest law firm, with offices all over
the State. It might be characterized as a white-shoe, establishment firm. To say that it
is politically well-connected would be an understatement.
33 "The federal principle or system of political organization .... Of or pertaining
to, or of the nature of, that form of government in which two or more states consti-
tute a political unity while remaining more or less independent with regard to their
internal affairs." THE OxroRD ENGLISH DICrIONARY 795 (2d ed. 1989).
34 See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (Court held jury instructions to
consider only statutory mitigating factors in capital case was improper as any relevant
mitigating evidence, including nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, should be con-
sidered); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (Court held defendant's due pro-
cess violated when confidential information that would have persuaded the jury to
sentence defendant to life in prison rather than death was withheld during resentenc-
ing hearing); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (Court held imprisonment
without benefit of counsel even for misdemeanors and petty offenses a violation of
due process); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 334 (1963) (Court ruled that a right to
counsel was necessary to protect indigents even during prosecution of lesser crimes).
35 372 U.S. 334 (1963).
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and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 6 both Florida cases.
We learned in Gideon and Argersinger, and most recently in
Hitchcock v. Dugger,37 that the only apparent way for the United
States Supreme Court to prevent the Florida Supreme Court from
evading federal constitutional law is for the Court to grant plenary
review and resoundingly reverse Florida cases in no uncertain
terms. Sadly, the Florida Supreme Court's dictates in this case
show that court cannot be trusted to enforce the federal Constitu-
tion. Certainly, Florida cannot be trusted to decide who dies in
secret.
As I write these words, Joseph Spaziano has a stay of execu-
tion. What the Florida Supreme Court will ultimately do with his
36 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
37 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
38 If you've skipped ahead to "The Happy Ending," see infra pp. 438-44 and notes
120-26, then this is no surprise. The stay is due to the enormous press coverage gen-
erated by his plight, and not due to anything done by any defense lawyer orjudge. I
am most grateful to the Miami Herald, although the newspaper is not shy about claim-
ing full credit for saving Mr. Spaziano's life. Of course, the Herald did not adopt Mr.
Spaziano out of altruism. The newspaper had its own institutional reasons. Neither
the Herald's reasons, nor its self-promotion, diminish the public service it performed
in the Spaziano case.
I will never find the words to express my profound gratitude to the Herald for
saving Joe's life, even if only for a short time. I will not say that the amount of time
does not matter, because it does; more time is always better than less. Still, what
mattered most to me - and, I think, to Joe - was the fact that someone had listened to
the record in his case, and that someone had written it down and published it. That,
and the fact that the Herald's stay let him enjoy another Thanksgiving, Christmas and
New Year. That is how Joe and I have marked the passage of time over the years, one
holiday season at a time.
And yet . . . the Herald's success only underscored my failure as Joe's lawyer. I
have poured my soul into Joe's case, for as long as I have been a lawyer, and I never
succeeded in convincing a single judge to even consider the evidence of innocence. If
I could not persuade any court anywhere not to kill my innocent client, then what was
the point? Maybe the "system" is too obtuse to care, or maybe I am just not much of a
lawyer. Either way, it seems time to quit. It's far past time, actually. The biggest
mistake I made in Joe's case was going to the Herald in 1995, rather than in 1983. I
played the polite professional far longer than the courts deserved. I trusted the judi-
ciary not to kill an innocent man.
The media's coverage of Spaziano, with the exception of the Orlando Sentinel,
comes far closer to the truth than anything yet written by a judge or a law clerk. See,
e.g., Liz Balmaseda, Chiles'Logic, Like This Case, Is Full of Holes, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 3,
1995, at BI; William Booth, Gov. Chiles Halts Execution After Witness Recants, WASH.
PosT, June 17, 1995, at AS; Cartoon, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 31, 1995, at 20A; The Death
Penalty: Change of Heart, ECONOMIST, June 24, 1995, at 28; Death by Secret Evidence, MIAMI
HERALD, Aug. 25, 1995, at 22A; A Death Penalty Mistake, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 4,
1995, at 2D; Death Unwarranted, MIAMI HERALD, June 16, 1995, at 30A; Martin Dyck-
man, Call Again for Clemency, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 13, 1995, at lIA; Martin
Dyckman, A Man May Die Under Cover of Secrecy, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 27, 1995,
at 3D; The Executioner's Song, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 17 & 24, 1995, at 9; Tom Fiedler,
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Taking the Politics Out of Capital Punishment, MIAMI HERALD,June 18, 1995, at IC; Linda
Gibson, Court Gives 'Crazy Joe' 11th-Hour Reprieve, NAT'L L.J, Sept. 25, 1995, at A10;
Michael Griffin, Spaziano Asks Chiles, Cabinet for Clemency Hearing, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
June 29, 1995, at Al0; Michael Griffin &Jim Leusner, Chiles to O.K. Spaziano's Death,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 24, 1995, at Al; Justice for Spaziano, ORIANDO SENTINEL, Aug.
25, 1995, at A12; JamesJ. Kilpatrick, Florida May Execute Innocent Man, MIAMI HERALD,
June 8, 1995, at 21A; Lawyer for Spaziano Asks for More Time, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT,
Sept. 12, 1995, at 3B; Less 'Panic'for Spaziano, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 13, 1995, at 10A;
Jim Leusner & Michael Griffin, Chiles Keeps FDLE Records of Spaziano Review, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Aug. 26, 1995, at D3; Bryan K. Marquard, Lawyer Stretches the Ethics Envelope,
VALLEY NEWS, Oct. 8, 1995, at 1; Bryan K. Marquard, Opposition to Capital Punishment
Goes Back to Teen Years, VALLEY NEWS, Apr. 9, 1994, at 1; John D. McKinnon, Spaziano
Lawyer: Hearing a 'Sham,' MLi HERALD, Sept. 10, 1995, at 6B; Kevin Metz, Clemency
Sought in Death Case, TAMPA TRIBUNE,June 29, 1995; Kevin Metz, Chiles Orders Execution
of Killer, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Aug. 25, 1995, at 1; Kevin Metz, Spaziano Gets Stay of Execution,
TAMPA TRIBUNE, Sept. 13, 1995, at 4; Bill Moss, Joe Spaziano Gets Fifth Death Warrant, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 25, 1995; Tim Nickens & Lori Rozsa, Gov. Chiles Steps in; Exe-
cution Called Off, MIAMI HERALD, June 16, 1995, at IA; Tim Nickens & Lori Rozsa,
Governor Considers Staying Execution, MIAMI HERALD,June 15, 1995, at 5B; Tony Proscio,
Anatomy of a Lie, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 8, 1995, at 23A; Tony Proscio, 'Memory' of Mur-
der, Mockery ofJustice, MIAMI HERALD, June 14, 1995, at 15A; Diane Rado, Justices Grant
Stay to Spaziano, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 13, 1995, at 1B; Diane Rado, Spaziano's
Lawyer Says State Lied, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 1, 1995, at 5B; Larry Rohter,
Though Witness Recants, Florida Man Faces Death, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1995, at A14; Lori
Rozsa, A Case Built on Hypnosis Crumbles, MIAMI HERALD, June 16, 1995, at IA; Lori
Rozsa, Case # 75-430, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 19, 1995, at IA; Lori Rozsa, Chiles Based His
'Crazy Joe'Decision on Flawed Report, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 16, 1995, at Al; Lori Rozsa,
Condemned Inmate Gets New Hearing, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 9, 1995, at IA; Lori Rozsa,
Murder and Memory: Witness Recants, But the Chair Awaits, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 6, 1995,
at 1A; Lori Rozsa, 'Crazy Joe' Is Granted a Reprieve, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 13, 1995, at IA;
Lori Rozsa, 'Crazy Joe' Trial Witness Told Pastor That He Lied, MII HERALD, Sept. 21,
1995, at IA; Lori Rozsa, Governor Asked to Free "Crazy Joe," MIAMI HERALD,June 30, 1995,
at 5B; Lori Rozsa, Psychic 'Sees'More in 'Crazy Joe' Case, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 15, 1995, at
1A; Lori Rozsa, Witness: Don't Kill Convict, MIAMI HERALD, June 11, 1995, at IA; Lori
Rozsa & Mark Silva, Witness' Change of Heart Fails to Persuade Chiles To Spare 'Crazy Joe,'
Miami Herald, Aug. 25, 1995, at IA; Bruce Shapiro, Not for Burning, THE NATION, July
17/24, 1995, at 79; Mark Silva, 'Crazy Joe's' Lawyers to Square Off Today, MIAMI HERALD,
Sept. 7, 1995, at 5B; Mark Silva, Court Faces Quandary on Spaziano, MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
8, 1995, at 5B; Mark Silva, Spaziano May Lack Lawyer for Hearing, MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
12, 1995, at 5B; Beth Taylor, Essay-Writing Lawyer Rejoins Killer's Case, ORLANDO SENTI-
NEL,June 8, 1995, at B1; Tick-Tick for 'Crazy Joe, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 30, 1995, at 10A;
Time Is Running Out, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 15, 1995, at 14A; Too Much Doubt in
Spaziano Case, TAMPA TRIBUNE, June 17, 1995, at 12; David Von Drehle, A Hypnotized
Witness, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 1995, at A25; World News Tonight with Peter Jennings:
Hypnotized Witness Recants Story (ABC television broadcast, June 30, 1995) (transcript
on file with the New York City Law Review).
The best accounts of the evidentiary hearing regarding Anthony DiLisio's re-
canted testimony are: Carl Hiaasen, Fairly Convict Crazy Joe - or Let Him Live, MIAMI
HERALD,Jan. 11, 1996, at B1;John D. McKinnon, OneJudgeHolds Key to Crazy Joe's Fate,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 16, 1996, at IA; John D. McKinnon, Tables Turned, State Grills Ex-
Star Witness, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 11, 1996, at 5B; John D. McKinnon, Witnesses: Truth
was Told in '76, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 14, 1996, at 6B; Retry 'Crazy Joe', MIAMI HERALD,
Jan. 17, 1996, at 10A; Lori Rozsa &John D. McKinnon, Ex-Girlfriend: 'Crazy Joe' Forced
Me to Lie, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 12, 1996, at 5B.
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case is impossible to know. He may have been executed by the
time you read these words. He may have been released from
prison. In a cockeyed way, it will not matter; either way, Joe is
dead. He could be released from prison tomorrow, but he is an
old man now who spent his life on death row for crimes he did not
commit. He trusted the judges, in part because I told him he
should. He trusted me. I failed. We failed. Joe could be freed
tomorrow. He could make it to Vermont to teach me to ride a
Harley. He could do many things. He'd still be a dead man
walking.
3 9
But right now, Joe has a stay, and I am guardedly nonpessimis-
tic that his stay will hold. There is a moment toward the end of
Camus' The Plague40 when, against all expectations, signs emerge
of a slight abatement of the horror.4' The season slowly changes,
By far the worst accounts of the hearing are the "coverage" provided by the Or-
lando Sentinel: Michael Griffin & Beth Taylor, Brother Against Brother, ORLANDO SENTI-
NEL, Jan. 14, 1996, at Al; Michael Griffin & Beth Taylor, DiLisio's Facts Wobble,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 11, 1996, at Al; Michael Griffin & Jim Leusner, Spaziano
Brothers: Joe Said He Killed a Nurse, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 9, 1996, at Al; Michael
Griffin & Jim Leusner, Spaziano's Former Gir fiend Contradicts DiLisio's Story, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Jan. 12, 1996, at Al; Michael Griffin &Jim Leusner, Spazianos LifeHinges on
Whether Judge Believes Witness's Latest [sic] Story, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 7, 1996, at Al;
Jim Leusner & Michael Griffin, Former Outlaw: Spaziano Enjoyed Killing, ORLANDO SEN-
TINEL, Jan. 8, 1996, at Cl; Jim Leusner & Beth Taylor, Spaziano's Future is Now in
Hands of Circuit Judge, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 1996, at A1;Jim Leusner & Michael
Griffin, Stepmother Disputes Dilisio's New Version, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 13, 1996, at
Al; Beth Taylor & Michael Griffin, Dilisio: I Wronged Spaziano, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan.
10, 1996, at Al.
The Sentinel has cheapened public discourse over Mr. Spaziano's guilt. It has
cheapened journalism. Both deserve better. I was unable to comprehend Michael
Griffin's difficulty in understanding a one-page motion I filed in the Florida Supreme
Court in September 1995. The motion's caption, as well as its nonlegalistic and clear-
as-a-bell contents, made clear that it was a request forjudicial guidance about whether
I should move to withdraw as Mr. Spaziano's appellate counsel. Mr. Griffin read the
motion as a motion to withdraw, and mischaracterized the motion in his newspaper.
The homicide and the resulting trial occurred in the Sentinel's back yard in Semi-
nole County. After the Sentinel slept on the case for almost two decades, the Herald
secured the break that turned the case around and that resulted in two stays of execu-
tion and an evidentiary hearing - after working on the case for a mere three weeks.
The Herald's investigations seem to cast doubt on the Sentinel's findings and reports.
From the beginning, it appears that the Sentinel received information from other
sources which were not disclosed to Mr. Spaziano and his attorney. Thus, the Sentinel
published "confidential" information immune from cross-examination or any other
means of adversarial testing.
39 The phrase, of course, comes from Sister Helen Prejean's haunting memoir. See
HELEN PREJEAN, S.J., DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYwITNESs ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (1993).
40 ALBERT CAMus, THE PLAGUE (Stuart Gilbert, trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1968)
(1948).
41 Id. at 241.
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but not everyone can adapt.42 Camus writes the following:
Some of them plague had imbued some of them with a skepti-
cism so thorough that it was now a second nature; they had be-
come allergic to hope in any form. Thus even when the plague
had run its course, they went on living by its standards. They
were, in short, behind the times.43
The only solace left for me now is knowing that, no matter
what happens, the governor and the Florida Supreme Court can
destroy Joseph Spaziano's body, but they cannot destroy his soul or
his story. I will not allow them to write his history-our history.
This story begins on August 25, 1995 ....
42 Id. at 243-44.
43 Id. at 244.
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II. LETTER TO FLORIDA GOVERNOR LAWTON CHILES,
AUGUST 25, 199544
I wrote this letter to the Governor of the State of Florida, Law-
ton Chiles, on the day after he signed Joseph Spaziano's fifth death
warrant. At that time, Mr. Spaziano's execution was scheduled for





via fax (904) 488-9810
Dear Governor Chiles:
I learned from yesterday's Orlando Sentinel - rather than from
any member of your staff - that you signed another death warrant
on Joseph Spaziano. The Sentinel also reported a secret FDLE re-
port that relied upon alleged statements made by unnamed and
unidentifiable persons. Ron Sachs apparently leaked both the
FDLE report and the fact that a warrant would come yesterday.
Your decision to inform the media that a person's death war-
rant would be signed - rather than to tell the man's attorney first
- is beneath contempt. The only thing more revolting is that you
base the warrant on secret information allegedly received from se-
cret sources not subject to cross-examination to test the reliability
of their witness.
In a letter you wrote on August 17th - the existence of which
I learned on August 25th, the day after you signed the warrant and
two days after you leaked the report to the Orlando Sentinel - you
directed the FDLE that its investigative materials "may not be in-
spected or copied" - by Mr. Spaziano's counsel or by any media
organization other than those reporters selected by yourself. In
the end, have you no shame sir? Have you no shame at all? Your
approach bears more resemblance to the Star Chamber than to a
hall of justice. [sic]
44 The text of this letter appears in its original form. It has not been altered in any
way, as indicated by the use of [sic] (copy on file with the New York City Law Review).
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[sic] As I know you are aware, actions have consequences.
Ideas have consequences. If my idea, explained to you in great and
documented detail, is correct, and Mr. Spaziano is innocent, then
his execution is simple murder.
"Murder" is the word Mr. Spaziano uses to describe what the
state has been trying to do to him for the past two decades, and
"murder" is the right word. It's a word he had used often in private
conversations with me over the years, but when he used it in an
ABC Nightly News interview, I cringed inwardly. 'Jesus, Joe," I
though; this kind of hyperbole doesn't help us." But, the more I
thought about it, the righter my client sounded to me. Once
against, the plain spoken common sense of my not-formally-edu-
cated client had trumped my law-trained lexicon; Mr. Spaziano's
intuitive, earthy naming had cut through the tissue of complexified
legalisms that have always tended to obscure the bone-level unfair-
ness in this case. Mr. Spaziano is innocent. Killing an innocent
person is simple murder. People who, aware of the facts, order the
killing of innocent people are simply murderers. Their accom-
plices are treated as legally - and morally - equivalent to mur-
derers; accomplices stand in the shoes (morally, if not legally) of
their principals.
That murder will have many accomplices. Governor Lawton
Chiles. Dexter Douglass, your general counsel, who sees his job as
being the whitewashing of the state's frameup of my client. Attor-
ney General Butterworth. Your unindicted co-conspirators at the
Orlando Sentinel bulletin board.
None of the people named will actually throw the fatal switch.
But under well-settled criminal law principles of accomplice liabil-
ity, they acted in ways that reasonable people would expect to re-
sult in the killing of an innocent man. The killing of that innocent
man was the natural and probable consequence of the facts and
circumstances as they knew them to be. These people cannot plead ig-
norance of the facts. They knew the facts as set out in papers.
The people named would reply that they are not murderers,
that they acted under the color of law - and, in a positivistic sense,
they'd be right. But the whole point of the Nuremberg trials was
that government bureaucrats who commit murder under color of
[sic]
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[sic] law are still murderers - if they possess knowledge of the facts
and circumstances that animate their actions and that imbue those
acts - actus reas, we call them in the criminal law dodge - with
mental awareness - mens rea that defines one's quantum of culpa-
bility for homicide. Under our criminal law, what distinguishes
capital murder from manslaughter from blameless homicide is the
mental state and informational awareness of the killer: murder is
the purposeful homicide, or homicide with such a high degree of
knowledge and certainty that the law will treat it as purposeful kill-
ing; homicide done with lower levels of mental awareness - negli-
gence or recklessness, say - are considered manslaughter. Same
homicidal act. What distinguishes murder from manslaughter
from non-culpable homicide (killings committed in self-defense,
for instance) is the mental state of the killer. What did he know,
and when did he know it.
As I set out in Mr. Spaziano's clemency application, the named
people who are accomplices to the murder of Joe Spaziano knew
this. That makes them all accomplices to murder. Of course,
they'll never be charged. They're judges and lawyers, who are just
doing their jobs, just following orders. Who will judge the judges?
Or the governor?
To paraphrase the New Republic writing of the genocide in Bos-
nia, evil is a mirror, and the evil of Joseph Spaziano's case is a mir-
ror, too. Among the images in the Florida glass is an image of
America, and it's not pretty. Your office seems to be taking a sab-
batical from legal seriousness, blinding itself to the moral and prac-
tical imperatives of its own power to stop this killing, to prevent this
particular murder from being committed in our name.
Well not exactly done in our name. You would be an accom-
plice to murder. Not so the American public, not even the Florida
public. The Florida governor does not have the right to make the
people of their state seem as indecent as you are. You have the
power, but you do not have the right. The evidence is everywhere
that more and more Floridians, even proponents of capital punish-
ment - especially proponents of capital punishment, God bless'er
- would like to know why Joseph Spaziano is being killed in their
name. They await your answer. Mr. Spaziano and his family await
your answer. Your whole world is watching - and waiting.
[sic]
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III. MEMORANDUM, AUGUST 27, 199541
I sent this memorandum to a group I hold near and dear.
They are colleagues and staunch supporters of Mr. Spaziano's
plight. They include Pat Doherty, a Clearwater, Florida criminal
defense attorney who was my co-counsel for a brief time; Mark Ol-
ive, my boss when I worked at Capital Collateral Representative
(CCR), and the best capital post-conviction litigator in the country,
as far as I'm concerned, for his nontraditional litigation tactics;
Jenny Greenberg and Matthew Lawry, Co-Executive Directors at
Volunteer Lawyers' Post-Conviction Defender Organization of
Florida, Inc. (VLRC); Steve Gustadt, a pro bono investigator with
VLRC before it lost funding on October 1, 1995 and was forced to
close its doors; and George Kendall, Associate Counsel, National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Legal De-
fense and Education Fund, Inc. in New York.
[sic]MEMORANDUM
DATE: August 27, 1995
TO: Pat, MO, Jenny, Matthew, Steve, and George
FROM: Mello
RE: Why I will not take Joe Spaziano's case back into federal
court on a successive habeas, or into the state trial
court on a fifth Rule 3.850 motion
All of you are understandably skeptical about my decision not
to take Joe's case into Federal court. I'll try here to sort out my
thought processes.
There is an undeniable legal benefit in going into every possi-
ble court to seek a stay: The system of capital punishment is ran-
dom, and we might get lucky and get a stay from the federal courts
- if we don't ask, we don't get. There is also a psychological bene-
fit: we feel better, because we've done all we can do as lawyers; our
client feels better, knowing that we've knocked on every legal door,
the judges feel better, because they can tell themselves "the de-
fense system worked because they defense lawyers scurried like rats
from court to court, raising every conceivable issue (we chide them
for doing that, but we don't mean it);" ditto the public feels better.
[sic]
45 The text of this memorandum appears in its original form. It has not been
altered in any way, as indicated by the use of [sic] (copy on file with the New York City
Law Review).
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[sic] So the benefits of the eleventh hour dash are clear and
familiar to us; we've all been through the drill before. But every
litigation decision we make - be it to go into court or not to -
entails risks as well as benefits. The risks are as un-quantifiable as
the benefits. The best I can do here is try to identify the risks as well
as the benefits in choosing whether to take Joe's case into federal
court under a fifth (count 'em) warrant.
First, the cost of foregoing the federal courts are minimal: to
paraphrase Lincoln in 1862, forJoe Spaziano, there is no North -
not on a successive habeas petition, at any rate. The "federal
courts" here mean Kendall Sharp, Ed Carnes, and the Big Bill
Rehnquist Court. Sharp has never granted CPC, much less a stay
or an evidentiary hearing; in 13 years on the bench, Brother Sharp
has not once found a single claim by a condemned prisoner to be
non-frivolous - to say nothing of sufficiently potentially meritori-
ous to justify a stay. Ed Carnes - the Alabama capital prosecutor
cross-dressing as a federal appellate judge - requires no com-
ment. Mr. Ed wrote the Eleventh Circuit's opinion on Joe's case,
and he spent more energy bitching about the page limit for my
brief than he devoted to the evidence of innocence I raised in the
goddamn brief. So we clear the Eleventh Circuit on a successive
habeas petition in a 20-year-old case on which the Court granted
plenary review in 1984, with no stay and no CPC. The innocence-
based cert. petition I filed in November did not get a single vote
for cert. And that was on a first habeas - a habeas based on pretty
compelling evidence of innocence, some of which wasn't procedur-
ally defaulted.
Our evidence on innocence is pretty powerful, but we don't
have a videotape showing thatJoe was elsewhere at the precise time
of the murder. The videotaped alabi isn't a hypo, of course; that's
what Lloyd Schlup had in his successive habeas petition. And all
Schlup got out of the Rehnquist/Scalia, Thomas ("bitch set me
up") court was an evidentiary hearing - and that only by a razor
this margin of 5-4, the same number of votes we'd need (5, not 4;
remember Streetman and Herrera?) for a stay in Joe's case.
So the real legal test, as opposed to the black letter law, is: If
you have a videotaped alabi, and you're in successor habeas status,
then you might be able to scrape together five votes for a chance to
[sic]
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[sic]prove your claim at an evidentiary hearing - a hearing which,
inJoe's case, would occur before judge Kendall Sharp. And a hear-
ing before Sharp is the most we can expect to get out of the federal
judiciary. We have little chance of getting even that, it seems to
me. We don't have a videotaped alabi, or anything close. Like
Schlup, we're a successor; unlike Schlup, Joe ran innocence as the
centerpiece of his first habeas - and of the 13 federal judges who
could have considered that evidence, none did - not a single one.
In federal court, innocence is irrelevant. The Supreme Court says
so, and the lower courts listen - as they're required to do.
So I think we give up little by foregoing the federal courts.
Let's take their procedural default/retroactivity/abuse-of-the-writ
rhetoric seriously. Fuck 'em.
On the other hand, the risks of going into federal court are
great. We waste our scarce time and energy on essentially hopeless
litigation before judges who don't think we belong there - and, if
the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Teague and Sykes and Mc-
Cleskey and Coleman and Parks are the law, then those judges are
right. We don't belong in federal court. The Supreme Court has
said so again and again. Maybe it's time to start listening to those
robed assholes.
More significantly, it seems to me, by doing the 50-yard dash
from court to court, we shift attention from Chiles and from the
FSC. Most critically, we diffuse responsibility among Chiles, the
FSC, and the federal courts. It's an intersticial, systemic manifesta-
tion of the Private Slovick syndrome and the Caldwell problem: If
everyone shares some responsibility for the killing of this innocent
man, then no one does.
I have long thought that the diffusion of responsibility was the
fundamental systemic and institutional problem with this case.
The jury wasn't sure Joe was guilty, but they knew he was an Out-
law, and it was Orange County in the mid-1970s. So they split the
difference, and they found Joe guilty but recommended life. The
trial judge didn't know about the jury's lingering doubt about
guilt, so he overrode and imposed death. So the jury shifted re-
sponsibility to the judge, and vice versa. And the same thing hap-
pened at each other sequential step along the capital assembly line.
[sic]
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[sic]The FSC deferred to the jury and trial court, as principles of
appellate practice dictate. And the federal courts deferred to the
state judiciary, as principles of federalism command.
Finally, the judiciary (state and federal) deferred to the clem-
ency authority of the governor - which, under Herrera and Graham
they were supposed to do, no matter how idiotically unrealistic Her-
rera and Graham might seem to us. Finally, in 1995, the responsibil-
ity for executing this innocent man rested on the shoulders of one
person: Lawton Chiles. The buck stopped there, and he knew it.
That's why the Herald's coverage persuaded him to stay the warrant
in June, I'm convinced.
And, I'm afraid, I erred in giving Chiles an out when I filed in
the FSC. FDLE and the Orlando Sentinel gave him all the political
cover he needed. We were back in the FSC, so it was the court's
problem - not his. If we lost in the FSC, Chiles would expect us to
dash into FDC, then the 11th Circuit and the Supreme Court.
With thudding predictability, the stay would then be denied the
night before the scheduled execution, and all of the attention -
and any blame - would stick to the judges and not to Gov. Chiles.
As we all know, that's the expected drill: the motherfuckers run us
ragged from court to court, then they kill our clients and blame it
on us for filing at the eleventh hour.
In my opinion, Joe has some (very little) chance of getting a
stay from either of two places: the FSC and Chiles. If the FSC has
any interest in doing right in this case, they have the opportunity to
do so with the out-of-time rehearing motions pending before them.
If the FSC has any inclination now - and they have never shown
the slightest inclination in the eight other times Joe's case has
come before them - in cutting through the procedural screens
the court itself has erected to avoid even considering the evidence
of innocence here, now they have a chance. I have no reason to
think they will suddenly seize that opportunity. If they don't, I see
no reason to give either the FSC or the trial court yet another
chance to default and abuse us.
That leaves Chiles as our best shot at a stay. It is very depress-
ing thought, and I want to be clear that I do not for a moment
think that Chiles will grant a stay out of any impulses of justice or
[sic]
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[sic]fairness or decency. I keep hearing what a decent fellow
Chiles is, but the May warrant, the stay (in the wake of public pres-
sure), and the present warrant (now that the media attention has
died down; remember Larry Joe Johnson?) leave me convinced
that Chiles uses the killing machinery of the state according to the
crass political calculus perfected by Bob Graham, the original wimp
who transformed himself into a national political force, and who
did so on the charred bodies of our clients.
That political calculus is, I believe, our only real chance for a
stay. It's not much of a chance, but neither are the courts. It
worked in June, to the amazement of us all (especially me). It may
well not work again, as it wasn't supposed to work last time, either.
What we must do is to maximize the pressures on Chiles.
The key to maximizing the pressures on Chiles is to eliminate
any opportunity for him to pass the buck to the courts, to close off
all possible escape routes. Thus, it seems to me, our chance with
Chiles hinges on our ability to keep the responsibility for killing
this innocent man squarely on Chiles and on Chiles alone. That's
why I won't go to federal court. That's why, should we lose in the
FSC, I won't file a new 3.850 in the trial court.
The magnitude of the pressure Chiles will face will depend,
more than anything else, on our (and the media's) ability to dis-
credit FDLE's secret, Star Chamber "process." That means getting
access to FDLE's report and its underlying materials and exposing
them as the product of a whitewash with a foreordained conclu-
sion. Perhaps the combination of the report and the Orlando Senti-
nel will provide Chiles with enough political cover regardless of
what we are able to ferret out. But I still think that Joe's best shot
at a stay - and his only shot at any real, substantive relief - lies in
my joint investigative venture with the Herald. The paper isn't be-
holden to me or to Joe of course; if they discover evidence Joe is
guilty, they'd print it; they'd have to print it. Still, I plan to con-
tinue to treat the Herald as an investigative partner, giving them full
and open access to my files and my thinking. By now, I trust
Miller's, Holmes' and Rosza's ability to distinguish the real, reliable
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[sic] It's terrifying to think that Joe's life is in the hands of a
politician - a politician who has signed two warrants on him
within three months, notwithstanding the evidence of innocence.
But I believe our best shot is in keeping the responsibility on Chiles
and on Chiles alone.
If Joe is killed, I want there to be no doubt that the final re-
sponsibility rests with one man, a man who must be thinking about
his place in history. I want them to know that, no matter how
much good he did the Senate and in the governor's mansion, it
will all be eclipsed by this; it will all be outweighed by his killing
this man. Tony Proscio was right that this really is a defining mo-
ment for America; it will, I can only hope, be the moment for Law-
ton Chiles to define how he is to be remembered. This will be the
ultimate measure of the grain of his character and the content of
his soul. This will be in his obituary, no matter how few column
inches he rates when he dies.
Wayne Gretzky (cameo star of Mighty Ducks, II) asked the se-
cret of his success in hockey, said, "I always skate to where the puck
is going, not to where it's been." The continuity of our litigation
strategy under warrant contrast sharply with the discontinuity of
events - the "federal courts," especially our lower federal courts)
have been packed with hacks by Reagan and Bush - suggests that
perhaps we, by continuing to do the death warrant Shinkansen
through the federal courts, are skating to where the judicial puck
has been. Or maybe it's the political puck. Or maybe I'm just plain
wrong about all of this, and maybe my wrongheadedness will cause
the death of my one innocent client and close friend. Gene Miller
accused me yesterday of "playing games" with Joe's life, and maybe
he's right. On some level this is all a high-stakes game - so is
Russian Roulette, and so are Pentagon war exercises in the Persian
Gulf - but if it is all a game, then I think we need to consider
changing the rules. My recent experiences with CCR convince me
now - and better late than never, I guess - that Millard was right
when he said at Airlie in 1986 that we risk becoming "the mask of
the executioner." Better thatJoe have no lawyer at all - and that
the world clearly sees that he has no lawyer - than that Joe have
the illusion of a lawyer, a hack PD office like CCR that plays by the
rules laid down by the people whose job it is to kill their clients.
[sic]
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[sic] One final word about taking responsibility. This call is
mine (and Joe's). I've been privileged to have the input and advice
of many, many people far smarter than I, and for that I am deeply
grateful. But the final responsibility is mine alone. I hope I'm
making the right decision on this; I hope even more that we won't
need to find out, because the FSC will grant a stay to consider the
rehearing motions now pending before it. Gulp.
God help Joe. God help us. [sic]
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IV. UNTENDERED STATEMENT TO FLORIDA GOVERNOR LAWTON
CHILES AND ATrORNEY GENERAL ROBERT BUTTERWORTH
46
Actor Mike Farrell co-wrote this Statement and gathered most
46 The text of this Statement and notes 47 and 48 appear in their original form.
They have not been altered in any way, as indicated by the use of [sic] (copy on file
with the New York City Law Review). The signatories include: Sons of Italy Amici
Lodge #2473, Palm Bay, FL. (All the members of this lodge are united and
unanimous in requesting a new trial.); Sons of Italy Lodge #2648, Marion County, FL.;
Senator George McGovern, Former Democratic Presidential candidate, 1972; Talbot
D'Alemberte, President, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL., Former Dean,
Florida State University College of Law, Former President, American Bar Association;
Stephen H. Sachs, Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, D.C., Former
Attorney General for the State of Maryland (1979-1987), (Argued and won the
leading case establishing the constitutionality of Maryland's capital punishment
statute.), Former U.S. Attorney, District of Maryland; Professor Michael Millemann,
University of Maryland Law School, Baltimore, MD, Former Chief, Civil Division and
Former Chief General Counsel, Maryland Attorney General's Office (1979-1981);
James R. Acker, Associate Professor, State University of New York, School of Criminal
Justice, Albany, NY; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Edward Weinfeld Professor of Law, New
York University School of Law, New York, NY; Aris and Carolyn Anagnos, Los Angeles,
CA; Congressman John Anderson, Washington, D.C.; Congressman Tom Andrews,
Washington, D.C.; Dr. Maya Angelou, Winston-Salem, NC; Ira Arlook, Washington,
D.C.; Edward Asner, Los Angeles, CA; Professor David Baldus, University of Iowa
College of Law; Alec Baldwin, New York, NY; Professor Susan Bandes, DePaul Law
School, Chicago, IL; Paul Basile, Editor, Fra Noi, Chicago, IL; Meredith Baxter, Los
Angeles, CA; Hugo Bedau, Austin Fletcher Professor of Philosophy, Tufts University,
Medford, MA; Dr. Joan Willens Beerman, Los Angeles, CA; Rabbi Leonard Beerman,
Los Angeles, CA; Marilyn and Alan Bergman, Los Angeles, CA; Rose Marie Boniello,
State President, Order of the Sons of Italy, Grand Lodge of Florida, Ft. Lauderdale,
FL; Scott H. Brassart, Editor, Northeastern University Press, Boston, MA; Jackson
Browne, Los Angeles, CA; Brad Buckner, Los Angeles, CA; Richard Capozzola,
Apopka, FL; Erwin Chemerinsky, Lex Legion Professor of Law, University of Southern
California School of Law; Carol Chomsky, Associate Professor, University of
Minnesota Law School; Diane V. Cirincione, Tiburon, CA; David Clennon, Los
Angeles, CA; Professor Douglas Colbert, University of Maryland School of Law,
Baltimore, MD; Kimberly Cook, Assistant Professor of Criminology, Mississippi State
University; Professor Mary Coombs, University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables,
FL; Phyllis L. Crocker, Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland, OH; Micki Dickoff, Pro Bono Productions, Los Angeles, CA; Professor J.
Herbert DiFonzo, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, NY; Dominic
DiFrisco, President Emeritus, Civic Committee of Italian Americans; ProfessorJoshua
Dressler, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Richard Dreyfuss, Los
Angeles, CA; N. Bruce Duthu, Associate Professor, Vermont Law School, South
Royalton, VT; Professor Linda H. Edwards, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer
University, Macon, GA; Nancy Ehrenreich, University of Denver College of Law,
Denver, CO; Diane G. Emery, Human Rights Activist; Shelley Fabares, Los Angeles,
CA; Mike Farrell, Los Angeles, CA; Magda Finnegan, Lifelines Ireland, Dublin,
Ireland; Professor David Firestone, Vermont Law School, South Royalton, VT; Robert
Foxworth, Los Angeles, CA; Bonnie Franklin, Los Angeles, CA; Professor Eric M.
Freedman, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, NY; William A. Frohlich,
Director, Northeastern University Press, Boston, MA; Michael Froomkin, Associate
Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, Coral Gables, FL; Professor
Linda Galler, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, NY; Professor Leandra
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of the supporting signatures. This document was prepared to be
sent to Governor Chiles in the event that Mr. Spaziano exhausted
all of his appeals. It's purpose is to beg the Governor for clemency.
What a depressing thought.
[sic]STATEMENT TO GOVERNOR LAWTON CHILES AND
ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT BUTTERWORTH IN
SUPPORT OF A NEW TRIAL FOR JOSEPH
ROBERT "CRAZY JOE" SPAZIANO
August 24, 1995, Governor Lawton Chiles signed a death war-
[sic]
Gassenheimer, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University, Macon, GA;
Willaim S. Geimer, Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA;
Sharon Gelman, Los Angeles, CA; Professor Dan Givelber, Northeastern University
School of Law, Former Dean, Northeastern University School of Law; Danny Glover,
Los Angeles, CA; Ann Goldstein, Visiting Professor of Law, University of Texas School
of Law, Austin, TX; John D. Gregory, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead,
NY; Alan Grier, Miami, FL; Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton, Detroit, MI; Rabbi Steven
Jacobs, Los Angeles, CA; Dr. Gerald G. Jampolsky, M.D., Tiburon, CA; Professor Peter
L. Kahn, Catholic University School of Law, Washington, D.C.; Casey Kasem, Los
Angeles, CA; Richard Kletter, Los Angeles, CA; Professor Stefan H. Krieger, Hofstra
University School of Law, Hempstead, NY; Charles S. Lanier, State University of New
York School of Criminal Justice; Piper Laurie, Los Angeles, CA; Jack Lemmon, Los
Angeles, CA; John Lewis, Atlanta, GA; Holly Maguigan, Professor of Clinical Law, New
York University Law School; Dr. Kathleen Maguire, State University of New York
School of Criminal Justice; Ronald D. Maines, Maines & Harshman, Washington,
D.C.; Rabbi Robert Marx, Glencoe, IL; Andrew A. Mcthenia, Professor of Law,
Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA; Professor Michael Mello, Vermont
Law School, South Royalton, VT; Gregg Meyer, Staff Attorney, South Royalton Legal
Clinic, South Royalton, VT; Chandler R. Muller, Winter Park, FL; Denise Nicholas,
Los Angeles, CA; Michael O'Keefe, Los Angeles, CA; Edward James Olmos, Los
Angeles, CA; Gregory Peck, Los Angeles, CA; Deanna L. Peterson, Wilder, VT;
Elizabeth Peterson, Minneapolis, MN; Sarah Pillsbury, Los Angeles, CA; Sister Helen
Prejean, Author; David Protess, Professor of Journalism, Chicago, IL; Bonnie Raitt,
Los Angeles, CA; Jeffrey T. Renz, Assistant Professor, School of Law, University of
Montana; Dr. Timonthy Reynolds, M.D., Los Angeles, CA; David W. Rintels, Los
Angeles, CA; Dr. Victoria Riskin, Los Angeles, CA; Phil Alden Robinson, Los Angeles,
CA; Marianne Rogers, Athens, GA; Grant Rosenberg, Los Angeles, CA; Eugenie Ross-
Leming, Los Angeles, CA; Diane Rust-Tierny, American Civil Liberties Union,
Washington, D.C.; Professor Jack L. Sammons, Walter F. George School of Law,
Mercer University, Macon, GA; Ed Saxton, New York, NY; Bruce Shapiro, Associate
Editor, The Nation;Jonathan Simon, Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami,
Miami, FL; Robert Singer, Los Angeles, CA; Stacy Smith, University of Denver College
of Law, Denver, CO; Scott E. Sundby, Professor of Law, Washington and Lee
University, Lexington, VA, David Tarbert, Director, Criminal Justice Clinic, Assistant
Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law, Dallas, TX; Frank
Torrillo, President, Sons of Italy Lodge, Boyton Beach and Lakeworth, FL; Margaret
Vandiver, Assistant Professor of Criminology, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN;
David D. Walter, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University, Macon, GA;
Professor Sidney D. Watson, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University, Ma-
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[sic] rant ordering the execution of Joseph Robert Spaziano, a for-
mer Orlando biker, was scheduled to be executed for a crime he
probably did not commit - the 1973 murder of Laura Harberts, a
young woman found dead in a Seminole County garbage dump.
The electrocution is scheduled to occur at 7:00 a.m. on September
21, 1995.
We are attorneys, professors, writers, artists and lay observers
of the Florida legal system. Some of us support capital punishment
as a legitimate social policy in the war on crime; others of us op-
pose it.
Although of diverse personal, professional and political back-
grounds, we are united in our conviction that the execution of Jo-
seph Robert Spaziano, in the absence of a new trial, would offend
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society.4 7 Several reasons reinforce our conviction that Mr.
Spaziano must receive a new murder trial; any one of these reasons
demands a new trial - the combination makes a new trial a com-
pelling moral necessity. Consider:
* There was absolutely no physical evidence linking Mr. Spaziano
to Ms. Harbert's death. Mr. Spaziano's conviction was based
solely on the testimony of a teenager who did not "remember"
anything about Spaziano or the alleged crime until police re-
moved him from a juvenile detention facility, dropped pending
investigations on breaking and entering charges, and then "re-
freshed" his memory with grossly suggestive hypnosis sessions,
conducted by a self-styled police "ethical hypnotist." This teen-
ager, Anthony DiLisio, is now 37 years old. In 1995, DiLisio and
his lawyer formally joined Mr. Spaziano in asking the governor
for clemency and in asking the courts for a new trial on both the
Harberts homicide conviction and on the previous, unrelated
rape and mutilation of Vanessa Dale Croft, of which Mr. Spazi-
ano was convicted in 1975 - again, based in large part on the
purchased testimony of Anthony DiLisio. Today, DiLisio dis-
[sic]
con, GA; Dennis Weaver, Los Angeles, CA; Richard L. Wiener, Professor, Saint Louis
University; Peter Yarrow, New York, NY; and Maryann Zavez, Professor, South Royal-
ton Legal Clinic, South Royalton, VT (Affiliation is for identification purposes only and
does not imply any institutional endorsement).
47 Obviously, not all of us have read the trial transcript. However, Mr. Spaziano's
attorney has made the transcript and all other files available for our inspection.
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[sic] avows his testimony in both cases, saying he had been "brain-
washed" by the police at the time.
* At his trial, the prosecution withheld evidence that police had
better suspects in the murder.
" The prosecution offered only one piece of circumstantial evi-
dence at trial; the prosecutor knew the evidence was false but
withheld the truth from the defense, judge and jury.
" A post-conviction investigation showed that the jury had serious
doubts that Mr. Spaziano was guilty, but because he was a mem-
ber of the Outlaws motorcycle club - a frightening thought in
the early 1970s - the jurors voted him guilty to keep him off the
streets. In an effort to show mercy, they recommended a life
prison sentence, but the judge overrode their recommendation
and sentenced Joseph Spaziano to death in Florida's electric
chair.
" Less than a decade after Mr. Spaziano's conviction, and shortly
after his conviction became final on direct appeal, the Florida
Supreme Court ruled that testimony gathered with the use of
hypnosis cannot be used as evidence because it is unreliable and
potentially harmful. The court relied on experts who said that
subjects who undergo hypnosis become extremely vulnerable to
suggestion and form hardened beliefs that what they
"remembered" while in the trance, no matter how true or false,
is absolutely accurate.
The ruling, which came during convicted murderer Theodore
"Ted" Bundy's appeals, was not retroactive. So even though the
Florida Supreme Court indirectly discredited the only evidence
used to convict Joseph Spaziano, he has been sitting on death
row for 19 years.
There is a popular misconception that criminals often 'get off
on legal technicalities; Joseph Spaziano is about to be executed by
one. Society, wrapped up in a frenzy of desire to exact revenge on
murderers, doesn't seem to care. Despite massive evidence that he
was wrongly convicted, numerous judges have disregarded his ap-
peals as frivolous. Governor Lawton Chiles has refused to grant
[sic]
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[sic]Joseph Spaziano a clemency hearing. Attorney General But-
terworth has argued - with great success - that courts ought to
use procedural devices to avoid deciding the merits of Mr. Spazi-
ano's claim of innocence. Mr. Spaziano's appeals - an exercise in
futility - are all but exhausted. The only thing between Joseph
Spaziano and the electric chair is the wait. And he's scared.
General Butterworth, your office has relentlessly opposed any
new trial in this case, or even any temporary stay of Mr. Spaziano's
execution. In refusing to join Mr. Spaziano's (and, today, Mr.
DiLisio's) requests for a new trial, you are legally correct. Florida
law does not require retrial in cases involving fresh evidence, such
as Mr. Spaziano's. You are legally correct - but not morally right.
You can, and should, go beyond the minimal requirements of the
law to permit a new trial.
It ought to go without saying that a capital prosecutor's job is
not to effect as many executions as he can - by any means neces-
sary. Such an act would be morally reprehensible; prosecutors
swear to uphold the United States Constitution, which directs them
to seek the truth, not stack the deck.
The police officers and prosecutors in this case had a duty to
accurately record the statements of the witnesses, to fairly investi-
gate the case, and to disclose all exculpatory evidence. Moreover,
they had a duty not to prosecute an innocent man. They failed in
these duties.
Whether Joseph Spaziano ought to be executed - in the ab-
sence of a new trial - is one of those choices that tests a civiliza-
tion's soul. Out of all the static about "defining moments" that
crowds the narrow bandwidth of modern politics and law, here -
finally - is a real defining moment for a real public and a real
governor. What you do in this case will tell what morality, if any,
guides Florida government. The issue is life and death, and the
choice is yours.
Governor Chiles and General Butterworth, this is no longer a
case about the death penalty. It should not be a case about poli-
tics. It is a case about public morality, our government's commit-
ment to human life, and about simple decency. This case tests the
[sic]
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[sic]moral fiber and legal quality of civilization. The evidence is
everywhere that more and more Floridians, even proponents of
capital punishment - especially proponents of capital punishment
- would like to know why Joseph Spaziano is being killed in their
name. We await your answer.
Signed:48 [sic]
48 Journalistic ethics preclude professional journalists from signing this sort of
statement. However, nationally syndicated columnists JamesJ. Kilpatrick and Colman
McCarthy, National publications including: The New Republic and The Nation, and col-
umns or editorials in every major Florida newspaper have publicly opposed the execu-
tion ofJoseph Spaziano. These include The Miami Herald, The Palm Beach Post, The St.
Petersburg Times, The Tampa Tribune, The Lakeland Ledger, and The Gainesville Sun, along
with columnists Tom Fiedler, Carl Hiaason, Tony Proscio, Martin Dyckman and Tom
Blackburn. The Spaziano story has been covered by ABC Nightly News with PeterJen-
nings, The Washington Post, The Economist, The Nation, The New Republic, The Christian
Science Monitor and Fra Noi ("Chicagolands Italian American Voice"), as well as virtu-
ally every Florida newspaper.
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V. ORAL ARGUMENT, FLORIDA SUPREME COURT,
SEPTEMBER 7, 1995'9
I filed a Motion for Out of Time Rehearing on behalf of Mr.
Spaziano on July 4, 1995. On Tuesday, September 5, 1995, at 4:00
p.m., the Florida Supreme Court notified me in Vermont that oral
argument on this motion would be heard two days later on Thurs-
day, September 7, 1995, at 2:00 p.m. I spent the next day, Wednes-
day, traveling from South Royalton to Tallahassee. On Thursday, I
stood before the Florida Supreme Court in what would prove to be
my last oral argument in a Florida death case.
The oral argument on Mr. Spaziano's stay application was
straight out of Through the Looking-Glass.5 ° Black was white, and
white was black. Florida's judicial system was not what it was meant
to be, it was a legal fiction. The atmosphere in the courtroom re-
flected the universe of capital punishment itself; chaotic, irrational,
characterized by random acts of violence and mercy.
ORAL ARGUMENT
Ladies and gentlemen, the Florida Supreme Court. Please be
seated.
Good afternoon. The only case on the docket is Spaziano v.
State.
MELLO: Mr. Chief Justice. May it please the court. My name is
Michael Mello from South Royalton, Vermont, and it is my honor,
my great honor, to be representing Joseph Robert Spaziano in the
proceedings before this court. There are a number of motions
pending before the court and I'm not certain whether there are
specific motions or specific aspects of specific motions that the
court would like me to focus on but it seems to me that a large
amount of paper pending before the court right now essentially
boils down to four basic points. First and foremost, Joseph Robert
Spaziano is innocent of the events for which he was sentenced to
death nineteen and a half years ago and for which he is scheduled
49 The official record of Florida Supreme Court oral arguments is available only
on audiotape from the Florida State University College of Law Library. This
document is a transcription of the September 7, 1995 argument as audiotaped by the
personnel at the Florida State University College of Law Library (original audiotape
on file with the New York City Law Review).
50 LEWIS CARROLL, THE WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL 111-219 (Roger Lancelyn Green
ed., 1965).
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to be executed two weeks from today. That was my position before
this court almost exactly ten years ago when I argued in favor of a
stay of execution on Mr. Spaziano's first death warrant signed by
then Governor Bob Graham. Mr. Spaziano is innocent, factually
innocent, and I want to be very clear about that. All of the other
factual issues in this case, all of the legal issues in this case, every-
thing I have to say of importance about this case boils down, in my
opinion, to that one basic fact. Second, if, I believe that if I had an
opportunity to prove Mr. Spaziano's innocence before a jury, he
would be acquitted. All I am asking for at bottom before this court
right now is a stay of execution and the provision of resources to let
me do my job as a capital defense lawyer. I want an opportunity to
prove it to a jury. The State has been arguing on the basis of the
record until fairly recently and within the past few weeks on the
basis of supersecret information that supposedly reliable witnesses
supposedly told FDLE that supposedly accurately reported it to the
governor that they have yet more evidence of this crime and they
have attempted to link Spaziano to other crimes. Well, if they've
got the evidence, if it's so great, let them present it to ajury. If they
want to convict him, if they want to kill him, let them do it the old
fashioned way. What I'm asking for at bottom is a jury. Give me a
jury. If they want to kill him [inaudible].
THE COURT: As I view this, the question here at this moment is
Mr. Desilio's [sic] alleged recantations of his testimony which ....
Your contention is that this was the sole evidence upon which his
conviction was based. Would not the proper procedure be at this
junction to remand this matter to the trial court to conduct a hear-
ing to determine whether or not Mr. Desilio [sic] perjured himself
and gave false testimony at the original trial and then if the trial
judge so found, the trial judge would then proceed to grant you
that new trial in front of a jury. Now how can we as a court bypass
the judge's hearing on this particular matter and just say you can
have the jury?
MELLO: A couple of points, if I may. First, if the court is willing to
grant a stay and remand the case to the trial court with directions
that I file a 3.850 motion in this case, I will do so. And I will do so
as quickly as possible. The main problem before this court right
now and when we go back to the trial court, if we go back to the
trial court, is I don't have an investigator. I, at this point, and since
this most recent death warrant was signed, VLRC, Volunteer Law-
yers Resource Center, has ceased to exist, and I have been and Mr.
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Spaziano has been totally reliant upon the good graces and ex-
traordinarily extensive work conducted by the investigative report-
ers at the Miami Herald. They've done a wonderful job, and I am
incredibly grateful to them and Joe Spaziano is incredibly grateful
to them, but I would really like to be able to do my own investiga-
tion, not just of Tony DiLisio's recantation. That, I think - Tony
DiLisio's recantation, it seems to me, is a fairly good metaphor of
everything else that's wrong with this case. When I was arguing
THE COURT: Has he recanted under oath?
MELLO: Yes sir, he has. As I understand, that he was under oath
when FDLE interrogated him last June. He was not placed under
oath in the version of the video tape of that interrogation that I
have, which is sort of the other huge lurking problem in this case.
If FDLE had its way, if Governor Chiles had his way, I would not
have that video tape. I would have had to have answered your
question ....
THE COURT: You do not have, nor have you filed with this court,
the matter that he has recanted his testimony under oath, do you?
That is not before the court.
MELLO: Oh, I believe that is before the court. That's before the
court in my motion to reopen the direct appeal to reconsider the
sufficiency of the evidence point and it's before the court ....
THE COURT: [A]nd I'm saying that you don't have an affidavit
from him signed by him.
MELLO: That's correct.
THE COURT: Under oath?
MELLO: That's correct.
THE COURT: Recanting his testimony?
MELLO: That's correct. I do not have that affidavit and I cannot
get that affidavit because he lives in Pensacola, is represented by
counsel; I live in Vermont and Tony DiLisio doesn't like to sign
things. I have the next best thing, it seems to me. What I have is a
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video tape or a portion of a video tape. I am now no longer certain
that the version of the video tape that came into my possession, no
thanks to the government, and that I provide to this court was in
fact the full video tape. But according to the video tape that I have,
Tony DiLisio is very, very clear and very, very emphatic that the
critical, the weight-bearing beam of his testimony at trial was not
true. He said that under oath. He said that to the police, which, it
seems to me, is considerably more reliable than him saying it to me
or signing ....
THE COURT: Did he also say that he would not sign anything to
investigators that had come to him asking him to sign something?
MELLO: So far as I know, no investigator of mine has asked him to
sign something. I understand ....
THE COURT: Who's the investigator called Hummel?
MELLO: That's a CCR investigator. And according to the video
tape, Mike Hummel and another CCR investigator did attempt to
get Mr. DiLisio to sign an affidavit. I've never seen a copy of that
affidavit. I don't know what was in the affidavit. I don't know that
affidavit exists.
THE COURT: Any statement by Mr. DiLisio has under oath said
that he committed perjury at the original trial? Where did he do
that under oath?
MELLO: I don't think I said that he said under oath that he com-
mitted perjury at the original trial. He doesn't use the word per-
jury. What he has done and what he did under oath - assuming
that ....
THE COURT: When was it that he was placed under oath and
gave contradictory testimony?
MELLO: I assume that he was placed under oath when FDLE in-
terrogated him. That fact is not reflected on the version of the
video tape - the bootlegged version of the video tape that I was able
to get on my own, but I understand, although not from first hand
knowledge, that when Florida law enforcement take formal video
taped depositions of witnesses, and especially this witness, that they
would have placed him under oath. His understanding was that he
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was speaking under oath. And when I alluded to his attorney that I
would very much like a signed statement from Tony DiLisio just to
have something very clear nailed down without any of the ques-
tions that had been raised by - about the veracity of the video tape,
whether he was under oath, he was not enthusiastic about that
idea. And the reason she said her client wasn't enthusiastic about
the idea was because he said, "I've already said that under oath. I
said that to the police under oath. I said it in the FDLE video tape
and I said it very clear, very emphatically in the FDLE video tape."
Now when I had that conversion with Kelly McGray, with Tony
DiLisio's lawyer, I hadn't - I didn't have a copy of the video tape.
All I had was Dexter Douglas being quoted in the Miami Herald as
saying, "There is no recantation on this video tape. Tony DiLisio
just says he doesn't remember anything before his twenty-first
birthday." And based on those representations, which I now know
were willful misrepresentations of the truth, I tried to get Tony
DiLisio to sign an affidavit. But once I got a hold of the video tape
and learned that Tony DiLisio was telling the truth about the video
tape - that Kelly McGray, his lawyer, was telling the truth about
what was on the video tape, that the governor's office was not, I
didn't pursue the affidavit rap.
THE COURT: Let me ask you two questions - if you had an investi-
gator, do you think that DiLisio would talk to that investigator?
MELLO: Yes.
THE COURT: On what do you base that?
MELLO: Conversations that I have had with his attorney. Conver-
sations - one conversation that I had directly with him at his attor-
neys' behest, a conversation that I was very squeamish about doing
because I knew that he was represented by counsel, but he very
much wants to tell the truth in this case.
THE COURT: Specifically, how are you being handicapped by not
having an investigator at this point? I know, as a general thing, you
would like for him to do, you know, do what investigators do, but
can you be any more specific than that?
MELLO: I sure can. According to the Miami Herald yesterday, and
the reason I keep referring to newspaper articles here is because
that's my only source of information about the kind of investiga-
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tion that I would like my investigator to be able to do. According
to the Miami Herald yesterday, there is now some serious question
about whether the State even identified the right remains. The
State's theory at trial, and I tagged two or three dozen references
in the trial transcript to this, the ultimate dump being a dumping
ground for girls. This is where the Outlaws dumped girls, and the
State at least raised the very strong inference at trial that the other
identified body was female as was Laura Lynn Harberts's remains.
Well, it now turns out that the State knows now or may well know
now, and might well have known then, that the other body was not
female, that the other body was male, which kind of blows their
whole scenario as fanciful, as it always seemed to me it was, of this
being an Outlaw dumping ground for girls. I would like to get a
forensic anthropologist in to look at those bones. I've got some-
one at Emory University who would love to do it if I can pay his
expenses, which I can't. That's one point. I mean that ....
THE COURT: I will pick up all your ....
THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. I don't want to cut you
off, go ahead....
MELLO: The investigation point is the critical one to me. And I
would - I mean, I could go on for two or three hours about the
investigation I want to do, and this is not fishing expedition stuff;
this is very specific avenues of investigation that Steve Gustaff, my
investigator at VLRC, was working on actively when he got his walk-
ing papers and VLRC shut down.
THE COURT: Okay, let me ask you. Why - kind of a follow-up to
Justice Shaw's question - why didn't you file a 3850 back in January
instead of filing with us a motion to reopen a rehearing that was
closed ten years ago?
MELLO: A couple of reasons, one of which relates to Justice
Shaw's question about resources. I didn't have the resources to put
together ....
THE COURT: But of course you had the volunteer people
then....
MELLO: They were working on the case then along with all their
other cases. No one expected a death warrant to be signed, at least
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no one that I was talking to expected a death warrant to be signed
when it was last May, and certainly no one expected a death war-
rant to be signed ....
THE COURT: How can you say that in the context of this particu-
lar case cause it's been here, I think, eight times, and there was a
proceeding and an extensive opinion written by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals and released last October. The United States
Supreme Court denied cert. on that appeal in January. There was
no other proceeding pending, and given those total circumstances,
you had to accept that this was a primary case in which a death
warrant would be signed.
MELLO: I made the mistake in January, and I have made the mis-
take as recently as a few weeks ago, of believing the information I
was getting from the governor's office. That's why I - that was the
source of the information. The information was wrong; it was a
mistake for me to rely on it; if I would have - the main point here, it
seems to me, is that if I messed up in not filing this as a 3850, in not
filing it in January, please don't take that out on my client.
THE COURT: What was the second reason that you didn't file?
MELLO: The second reason, and this is the reason that I feel a
little more comfortable about than the first reason - the second
reason was precisely because this case had been before this court so
many times in the past, and I didn't want to file a new lawsuit,
because what I was really trying to get the court to do, substantively
in the papers itself, in the pleadings themselves, was to get the
court to take another look at the direct appeal judgment, the suffi-
ciency of the evidence judgment, which was based on Tony
DiLisio's supposed trip to the dump with Joe Spaziano. I mean,
that's not me - that's the prosecutor, that's every prosecutor up
until the most recent ones. And since that was the basis - I mean,
since that's really what the pleading was about, I decided to call a
THE COURT: Let me ask you one other question. You make ref-
erence to conflict with CCR. What's this conflict?
MELLO: The conflict with CCR is as follows: In the FDLE video
tape, Tony DiLisio accuses CCR's investigators, Mike Hummel and
one of his colleagues, of essentially trying to strong-arm him into
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signing an affidavit that he didn't want to sign. My understanding
of the Florida ethics rules and of the Florida statutes on obstruc-
tion of justice and witness tampering is that those allegations, if
true, and I underscore if true, would place CCR's interests in de-
fending itself against those charges in a position directly conflict-
ing with the position taken by the State's only real witness against
their client at trial who has now recanted. CCR would be placed in
the position of having to argue, and I think CCR would be in the
position of having to argue when Tony DiLisio did the video tape
with FDLE, he was telling the truth when he disavowed his testi-
mony about the trip to the dump with Joe, but he really is not
credible when he talked about CCR. And in fact, I understand that
after - soon after FDLE's interrogation of DiLisio, FDLE went back
and talked to CCR and asked them, you know, essentially, what's all
this about? And it seems to me that the only ethical course of ac-
tion that CCR could have done at that point, since CCR at that
time still representedJoe Spaziano, was to show the FDLE the door
and not to answer their questions.
THE COURT: Let me ask you this - on the matter of this particular
case - DiLisio, by the recantation of testimony under oath, the testi-
mony at trial was not the only testimony that he gave under oath.
Am I correct?
MELLO: You are correct.
THE COURT: In other words, he gave testimony under oath in
deposition and assuming he gave testimony under oath before a
grand jury?
MELLO: Yes. Grand jury, I don't know about the deposition I
have. Yes sir.
THE COURT: Now, the other during the course of the case, there
were two witnesses that testified that Spaziano had a relationship
with the victim. Am I correct? Both her roommate and the room-
mate's boyfriend ....
MELLO: Not that Spaziano had a relationship with the victim, but
that Spaziano, I suppose it depends on how one defines relation-
ship, but, supposedly, Spaziano had come to the apartment look-
ing for her. I mean, that was ....
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THE COURT: They both identified him at the trial, did they not?
MELLO: Well, true, but their identifications, and this did come
out at trial, their identifications are pretty shaky. Their identifica-
tions were that they identified Joe Spaziano by looking at him
through translucent doors, and I'm not sure how they ....
THE COURT: [W]hat you're challenging, that particular testi-
mony at this stage, now, in addition, and this was at the time just
before she disappeared. Correct?
MELLO: Correct.
THE COURT: And also at the time, at that particular time, an-
other witness testified that Spaziano took him out to the dump to-
gether with another individual in his pickup truck.
MELLO: Took them out to the dump area to look for his stash -
for his stash of marijuana.
THE COURT: Yeah, well, and Spaziano and the other individual
said, "Stay there." But this was at a time, was it not, at the dump
where the bodies would have been there.
MELLO: Maybe, maybe not. Those witnesses, if memory serves,
and I can double check the record when I sit down, my memory of
the record is that those witnesses were not real clear on the time
frame. But even if those witnesses are right, all that proves is that
Joe Spaziano came to - even if you believe them, and I suggest that
neither of them are believable, but even if you do believe them, all
they show is that Joe Spaziano had gone out to the dump area.
THE COURT: Well, basically, none of these witnesses had any rela-
tion - the witness that went out with Spaziano had no relationship
with the roommate and her boyfriend?
MELLO: Right. Well, I think ....
THE COURT: Each of these witnesses had to be wrong.
MELLO: I think that they did have a relationship. I think all of
the State's witnesses in this case had a relationship, and I think that
relationship is Detective George Abdey who was desperate to nail
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the Outlaws. And I think he is the one who is responsible for what
happened to Tony DiLisio and, to the extent that there are ques-
tions about the credibility of other witnesses, and I believe that
there are substantial questions, that's the common link. That's the
common thread, it seems to me.
THE COURT: It just answered that one question.
THE COURT: The question before you sit down, as is obvious the
proceedings before us have taken a rather free form. This is the
way that you have approached this case with the court, and it is
obviously causing us considerable difficulty with the pleadings that
you filed, the various filings that you filed with the court. But a
court concern that we have is whether or not this issue could have
been or should have been properly raised in a post-conviction re-
lief motion. Now, if it had been presented in that form, and now
I'm talking about the recurring issue in all of your filings focusing
on recanted testimony by the witness DiLisio. Now, if it had been
filed in that form in a post-conviction motion, you would have had
the burden of demonstrating, first of all, that it would have made a
substantial difference in so far as the outcome of the case is con-
cerned of trial. But also, you would have carried a burden of dem-
onstrating some good reason why this couldn't have been
presented before, why it wasn't discovered before or whatever.
Now, and the State, you know, would have had an opportunity to
respond to that. We've got a considerable problem with the free
form here of the way that this is being presented. But can you
demonstrate with what you have filed with the court so far, those
ordinarily two essential ingredients that would entitle you to a
hearing before a trial judge to resolve those two questions that I
put. Have you made sufficient allegations or statements in the
pleadings that you have filed that in any way might permit this
court to treat that as the claim that you are seeking or at least one
of the claims that you are seeking. One, that you have discovered
new evidence that clearly would make a difference in the outcome,
and two, that you couldn't reasonably have discovered that evi-
dence before that time. Could you help us with that, and am I
right, is that the reoccurring basis for your claim here and can and
where in your pleadings, or how have you demonstrated that to the
court at this time?
MELLO: I believe that we have demonstrated in the pleadings and
in FDLE's own video tape that Mr. Spaziano is entitled to a new
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trial. If not entitled to an order of immediate release by vehicle of
reopening this court's direct appeal judgment on ....
THE COURT: What about those two ordinary hoops that you
would have to jump through to entitle you to a hearing before a
trial judge on this? First of all the substantial new evidence, and
secondly, why that hasn't been presented to the court before?
MELLO: I can't imagine new evidence more substantial than a dis-
avowal of the critical testimony by the witness that the trial prosecu-
tor ....
THE COURT: That has not been filed - there are over 1,500 pages
over there that have been filed in this proceeding.
MELLO: The transcripts not there?
THE COURT: Well, no, just motions and things that have been
filed in this proceeding, but you have not filed in this proceeding a
statement by DiLisio that his testimony was false.
MELLO: I believe ....
THE COURT: There is nothing - you do not have any statement,
any affidavit or the transcript of his stating under oath his testi-
mony was false. Isn't that correct?
MELLO: No sir, that's not correct. I do have a transcript of him
stating under oath, and as I understand him to be stating under
oath to the police ....
THE COURT: You have not filed in this record anything that says
"I swear", an oath by DiLisio, correct?
MELLO: No, I don't have him saying under oath because I have,
because FDLE, because the governor's office, because the attorney
general has not given me their version of the video tape. Maybe
it's on their version.
THE COURT: That doesn't mean that you can't go to him and get
an affidavit from him, does it?
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MELLO: I live in Vermont. He lives in Pensacola. He is difficult to
deal with ....
THE COURT: The investigators that have talked to him since at
lease June ....
MELLO: They are Miami Herald investigators who have talked to
him. They are newspaper investigators ....
THE COURT: There are CCR investigators that talked to him.
MELLO: He wouldn't talk to CCR, and I am as curious as you are
as to why that is. He gave an explanation in the video tape why he
wouldn't talk to CCR, and if his explanation is right, it's a pretty
good reason. I don't have an affidavit from him and if I have to
have, in order to get a stay of execution, a signed affidavit from
Tony DiLisio, I do not have that today.
THE COURT: Counsel, you are way over time, but that's because
we asked you a lot of questions. I'm gonna give the state, if they
need it, another five minutes in addition to their 20 minutes, and
I'll give you a couple of minutes for rebuttal.
MELLO: Could I just address, literally in two seconds, your last
point ....
THE COURT: The second prong, if you will.
MELLO: I have not set out in the papers why I was not able - why
my investigators in the past were not able to turn Tony DiLisio
around. I don't have a good explanation for that. My investigator
tracked Tony DiLisio down to Vista, California, in 1985 before the
first death warrant was signed, tried to get him to talk to him, and
he wouldn't. CCR's investigator approached him twice earlier this
year, tried to get him to talk to him, and he wouldn't. Laura Rose
of the Miami Herald tracked him down in Pensacola. First he
slammed the door in her face, second he slammed the door on her
foot, third he let her in to his kitchen; they talked for three hours,
and as they say, the rest is history. I don't know why my investiga-
tors weren't able to do that. I'm not gonna my investigators
aren't good enough investigators ....
THE COURT: Have you set out in any of the pleadings that you
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have filed at this court what you just said, that is that your investiga-
tors or CCR's investigators have attempted to question DiLisio on
this subject, but that prior to this interview by FDLE that he had
refused to cooperate with the investigators? Is that in the
pleadings?
MELLO: I am not sure whether it is in the pleadings in that form.
I will write it up right now and file it. I mean, that's the case, and
to the extent that I can make oral motions, please treat that as one.
I mean, that's what happened, and I will write it up while the state
is arguing.
ROPER: May it please the court, my name is Margene Roper; I am
an assistant attorney general, and I represent the State of Florida in
this proceeding. For the past 20 years, Joseph Robert Spaziano has
had fly-specking review from all the courts. His case was heard by
the highest court in this nation, the United States Supreme Court;
he has been before the circuit court and before this court at least
six times in post-conviction proceedings. Mr. Spaziano recognizes
in the out-of-time motion that has been filed in this case that at this
point in time he is simply out of claims, and that clemency is the
proper proceeding. He indicates in his motion to this court-he
addresses the court mistakenly as the Board, referring to the Board
of Clemency, and he states in the introduction to his out-of-time
motion that he recognizes that the claim he has may not be of the
magnitude to require a court to give him relief, and he urges the
Board to take action. I would submit that the Executive Branch is
the proper form in such a case for Mr. Spaziano to have gained
relief. As much as Mr. Spaziano may portray this as a gateway claim
to some other claim, what he has is a claim under Herrara v. Collins,
which is a free-standing claim of innocence. I would submit to the
court that Mr. Spaziano has taken that claim to the proper forum
and simply because he quarrels with the result, is not an issue that
can revoke the jurisdiction of this court. I would submit to this
court that, historically, clemency proceedings have been private
and that is a sad fact-that it's ignored to the benefit of defend-
ants. I would point out to the court that clemency was the proper
proceeding. Mr. Spaziano is out of claims, but if he does have
something he again wants to take before the courts, he's certainly
in the wrong forum.
THE COURT: What do you say to this rebuttal? A person owns...
facing days away from death, all of a sudden his counsel finding
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out that he's without resources. He has no investigator. He
doesn't have a system . . . volunteer lawyer organization that he
thought he was going to have at this stage. You recognize it gets
rather stressful at this point in the scenario. Everything is being
filed, every avenue is being explored, and here is a person days
from his execution date finding himself in this position. Why
shouldn't he be given a continuance to see whether he can get an
investigator for one thing and, is there some constitutional prob-
lem with that, or you find this... ?
ROPER: First of all, I think it would be a mischaractization to say
that Mr. Mello and his representation of Mr. Spaziano was without
resources. CCR has represented Mr. Spaziano for quite some time.
At this point in time VLRC, it's my understanding, is not defunct.
They will be in existence until September 30th. The warrant runs
out in this case September 26th. They are still making efforts to
get funds, which may happen at this point in time, and there's no
reason he can't use their investigators. CCR has a statutory man-
date to handle these sort of cases. There's absolutely no reason
why CCR can't assist Mr. Mello in his efforts. Mr. Mello, at this
point in time, seems to be the only one who is accusing CCR's in-
vestigator of wrongdoing. It's my understanding ....
THE COURT: There's an allegation of conflict of interests even.
ROPER: From watching the tape, your honor, I recall Mr. DiLisio
concluding at the end of the tape, after he had complained about
the biker appearance of an investigator, I recall him concluding
that since CCR had actually helped him, at the end of that tape I
didn't see Mr. DiLisio filing any charges against CCR and I know of
absolutely no impending charges against CCR. I think they are
characterized as wrongdoings by Mr. Mello in an effort to get sepa-
rate funding by this court when there are resources available to
him.
THE COURT: Even tighter, with the state conceding he's entitled
to counsel at this stage in the proceeding ....
ROPER: I think you have to look at several things, your honor.
First of all, he is represented by counsel at this stage in the pro-
ceeding. Mr. Mello ....
THE COURT: Is he entitled to counsel at this stage?
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ROPER: I would submit at this stage of the proceeding, when Mr.
Spaziano's counsel is recognized, that he has nojusticiable claim to
bring before the courts and has sought clemency as a last resort,
that further funding based on speculation would be inappropriate.
THE COURT: But he's not ....
THE COURT: Go ahead, I'm sorry.
THE COURT: He's claiming that he has an issue that if he can
show to this court that that is a valid issue, that this court should
then send this case back to the trial court to make a determination
as to whether or not in fact the recantation of this particular wit-
ness is in fact valid and truthful and, if so, then that trial judge
should grant a new trial before a new jury. Now, the fact of the
matter is, if he raises that particular issue, how can you say that he
doesn't have a viable issue before this particular court?
ROPER: Because, your honor, I know of no authority to recall a
mandate in a case a decade old. He is simply in the wrong forum
and he should be seeking funds and whatever other expenses he
may need if he can not get them from VLRC and CCR, which is
doubtful, from the appropriate forum, not this court.
THE COURT: What is the appropriate forum? He already says
that he can't get it from CCR because of the conflict there, and he
can't get it from this particular group which is going out of exist-
ence at the end of the month, and as I looked at the new pleading
that I found here, I came out a few moments ago, and apparently
they are telling him, you know, that they can't help him. So what is
he to do at this particular juncture?
ROPER: I think CCR has a statutory mandate to help him and one
would ask what sort of investigation he needs at this point in time.
He certainly doesn't need an expert ....
THE COURT: He needs an investigation apparently and what he
is telling us here today, and somebody going out there to talk to
Mr. Desilio [sic] and see if Mr. Desilio [sic] will sign an affidavit.
He apparently also needs investigators to check out what the gover-
nor's office has in a file which has apparently not been released
publicly and nobody knows what's in that file other than the gover-
nor's office and perhaps the Orlando Sentinel - know what's in that
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particular file. And what he's saying is, "I need the funds to go out
there and to investigate this particular matter to check all of this
out." Now what is this man to do? He said, "I don't have the
money to do this."
ROPER: I would submit that, your honor, at this late date in the
game, on the eve of execution, that investigation should have been
complete at this time. DiLisio either is or is not Mr. Mello's
witness....
THE COURT: On that point that investigation should have been
done at this particular point. The fact of the matter is that the
investigation apparently has not been done. Apparently there is an
allegation out there, and a very strong one, that the prime witness
against the defendant in this particular case has now recanted his
testimony and has said that "I did not tell the truth at the original
trial." As a matter of fact, on the video tape that everyone is talking
about which is part of his particular record, he does say that the
first time I ever went to that dump where the bodies were found
was when the police took me there. So we now have this particular
information, and remember what the U.S. Supreme Court said,
death is different, and it's up to us to decide in this particular court
whether or not we say we're sorry Mr. Spaziano, you cannot get any
relief from us despite the fact that there appears to be evidence out
there that you may be entitled to a new trial, but we can't do any of
that for you because counsel didn't file the proper 3.850 motion or
counsel doesn't have money to investigate this matter any further
and there are no other resources for him to go to. What do we do
as a court? Do we sit back and say, okay, you know, counsel, you
didn't do the job you should have done. You didn't file the right
pleading. You don't have the money. You should have gotten the
money way back when, so it's tough, Mr. Spaziano, we're gonna
electrocute you because all these things should have been done
before. Now is that the state's position?
ROPER: No, that is not the state's position.
THE COURT: What is the state's position?
ROPER: The state's position is that Mr. Spaziano's counsel is in
the wrong forum. He should be making these requests in the right
forum. It's debatable ....
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THE COURT: Are you saying what forum is clemency? When the
fact of the matter is the governor is already investigating this. The
governor has a report that the governor refuses to release to any-
body, and therefore the governor signs and makes a death warrant.
What he's saying is, give me a little time, you know, I need, I've got
the evidence here. I need people to go out and investigate this
proof.
ROPER: I am saying that he is, number one, before the wrong
court quarreling about the result of the proceeding he himself
prompted.
THE COURT: Well, what court should he be in?
ROPER: He should be in the circuit court.
THE COURT: I'll grant you that he ought to file a 3.850 in the
circuit court. But are we to tell the defendant in this case, Mr.
Spaziano, you know, your attorney should have filed a 3.850, and
even though we're aware of this information, that, if true, would
entitle you to a new trial, we're just going to ignore all that and
we're gonna let your execution proceed because your attorney
didn't file the right motion?
ROPER: No, I wouldn't characterize the situation as that at all,
your honor. I would say that Mr. Mello and Spaziano are seeking a
stay of execution and are seeking funding from this court to fur-
ther pursue litigation in another court that they should come
before this court with something beyond mere speculation, some-
thing that would satisfy the Jones criteria, something more with a
witness who has demonstrated ....
THE COURT: Does that mean speculation? Do you accept the
fact that this is the state's position that this DiLisio, in fact, has said
that his testimony that he gave at the time of trial was not true? Do
you accept that fact?
ROPER: No, I do not accept that fact.
THE COURT: You don't accept that fact at all?
ROPER: Not from the video tape that Mr .....
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THE COURT: I didn't ask from the video tape. The state would
accept that fact - whatever ....
ROPER: No.
THE COURT: You don't accept the fact that he has recanted his
testimony?
ROPER: No, your honor, I don't. And the reason I would say to
the court that that is not the case here as if you view the video tape,
what Mr. DiLisio says is that he went to the dump with police. Well,
that was known at the time of trial that he went to the dump with
police. He was specifically asked under oath in a deposition that
the police took him there. Well, of course we know he went in a
police car and that's what we believe ....
THE COURT: He says on that video tape I watched yesterday, he
says specifically that the first time he ever went to that dump was
with the police.
ROPER: He says specifically, your honor, that he has no recall of
going there with Mr. Spaziano. That does not mean that he never
went there with Mr. Spaziano. He does not recant his deposition
testimony where he answered the question of whether the police
took him there with the response that I show them landmarks.
There is no recantation of that whatsoever. What we have here is a
witness who, when asked what the police said to him, said, I don't
know what they said to me. He did not know what he said after he
spoke to the police. He did not know what he said at trial. The
investigators on the FDLE tape asked him, would you say that the
police fed you details, and he said, well, I couldn't say that they fed
me details, but what I said had to come from someplace. You basi-
cally have a man who, pursuant to Mr. Mello's proffered evidence,
which would include newspaper clippings, had no memory of the
time of the Miami Herald investigation, has, according to the Miami
Herald articles and fighting battles with alcohol and has no memory
of his life under the age of 21 at all other than getting married, you
still have the same witness who has no memory. I would submit to
the court that it takes more than speculation after 20 years of litiga-
tion and fly-specking review by court upon court to stay an execu-
tion and give funds for further investigation on the basis of such
speculation.
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THE COURT: Let me go back to the wrong forum position that
you put forth. Is the state conceding that if - that there is anything
that has been filed in this court, that it had been filed in the circuit
court would be a basis upon which relief could be granted in the
circuit court?
ROPER: No, your honor, the state is not conceding that at all and
that would be an issue for the circuit court. I am saying if more
funding is being requested then in the wrong forum in the first
place, then something more has to be demonstrated than the fact
that this man has no memory some 20 years later. As far as filing a
3.850, it isn't necessary for this court to remand because Mr. Spazi-
ano and Mr. Mello don't need the permission of this court in the
first place to file a 3.850, and the fact that they aren't filing a 3.850
is evidence that they have the kind of evidence that is not of a mag-
nitude to prompt court action. It's the kind of evidence that is tak-
ing to clemency and, in this case, has been taken now
unsuccessfully. Now nothing is preventing them from bringing
such a claim to the circuit court, but since they have not done so at
this point in time and considering the type of evidence proffered
to this court, I would submit that a stay is wholly inappropriate and
further funding at this point is wholly inappropriate, and that
would be an issue for another court. It would be wholly inappro-
priate to fund on the basis that one of the bodies found at the
dump is now discovered to be a male corpse rather than a female.
That's a totally collateral issue whether the Outlaws generically
dumped all sorts of bodies there. The fact remains that at trial
Laura Harberts was identified by dental records, and as Justice
Overton pointed out, there is other evidence. Spaziano was identi-
fied as a travelling cook looking for the victim by her roommate
and her roommate's boyfriend. He was identified as that person.
He was also identified as similar to the man appearing in the trans-
lucent window that night. There are also many details linking
Spaziano there. There's a testimony of Mike Coppick and Mike El-
lis linking him specifically to the dump, and I don't think the court
should also ignore the fact that a federal district court has found
this hypnosis session not to be suggestive in the least. We have
quite a bit of evidence here, and I would submit that on what coun-
sel has shown today, this court should not grant a stay of execution
and certainly shouldn't grant funding when VLRC is still in opera-
tion and CCR has a statutory mandate to assist in such situations.
Does the court have any further questions?
[Vol. 1:259308
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THE COURT: Mr. Mello, let me ask you a follow-up question. The
precise motion upon which you are here today in asking this court
to stay this execution is a motion for rehearing of the 1985 3.850
motion.
MELLO: Two motions form the underlying - the application for
stay of execution is based on the motion to reopen the first 3.850
appeal, also ....
THE COURT: Was that the first - I want to know precisely what
you're asking, what you're saying this court has a basis to reopen.
Is it that first 850, is it the 1985 850, or what basis are you traveling
on?
MELLO: The first one - 1985 was the first 850. It was filed in 1985
and under warrant and decided adversely to Mr. Spaziano by this
court in 1986. Also, I am asking for a stay of execution on the basis
of our motion to reopen the direct appeal judgment in this case,
specifically the sufficiency of the evidence determination in the di-
rect appeal determination in this case. If ....
THE COURT: So that would be the first direct appeal?
MELLO: Yes sir. Where the court said for the first time the evi-
dence in this case at trial is legally sufficient because of the trip to
the dump. Because of the trip to the dump with Mr. Spaziano and
because Mr. Spaziano supposedly led Mr. DiLisio to the dump.
Now, the second aspect of that, I respectfully suggest, was simply a
misreading of the record. But the trip to the dump is - the trip to
the dump with Mr. Spaziano was the heart of the state's case, and
as we have been saying all along - this is notjust me talking - that is
the trial prosecutor who knew his case better than Ms. Roper ever
will. "If we can't get in the testimony of Tony DiLisio, we absolutely
have no case here whatsoever. So either we're going to have it
through Tony or we're not going to have it at all." "He's the most
important witness in this case, and I would submit to you that if you
1996] 309
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don't believe Tony DiLisio, then find the defendant guilty in five
minutes. Not guilty, excuse me. Finally, as to the trip to the dump,
prosecutor on the Gardner remand, and that's what makes his tes-
timony more than just idle gossip. The trip to the dump. Accord-
ing to the prosecutor, what makes Tony DiLisio's testimony more
than idle gossip, in the words of the prosecutor, is the trip to the
dump. Take out the trip to the dump and all you're left with is
Tony DiLisio talking about idle Outlaw Bragadosio. Bragadosio
that not even Tony DiLisio believed and that Judge McGregor at
the original trial held inadmissible as a matter of law when Tony
DiLisio's father tried to testify about it. Finally, one final quote:
from the prosecutor on Gardner remand, "He took Mr. DiLisio to
the Automount dump to view the bodies and confirm his alarming
statements. At the dump site Mr. DiLisio saw the bodies of two
women. Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Mello, the matter of your representation, and I
think that, first of all, this has been a CCR case all the way along,
hasn't it?
MELLO: This was not a CCR case. This has been a CCR case from
January 17 until August. It was a CCR case when I was at CCR....
THE COURT: Was it a CCR case when you were at CCR?
MELLO: In 1985 and 1986.
THE COURT: Isn't CCR counsel of record in the proceedings
before the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in which they rendered a
decision in October?
MELLO: No.
THE COURT: That's what it shows.
MELLO: It's a little complicated. I was appointed sole counsel to
represent Mr. Spaziano in the 11th Circuit. I wrote the brief. I was
not able to do the oral argument for health reasons. I prevailed
upon Gail Anderson at CCR to do the oral argument. She did the
oral argument. By the time Judge Carnes's opinion on the 11th
Circuit was issued ....
[Vol. 1:259310
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THE COURT: But this has been - this was a CCR case originally - I
mean, right - you were counsel for CCR in this case ....
MELLO: In 1985 and 1986.
THE COURT: In this case in 1985 and 1986?
MELLO: Yes.
THE COURT: And it was CCR's investigator that was still trying to
get DiLisio to change his testimony in the spring of this year?
MELLO: As recently as two weeks before the May war ....
THE COURT: So basically, your representation is as a volunteer in
this particular cause?
MELLO: That's correct. Well, it is as a volunteer because, and I
want to be very clear about this to the court, because Mr. Spaziano
has no other attorney. CCR cannot represent him because they
have a conflict of interest. In my judgment, and more importantly,
in Mr. Spaziano's ....
THE COURT: There has been no determination by this or any
other court that there is a conflict of interest that requires an ap-
pointment of additional counsel in this case, is it?
MELLO: There has never been a determination because my un-
derstanding of the practice in that regard in the past is that those
things happen pretty informally. CCR informs me that when a con-
flict arises CCR contacts VLRC and VLRC tries to find a volunteer
attorney to come in and do the case. And that essentially is what
happened here.
THE COURT: Conflict cases are those ordinarily that end up with
the matter of other - where there is another defendant involving
the same incident.
MELLO: That is absolutely correct, but my understanding of Flor-
ida's Ethics Code is that that is not the only way that a conflict of
interest can come about. CCR has a directly adverse - an interest in
this case directly adverse to the interest of the witness who is trying
19961
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his best to correct a mistake, a hideous mistake, that he made at
this point.
THE COURT: How is CCR's position in conflict?
MELLO: CCR, in the course of defending itself, and as I under-
stand, in the course of CCR's defending itself to FDLE when FDLE
came in and interrogated CCR's investigators about what hap-
pened, CCR said what you would expect CCR to say. We didn't
intimidate him. We didn't do what he describes. And so CCR is in
the position of having to ....
THE COURT: That would be the basis of your representation ....
MELLO: Keeps the credibility ....
THE COURT: So CCR ....
MELLO: That is part of the basis of my representation.
THE COURT: What you said in the brief was that it was because
Spaziano's family wanted you to represent him rather than CCR.
MELLO: That was the other part. That was - when I took the case
back over in June, the conflict of interest existed, but I didn't know
about it because up until, at that point, the state had been success-
ful in keeping the video tape out of my hands. I didn't know about
it then. I undertook the representation over again at the request
of Mr. Spaziano, at the request of his mother and his daughter and
his niece for personal reasons. And if my doing that is at all a basis
for this court's denying a stay or in - if my trying to help out Joe
Spaziano is gonna make it more likely that he be executed, I can-
not tell you how sorry I am that I ever got back involved in this
case.
THE COURT: Are you asserting that CCR said we have a conflict,
we want you to represent him?
MELLO: No, CCR never said that. I have not had that conversa-
tion with CCR.
THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you very much.
[Vol. 1:259312
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MELLO: May I? ...
THE COURT: No sir. We really went over time. The governor's
office - whether you've got a copy of this or not - the governor's
office filed a request for leave to appear before the court on spe-
cific issues relating to congressional funding of the Volunteer Law-
yers Resource Center of Florida. Mr. Slackman, do you intend to
appear? Do you wish to appear?
SLACKMAN: [inaudible].
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VI. SPAZZANO V. STATE, SEPTEMBER 8, 199551
On September 8, 1995, the defendant, Joseph Robert Spazi-
ano, whose sentence for first-degree murder had already been af-
firmed,52 and whose death warrant was signed for the fifth time,
had a final opportunity to have his appeal heard in the Florida
Supreme Court. After Mr. Spaziano filed multiple motions to open
by rehearing an appeal that was finalized more than thirteen years
earlier and a post-conviction proceeding that was terminated more
than nine years earlier on the basis of recanted testimony, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court granted his motion.53
These motions fell into five distinct categories: (1) Two mo-
tions for rehearing; (2) four motions to supplement the record;
(3) two motions addressing actions by the office of the attorney
general; (4) two motions relating to my representation of Mr.
Spaziano; and (5) one catch-all motion concerning Mr. Spaziano's
rights.
The motions for rehearing, those in the first category, were
considered the principle motions by the court. They were: (1) An
out-of-time motion for rehearing of a previous Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion, which was denied by the Elev-
enth Circuit in 1985 and affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court in
1986; and (2) an out-of-time motion for rehearing of the direct
appeal and judgment on the sufficiency of the evidence.5
4 In order
to insure that these first two motions had enough momentum, I
filed four additional motions to supplement the record. These in-
cluded: (1) A motion to supplement the record to include a video-
tape; (2) a motion to supplement the record to include recent
media coverage of the case; (3) a motion to supplement the record
with media coverage of the FDLE investigation; and (4) a motion
to supplement the record with an unofficial transcript of the
FDLE's interrogation of Anthony DiLisio.55 I also filed an affidavit
by DiLisio that stated:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that I, Anthony Frank
DiLisio, of ... Pensacola, Florida 32534, do make, publish and
declare freely, under penalty of perjury, this statement that I
never under any circumstances went to the dump sight [sic]
51 Spaziano v. State, 660 So. 2d 1363 (Fla.) (per curiam), modified, (1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 722 (1996).
52 Spaziano v. State, 393 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1981), appeal after remand, 433 So. 2d 508
(1983), cert. granted, 464 U.S. 1038, affd, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
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with Joseph Spaziano. I went there in the company of law en-
forcement investigators and only in the company of law enforce-
ment investigators.56
This statement by DiLisio was, of course, significantly different
than his statement made at trial where he testified that Mr. Spazi-
ano had taken him by special route to the dump site and shown
him the bodies of two females.5 7
I took the hit and conceded that the motions filed were not
authorized in Florida's present legal system.
As a motion [for] rehearing of an opinion by [the] court
rendered in 1986, this motion [was] obviously untimely.
Treated as a new claim for postconviction relief, this action
[was] barred by the one year time limit on Rule 3.851 motions.
There [were] claim and issue preclusion barriers, because all of
the legal issues raised in this motion [had] been raised by Mr.
Spaziano in the past; there [had] been no intervening change in
the law; there [had] been new facts recently discovered, but they
may not [have been] of the magnitude necessary , under [the]
court's [precedents], to secure review. Finally, retroactivity prin-
ciples bar[red the] court from treating several aspects raised by
Mr. Spaziano as issues cognizable at [the] time.5 8
Slowly but surely, the court got around to discussing the meth-
ods for considering newly discovered evidence and recanted testi-
mony. The test for newly discovered evidence had been recently
broadened to allow evidence that would "probably" affect the ver-
dict, rather than "conclusively" affect it. The standards for re-
canted testimony had been broadened as well. 59 Even so, the court
held the motions were "clearly not authorized."6 After all
Spaziano ha[d] been before [the Florida Supreme Court] on
seven prior occasions; he ha[d] been before the United States
District Court and before the United States Court of Appeals,
which wrote an extensive opinion examining the twenty-three
issues raised before the United States District Court. The
United States Supreme Court ha[d] considered his case on the
merits and ha [d] denied petitions for writs of certiorari on three
occasions.
6 1
Nevertheless, as if the court were doing Mr. Spaziano a favor
despite his inept counsel, it remanded the "successive Rules of
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 1365.
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Criminal Procedure 3.850-3.851 motion" to the Circuit Court of
the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit for review stating, "consistent with
our constitutional responsibility to refrain from dismissing a cause
solely because an improper remedy has been sought, we have con-
sidered the contents of these motions . . . to determine whether
they have any basis for relief under our jurisdiction."62
Some favor. The Florida Supreme Court scheduled the evi-
dentiary hearing on the narrow issue of DiLisio's recanted testi-
mony for no later than September 15, 1995, one week later! And in
one more bout of insanity, the court refused to stay the
execution.6
To finish him off, the court then predictably proceeded to
deny Mr. Spaziano's remaining motions. The motion to supple-
ment the record with news articles was "clearly unauthorized and
improper."64 The motions to disqualify the office of Attorney Gen-
eral Butterworth and to compel discovery from his office were de-
nied.65 The catch-all motion to compel release of the FDLE
investigation report, to enter a stay of execution, or to alter the
court's reading of the public records law was also denied.66
On the matter of my representation of Mr. Spaziano, the court
held "CCR has the primary responsibility for... representation."6 7
My motions were "not proper under the particular circumstances
of this case."68 The court found "that Mello may continue the rep-
resentation with assistance from CCR and, if possible, with the
assistance of any resources available from the Volunteer Lawyer's
Resource Center."
6 9
Thank goodness three Justices had their heads on straight that
day. Justice Kogan, writing for himself and two of his colleagues,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated:
I agree with virtually all that is said in the majority opinion
except that portion imposing an unrealistic time frame for
resolving what we all have now agreed is a cognizable claim for
postconviction relief. Such a restriction is without precedent in
our case law and tends to create an atmosphere of panic for
resolution of an issue that requires calm and deliberate resolu-
62 Id. at 1365-66.
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tion. Indeed, this is an issue demanding the most careful of at-
tention because its end result could be the state-sponsored
taking of a man's life when his guilt now has been called into
question.
70
Today we are presented with a grossly disturbing scenario:
a man facing imminent execution (a) even though his jury's
vote for life imprisonment would be legally binding today, (b)
with his conviction resting almost entirely on testimony tainted
by a hypnotic procedure this Court has condemned, (c) with the
source of that tainted testimony now swearing on penalty of per-
jury that his testimony was false, and (d) without careful consid-
eration of this newly discovered evidence under the only legal
method available, Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 or 3.851. 7'
[W] e are talking about a man's life here. And in that sense,
we are also talking about the moral underpinnings of the death
penalty itself: an abiding faithfulness to heightened procedural
safeguards, an absolute requirement of the certainty of guilt,
and an overriding commitment to the proposition that society
should never descend into lawlessness in an effort to eliminate
the lawless. Ends do not justify means. Quite to the contrary,
the means chosen almost always color and shape the ends
achieved.72
All that can be said with finality about this case today is that
it remains mired in serious doubt. Because of the irrevocable
nature of the death penalty, I am utterly unwilling to dismiss
those doubts without adequate inquiry into their source. The
present record presents at least a prima facie showing that the
State's chief witness has recanted, and I thus agree that the trial
court must review the claim presented here pursuant to Rule
3.850 or 3.851. 73
Because of the seriousness of the claim, I further believe
this Court should enter an indefinite stay of execution to permit
the parties to develop their cases without facing the pressures of
an active death warrant, if the Governor does not stay or with-
draw his warrant in light of our opinion today.74
Finally, as the majority indicates, the Office of Capital Col-





71 Id. (citations omitted).
72 Id. at 1367-68 (emphasis in original).
73 Id. at 1368.
74 Id.
75 Id.
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VII. TENDERED BUT UNFILED MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
RECONSIDERATION AND STAY OF EXECUTION,
SEPTEMBER 8, 199576
After completing the oral argument on Thursday afternoon, I
76 This document is a reproduction of a facsimile sent to the Florida Supreme
Court. It appears in its original form. It has not been altered by anyone, in any way,
as indicated by the use of [sic] (original on file with the New York City Law Review). A
transcription of the facsimile appears below.
On Tuesday [9/5] at 4:30 pm, this court notified counsel in Vermont that it had
scheduled oral argument for 2:00 p.m. on Thursday (9/7). (9/6) After spending all
of Wednesday en route [from VT to Fla] the court granted counsel 30 minutes for
oral argument. At 5:00 pm, a few hours before the court knew counsel was scheduled
to [leave for] Vermont [on 7/8] to teach, the court issued an order - denying a stay,
remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing, & "permitting" counsel to remain as
pro bono counsel with the "assistance" of CCR, a law firm with a conflict of interest in
this case. [*] The "hearing" would be in the home of the Orl. Sent.
The court should be aware that counsel shall not follow the court's unreasonable
commands - not when those commands deny the reality of CCR's conflict & VLRC's
sudden death. The state offends the federal constitution when it commands counsel
to render the ineffective assistance of counsel. US v. Cronic, ____US_ (1984).
If this court intends to kill this innocent man by depriving him of the effective
assistance of counsel, then it will do so without my complicity. I will not participate in
a sham evidentiary "hearing" under warrant when I lack the time & resources to do
the job effectively. As the amicus brief sets out, VLRC is dead. As counsel has told the
court, I lack the funds to do a meaningful evidentiary hearing under warrant - that
is part of the reason I filed in this court. If the court wants to decide whether the CCR
has a conflict & whether CCR can be forced upon Mr. Spaziano, this court, then the
court should ask that the matter be fully briefed & argued - I should not be limited
to a tiny fraction of a 30 minute argument. I teach legal ethics, & I have no doubt
that CCR does have a conflict. More importantly, so does Mr. Spaziano.
The state that gave the world such famous right - to - counsel opinions as Gideon
v. Wainwright & Argersinger v. Hamlin perhaps ought not to treat counsel claims with
contempt that borders on the cavaleir. In any event, Cronic forbid court - imposed
ineffective assistance of counsel.
CCR has none of the 25 bankers' boxes of files in this case. Nor will CCR ever
have those files, as CCR will never have the cooperation or acquiescence of Mr.
Spaziano.
If it wishes to base its ruling on reality, the court must know that counsel has
rejected - & will continue to reject, until the last dog dies - the court's directive
that he do the impossible. Nor will I accept as "co-counsel" a law firm with interests
adverse to my client's - a law firm my client has rejected for very good reasons.
Specifically, the court should know that (1) I will participate in no evidentiary
hearing under warrant; (2) Neither Mr. Spaziano nor I will accept CCR as co-counsel
in this case, since CCR refused to serve as co-counsel when I asked them to do so in
June; (3) counsel lacks the funds to return to Florida for purposes of any further
court proceedings, as counsel's few remaining personal funds were spent to attend
this court's 30 minute oral argument.
in Ther, ezun.d will No valid procedural bar constitutes an adequate &
independent ground precluding federal judicial review. First, Florida's default rules
are discretionary & haphazardly applied. Second, the governor's abdication of his
clemency function (see Herald interview with Chiles) trumps the state's interest in
318
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took the opportunity on Friday, September 8, 1995 to drive out to
the Florida State Prison, in Starke, to visit Mr. Spaziano. Have you
ever been to Starke? It is a grim place. It has the feel of a medieval
fortress. It was then that I received the Florida Supreme Court's
response to my argument, its opinion synopsized above. I drove
back from the prison that night in a rainstorm, disgusted. It was at
that time that I felt the need to respond to the court's decision.
The motion below was written on that road trip from Starke to Tal-
lahassee, then faxed to the Florida Supreme Court, Office of the
Clerk, from my hotel room at 11:10 p.m. that evening.
procedural rectitude. We now know that the fundamental assumption of Herera v.
Collins - that clemency in Texas functions as a failsafe safety valve against execution
of a truly innocent person - does not apply in Florida under this governor. Chiles
clearly thinks it's the courts job, not his job, to prevent state killing of innocents.
The Attorney General claimed, in Thursday's oral argument before this court,
that Mr. Spaziano has "run out of legal claims." In its opinion, this court essentially
agreed.
All I have is an innocent client. If I had the resources, I could prove it - without
having to rely on the Miami Herald to do my investigation for me. I have a videotaped
police interrogation of the state's only real witness at trial - & on that videotape that
witness disavowed the testimony the trial prosecutor said was the indispensable
element of his case.
If General Butterworth is correct that an innocent man in these circumstances
has "run out of legal issues, " than there is something very wrong with the law.
Should this court choose to hold me in civil contempt, I will waive extradition; I
learned a good bit about civil contempt from my representation of Dr. Elizabeth
Morgan. Should this court disbar me, I will plead guilty. Do you really think you can
do anything to me comparable to what you have done to my client? What you are
about to do to him? is cmething vr " ;-rzg with thc law.
In short, undersigned counsel - an experienced Florida capital appellate
littigator & an ethics teacher familiar with Florida's professional responsibility
commands - will not accept this court's invitation to be ineffective. If you are going
to kill an innocent man without a lawyer, you will do so in such a way that the whole
world will see what you are doing. If you act as executioner of this innocent man, I
will not be your mask.
[Signed] Michael Mello
Service by US mail to Robert Butterworth, Fi Sat Sept 8 9, 1995
[*CCR's conflict arises from three independently sufficient sources: (1) the
DiLisio allegations against CCR, made in a videotaped interrogation by police, which
are at present under investigation by the Leon County State Attorney's Office; (2)
CCR's present overload of cases, of which CCR has been detailed in pleadings in others
matters before this court; (3) CCR's failure to investigate prior to, & during, the last
death warrant, matters that counsel could detail to the court if the court compels him
to do so.]
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LES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE
VIII. MEMORANDUM, SEPTEMBER 10, 199511
[sic]MEMORANDUM
DATE: September 10, 1995
TO: Folks....
FROM: Michael Mello
RE: Snatching Defeat From The Jaws Of Victory
(or How We Won In The Worst Possible Way)
Ugh. This is a hard memo to write, but I'm going to try to
explain how we really lost in court on Friday.
First, the evidentiary hearing was ordered to address the ques-
tion of Anthony DiLisio's recantation. That means the only ques-
tion before the court will be this: Was Tony DiLisio lying when he
testified at Joe's trial 20 years ago, as he now says he was, or is he
lying now about lying 20 years ago? Tony will be called to the
stand, and will testify quite powerfully that he was lying atJoe's trial
and is telling the truth now.
Here comes the hard part. Dexter Douglass has already indi-
cated to the media that the state intends to call some of its super-
secret witnesses, and we can assume they will be used to try to dis-
credit Tony's recantation. They will, in essence, testify that Tony
was telling the truth atJoe's trial, and is lying now. We would then
have an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses and attempt
to discredit their testimony - except that we don't know who those
witnesses are!
Further, even if we were given the identities of those witnesses
first thing Monday morning - an event which is extremely unlikely,
given the pattern of state misconduct in this case -96 hours is not
enough time for us to investigate those witnesses, their back-
grounds, their relationship to Tony, and the validity of their testi-
mony. In short, 96 hours is simply insufficient time to prepare any
meaningful cross-examination of critical witnesses.
Our inability to prepare for this sham "hearing" will be
[sic]
77 This memorandum appears in its original form. It has not been altered in any
way, as indicated by the use of [sic] (copy on file with the New York City Law Review).
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[sic]the surest thing to kill Joe. If we try - if we rush around
blindly, trying to find out what we can, however we can, and wind
up doing a lousy investigation of anonymous witnesses - we go
into court ill-prepared, at best, and we will be unable to discredit
the state's witnesses. And if we are unable to discredit those wit-
nesses, the judge will make a factual determination that Tony is
lying now, and was telling the truth 20 years ago atJoe's trial. That
ruling will be presumptively correct - which means it is completely
unreviewable by any other court, even the Supreme Court of the
US. In short, if we rush this and blow it, Joe is dead. Since there is
absolutely no way in which we can be prepared for a hearing in 96
hours, and given the grave consequences of a slip-shod attempt, we
must prevent the hearing from happening on Friday. On this basis
I have filed a motion to stay the execution and hold the evidentiary
"hearing" in abeyance. We need more time.
In addition, I am an appellate attorney, not a trial lawyer.
Since I learned of the court's opinion, I have been trying to find a
trial attorney willing and competent to represent Joe at the "hear-
ing" ordered by this court. As of this writing, no experienced, com-
petent attorney is willing to do so under the unreasonable time
constraints established by the court. I will keep looking for
one. [sic]
[Vol. 1:259
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IX. SPAZIANO V. STAT, MODIFIED OPINION, SEPTEMBER 12, 199578
On September 12, four days after issuing its September 8 opin-
ion directing the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing by Sep-
tember 15, and CCR to retain primary responsibility for
representation, the Florida Supreme Court modified its opinion to
respond to several motions, most especially my Motion for Rehear-
ing and Reconsideration and Stay of Execution. Justices Shaw and
Armstead opined:
In our September 8, 1995, opinion, we specifically stated
that CCR has primary responsibility for Spaziano's postconvic-
tion relief proceedings. Furthermore, we declined to appoint
Mello, nunc pro tunc, as Spaziano's counsel. In rendering that
decision, this Court unanimously rejected Mello's assertions that
a conflict existed in CCR's representation of Spaziano. Addi-
tionally, when we issued that opinion, we envisioned a spirit of
cooperation between CCR and Mello that would guarantee the
best representation for Spaziano. Unfortunately, the events of
this past weekend make it clear that such cooperation does not
exist. Indeed, Mello has not accepted our findings or
conclusions.
79
The fair administration ofjustice in Florida cannot proceed
with such flagrant disregard of this Court's procedures and di-
rections. In view of Mello's actions, including his refusal to
abide by this Court's directions, his statement that he is not
competent to handle an evidentiary hearing at the trial level,
and his express refusal to appear at the evidentiary hearing or-
dered by this Court, we find that he has effectively withdrawn
from representing Spaziano.
80
Spaziano is an indigent inmate. Spaziano has previously re-
quested that this Court address the issue of investigation costs
and legal fees for his postconviction relief proceedings. We at-
tempted to provide for both Spaziano's wishes and rights in our
September 8, 1995, opinion. CCR and Mello were to work to-
gether to ensure adequate counsel and resources. That solution
was intended to satisfy both Spaziano's wishes and his need for
effective counsel. This past weekend's events have made it clear
that a choice must now be made. Under the present circum-
stances, we direct that CCR shall act as Spaziano's counsel with-
out Mello's assistance or interference.81
78 Spaziano v. State, 660 So. 2d 1363 (Fla.) (per curiam), modified, (1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 722 (1996).
79 Id. at 1368-69.
80 Id. at 1369.
81 Id. at 1370.
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Spaziano is faced with a choice. He may be represented at
the evidentiary hearing by CCR or by competent volunteer
counsel who will comply with rules and directions of this Court
at no expense to the State, or he may choose to have no counsel
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X. TENDERED BUT UNFILED PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA,
OCTOBER 10, 199583
I filed this petition along with a motion to exceed the Court's
page limit for such filings84 in the United States Supreme Court on
October 10, 1995. In its original form, this document raised three
questions presented and was one hundred and ten pages long,
forty-five pages longer than the limit. Unfortunately, the Court
could not be bothered to read these extra forty-five pages about
Mr. Spaziano's innocence, and denied the motion. To remedy this









THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
Mr. Spaziano prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review final
judgement of the Supreme Court of Florida filed on September 8,
1995.
CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW
The Florida Supreme Court rendered its judgement in this
[sic]
83 The relevant portions of the text of this Petition and notes 85-110 appear in
their original form. They have not been altered in any way, as indicated by the use of
[sic] (copy on file with the New York City Law Review).
84 SUP. CT. R. 33.3.a., supra note 5.
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[sic]case on September 8, 1995. The court's opinion, not yet pub-
lished, is attached, as Appendix A.
JURISDICTION
The judgement and opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida
was filed on September 8, 1995. No rehearing was permitted by
the court. The Court's opinion said: "NO MOTION FOR RE-
HEARING WILL BE ALLOWED." Spaziano v. State, Appendix A,
So. 2d __, slip op. at 7 (Fla. Sup. Ct. Sept. 8, 1995) (capitalization
in original). Mr. Spaziano's counsel did file a rehearing motion,
which the Court appeared to consider, See Appendix C; because pro
bono counsel was on the road (in Tallahassee, for the oral argu-
ment scheduled on short notice by the Florida Supreme Court),
covering all his own out-of-pocket travel and litigation expenses
and without secretarial or other support, he was forced to file the
rehearing in handwritten form. This rehearing was withdrawn on
September 10. See Appendix D. On September 12, 1995, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court issued a second judgment, modifying its Sep-
tember 8 opinion in ways not germane to the questions presented
in this petition. See Appendix E. The court's mandate issued on
September 12. See Appendix F.
Jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254 (1993), Mr. Spaziano having asserted below and asserting
herein deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution of the
United States.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED
This case involves the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution, which provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which dis-
trict shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
This case also involves the eighth amendment to the United
States Constitution, which provides:
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
[sic]
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[sic] This case also involves Section 1 of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, which provides in part;
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; mpr deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
STATEMENT REGARDING RELATED CASES PENDING
BEFORE THE COURT
The class action Asay v. Fla. Parole Comm., pet. for cert. filed, No
95-5807, presents, in an abstract, class-based way, the public
records issue presented in Joseph Robert Spaziano's certiorari peti-
tion. Asay was one of only two cases cited by the Florida Supreme
Court in support of its rejection of Mr. Spaziano's secret records /
Brady claim.
As the certiorari petition in Asay sets out, the secrecy claim is
of some significant importance. However, Mr. Spaziano's case
might provide a more appropriate vehicle through which the
Court could decide this significant issue. Asay traces the abstract
issue in a class action; Mr. Spaziano raises the issue in a concrete
case, where the exculpatoriness of the secret evidence could not be
clearer. Further, the Asay class action has procedural problems, See
Appendix -, not present in Mr. Spaziano's case-specific presen-
tation of the question presented. Finally, unlike Asay, this Court is
familiar with the record in Mr. Spaziano's case, having granted ple-
nary review in the case once before. Spaziano v. Florida, __ U.S.
__ (1984).
HOW THE FEDERAL QUESTIONS WERE RAISED AND
DECIDED BELOW
Undersigned counsel presented the first two constitutional
questions raised in this petition to the Florida Supreme Court in
the form of several motions and supplements. See Appendices G-
UU. The Florida Supreme Court's September 8 opinion referred
to a "catch-all" motion. See Appendix A. In any event, the court
refused to file several motions filed by undersigned counsel. See
Appendix TT. For this reason, counsel includes the relevant mo-
tions in the appendices to this petition.
At the outset of his principal pleading in the Florida Supreme
Court, Mr. Spaziano's counsel wrote:
Undersigned counsel candidly concedes that a plethora of pro-
cedural preclusions articulated by this court bar this instant
[sic]
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[sic]action. As a motion to rehearing of an opinion by this
court rendered in 1986, this motion is obviously untimely.
Treated as a new claim for postconviction relief, this action is
barred by the one year time limit on Rule 3.851 motions. There
are claim and issue preclusion barriers, because all of the legal
issues raised in this motion have been raised by Mr. Spaziano in
the past; there has been no intervening change in law; there
have been new facts recently discovered, but they may not be of
the magnitude necessary, under this court's precedence, to se-
cure review. Finally, retroactivity principles bar this court from
treating several aspects raised by Mr. Spaziano as issues cogniza-
ble at this time.
Spaziano v. State, - So. 2d __ , Appendix A (Fla. Sup. Ct. Sept.
8, 1995).
The Florida Supreme Court decided the issues presented in
this petition on their merits - and solely on their merits - thus
forgiving any possible procedural bars. Id. This Court must do so
as well: Even if a petitioner committed a procedural default that
could have supplied an "adequate" and "independent" state
ground for denying relief, the procedural default doctrine does
not apply if "the last state court rendering ajudgement in the case"
reached the merits of the claim.85 If the last state court in a given
[sic]
85 Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989). See, e.g., Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct.
1239, 1249 (1994) ("On state postconviction review, the Nebraska Supreme Court
rejected Victor's contention that the instruction ... violated the Due Process Clause.
Because the last state court in which review could be had considered Victor's constitu-
tional claim on the merits, it is properly presented for our review despite Victor's
failure to object to the instruction at trial or raise the issue on direct appeal." (citing
Ylst v. Nunnemaker, infra)); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 893, 921 n.6 (1993) (Souter,J.,
dissenting) (although at trial, habeas corpus petitioner did not seek mitigating-
circumstance instruction he now claims was required, issue is "properly before us"
because, inter alia, "the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals appears to have addressed
petitioner's challenge on the merits in a state postconviction proceeding"); Ylst v.
Nunnemaker, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2593 (1991) ("If the last state court to be presented with
a particular federal claim reaches the merits, it removes any bar to federal court re-
view that might otherwise be available"); California v. Freeman, 488 U.S. 1311, 1314-15
(1989) (O'Connor, J., on application for stay) (direct review case) (if discussion of
state claim is interwoven with discussion of federal claim, ruling on state claim may
also be ruling on merits of federal claim); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 371 n.3
(1988); Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 240 (1988); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S.
284, 289 n.3 (1986); Wainright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 413 n.1l (1985) ("Under circum-
stances where the state courts do not rely on independent state grounds . . .and
instead reach the merits . . ., the federal question is properly before us."); Connecticut
v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 80 n.8 (1983) (plurality opinion) (direct review case); Engle v.
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 n. 44 (1982); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 582 n.19
(1980); Ulster County Ct. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 152-54 (1979); Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154, 161-62 (1978); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 485 n.4 (1977); Mullaney v.
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[sic]case did not see fit to rely on any procedural ground in re-
jecting a claim and instead decided the claim on its merits, the
federal court may do likewise, for in such cases there is no federal-
ism basis for deferring to any adequate and independent state pro-
cedural ground of decision, 6 and the state cannot claim that the
defendant's default deprived the state courts of a fair opportunity
to dispose of the claim.87 As the Supreme Court has stated, "if the
state court under state law chooses not to rely on a procedural bar
[sic]
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 n.* (1975) (Rhenquist, J., concurring); Le/kowitz v. Newsome,
420 U.S. 283, 292 n.9 (1975); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (direct
review case); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297 n.3 (1967); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 360-62 (1927) (direct review case);Jenkins v. Gra/ey, 8 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir.
1993); Shaw v. Collins, 5 F.3d 128, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1993); Suniga v. Bunnell, 998 F.2d
664, 667 (9th Cir. 1993); Panther v. Hames, 991 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1993); Thomas
v. Harrelson, 942 F.2d 1530, 1531-32 (l1th Cir. 1991); Brown v. Collins, 937 F.2d 175,
179 (5th Cir. 1991); Evans v. Dowd, 932 F.2d 739, 741 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 385 (1991); Thigpen v. Thigpen, 926 F.2d 1003, 1011 n.18 (lth Cir.
1991); Love v.Jones, 923 F.2d 816, 818 n.1 (11th Cir. 1991); Walton v. Caspari, 916 F.2d
1352, 1356-57 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1337 (1991); May v. Collins, 904
F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 770 (1991); Russell v. Rolfs, 893
F.2d 1033, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2915 (1991); Smith v. Free-
man, 892 F.2d 331, 337 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Under the principles of Harris, we are not
bound to enforce a state procedural rule when the state itself has not done so, even if
the procedural rule is theoretically applicable to our facts"); Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d
1273, 1282-87 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), aff'd sub nom, Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227
(1990); Lewis v. Borg, 879 F.2d 697, 698 (9th Cir. 1989) ("We have held that a federal
habeas claim is not barred by the procedural default rule when the state court de-
clines to apply the procedural bar and adjudicates the habeas claim on the merits");
Williams v. Armontrout, 877 F.2d 1376, 1384 n.3 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1082 (1990); Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 617 (10th Cir, 1988); Mann v. Dugger,
844 F.2d 1446, 1448 n.4 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989) (federal
habeas corpus review not barred when state supreme court chooses not to enforce its
own procedural default rule); Doucette v. Vose, 842 F.2d 538, 539-41 (1st Cir. 1988);
Cohen v. Tate, 779 F.2d 1181, 1185 (6th Cir. 1985); Velarde v. Shulsen, 757 F.2d 1093,
1096 n.1 (10th Cir. 1985); Briley v. Bass, 750 F.2d 1238, 1242 n.6 (4th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1088 (1985); Williams v. Parke, 741 F.2d 847, 848 n.1 (6th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029 (1985); Hux v. Murphy, 733 F.2d 737, 739 (10th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1103 (1985); Jackson v. Amara, 729 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1984);
Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 286-87 (2d Cir. 1981); Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d
1346, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982). The federal courts look
to the opinion of "the last state court rendering a judgement in the case," Victor v.
Nebraska, supra, 489 U.S. at 262, because "[s]tate procedural bars are not immortal
...; they may expire because of later actions by state courts," Ylst v. Nunnenzaker, supra
at 2593.
86 Ulster County Ct. v. Allen, supra, 442 U.S. at 154.
87 Cf Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. - (19__) at 2555 ("in a federal system, the
States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of
state prisoners' federal rights... [and] a habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the
State's procedural requirements for presenting his federal claims has deprived the
state courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance").
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[sic].. ., then there is no basis for a federal habeas court's refusing
to consider the merits of the federal claim."88
The procedural barriers set out above preclude the filing of a
successive habeas corpus petition in federal district court. The dis-
trict court and the Eleventh Circuit ignored Mr. Spaziano's evi-
dence of innocence in his first habeas petition. There is little rea-
son to think those courts would treat a second habeas petition any
differently.89
[sic]
88 Harris v. Reed, supra, 489 U.S. at 265 n. 12. Accord Coleman v. Thompson, supra, 111
S. Ct. at 2557; Ylst v. Nunnemaker, supra, 111 S. Ct. at 2593.
89 The new death warrant signed by Governor Chiles, and based on the FDLE
report, left undersigned counsel with the difficult question of whether to take Mr.
Spaziano's case to federal district court. This was not an easy decision but, eventually,
counsel decided not to pursue this unlikely channel of justice. Counsel made this
decision for several reasons.
There are indeed undeniable legal benefits to going to every possible court to
seek a stay. The system of capital punishment is random: we might get lucky and
secure a stay from federal courts-if we do not ask, we will not get one. There is also the
psychological benefit: we feel better because we have done all we can do as lawyers;
our client feels better knowing that we have knocked on every legal door; the judges
feel better because they can tell themselves the system worked because the defense
lawyers scurried like rats from court to court raising every conceivable issue; and, for
the same reasons, the public feels better.
So, the benefits of the eleventh-hour dash are clear and familiar to us. We have
all been through the drill before. Yet, the costs of foregoing the federal courts would
be minimal. The "federal courts" in this case were Kendall Sharp, district judge, and
Ed Carnes, Eleventh Circuit judge. In thirteen years on the bench, Judge Sharp has
not once found a single claim by a condemned prisoner to be non-frivolous-to say
nothing of being sufficiently meritorious to justify a stay. Judge Carnes provided even
less hope; Carnes can most fairly be characterized as a capital prosecutor cross-
dressing as a federal appellatejudge. He wrote the Eleventh Circuit's opinion on Mr.
Spaziano's case and spent more energy complaining about the page limit for coun-
sel's brief than the evidence of innocence he raised in the brief. And this had been
the first habeas-a habeas based on compelling evidence of innocence, some of which
was not procedurally defaulted.
Our evidence on innocence was powerful, but we did not have a videtape show-
ing that Mr. Spaziano was elsewhere at the precise time of the murder. A videotape
was what Lloyd Schlup had in his successive habeas petition and all Schlup got out of
the Court was an evidentiary hearing, and that only by a slim margin of 5-4, the same
number we would need for a stay.
So, the real legal test, as opposed to the black letter law was: if you have a video-
taped alibi, and you are in successor habeas status, then you might be able to scrape
together five votes for a chance to prove your claim in an evidentiary hearing, a hear-
ing which would be before Judge Sharp. Not having a videotape, or anything close,
this was the absolute most we could hope for from the federal judiciary. We had al-
ready argued innocence as the basis for our first habeas and, of the thirteen federal
judges who could have considered that evidence, not one agreed with us. In federal
court, innocence seems irrelevant. So, in light of their procedural default rhetoric, we
would give up little by foregoing the federal system.
On the other hand, the costs of entering the federal courts would have been
1996] 349LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE




The FBI conaurts an internal review.
[sic]
great. We would waste scarce time and energy on an essentially hopeless litigation in
front of judges who did not think we belonged there.
More importantly, it seemed to counsel, by doing the fifty-yard dash from court
to court, we deflected attention away from Governor Chiles and the Florida Supreme
Court. Most critically, we would diffuse responsibility and spread it among the Gover-
nor, the Florida Supreme Court, and the federal courts. If everyone shared responsi-
bility for the killing of this innocent man, then no one would feel the responsibility.
Diffusion of responsibility is the fundamental systemic and institutional problem
with Mr. Spaziano's case. The jury was not sure that Mr. Spaziano was guilty, but they
knew he was an Outlaw biker so they split the difference and found him guilty but
gave him life. The trial judge was unaware of the jury's doubt so he imposed death.
The jury shifted responsibility to the judge and the judge shifted it to the jury. The
same phenomena occurred at each step of the capital assembly line. The Florida
Supreme Court deferred to the jury and trial court as principles of appellate practice
dictate. And the federal courts deferred to the state judiciary as federalism demands.
Finally, the judiciary, both state and federal, deferred to the authority of the gov-
ernor, as directed by Herrera v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 853 (1993). In 1995, the responsibility
for executing this innocent man rested on the shoulders of one person, Lawton
Chiles. The buck stopped there, and he knew it. For this reason,the Herald's coverage
persuaded him to stay the warrant in June.
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[sic] Replace the word "FBI" with "Florida Department of Law
Enforcement (FDLE);" a now-public FBI whitewash with a still-se-
cret FDLE whitewash; rightist militiamen with Outlaw bikers; and
the above political cartoon captures the questions presented in this
certiorari petition: law enforcement investigating law enforce-
ment, to determine if law enforcement committed hideous errors
with tragic consequences. In Ruby Ridge, the tragic consequences
were the killing of a woman and her child. In Mr. Spaziano's case,
the tragic consequence was the 19 year incarceration on death row
of an innocent man. This case has not yet resulted in the killing of
an innocent life. Yet. And the state relentlessly keeps trying.
The proceedings in the lower court involved a number of legal
issues, but all the legal issues were grounded on the same factual
premise that has been at the core of Mr. Spaziano's case for the
past nineteen years: Mr. Spaziano is absolutely innocent of mur-
der. He didn't do it, period. Not "he did it but he had a bad child-
hood;" not "he did it but he was crazy." Mr. Spaziano is innocent
the old fashioned way: He didn't commit the crime.
All he has been asking for these past 19 years is an opportunity
to prove his innocence to a jury allowed to hear all the evidence,
on both sides. Give us ajury. If the state wants to kill him, let them
do it the old fashioned way: Give us a jury.
[sic]
Counsel was afraid that he had already erred in giving Governor Chiles an out
when he filed for relief in the Florida Supreme Court, and did not want to further
dilute his responsibility by filing in federal court.The FDLE gave Chiles the political
cover to issue another death warrant and, therefore,we were back in the Florida
Supreme Court. So it was the Court's problem, not the Governor's. If we lost in the
Florida Supreme Court, Chiles would expect us to dash into federal district court,
then the Eleventh Circuit, and the Supreme Court.With frightening predictability, the
stay would be denied the night before the scheduled execution, and all of the atten-
tion-and any blame-would rest on the judges and not Governor Chiles. As we all knew,
that was the expected drill.
In my opinion, Mr. Spaziano had little chance of getting a stay from the Florida
Supreme Court. If they were concerned with providing justice, they would have cut
through the procedural screens that courts erect to avoid even considering the evi-
dence of innocence and would have already mitigated the sentence. This left Gover-
nor Chiles as our best shot at a stay. And the key to Governor Chiles granting the stay
was to eliminate any opportunity for him to pass the buck to the courts, to close off all
possible escape routes. Thus, our chances for success hinged on keeping the responsi-
bility for killing an innocent man squarely on Chiles and Chiles alone. This was why
will not go to federal district court. Counsel hoped that by keeping the pressure on
Governor Chiles, while allowing the media to continue championing Mr. Spaziano's
innocence, we could succeed.
The magnitude of the pressure Governor Chiles faces depends not only on plac-
ing the full weight of Mr. Spaziano's death on him, but also on discrediting the FDLE
report and exposing it as a whitewash with a foregone conclusion.
LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE
[sic] Joseph Robert Spaziano has spent the past 19 years on
death row for crimes he did not commit. The evidence of his inno-
cence has been accumulating over the past two decades, but court
after court, blinded by procedural technicalities, refused to con-
sider it. But for the investigative reporting of the Miami Herald over
the past few months, Mr. Spaziano would have been killed at 7:00
a.m. on June 21, 1995, - See generally, Michael Mello, Death and His
Lawyers, 20 Vt. L. Rev. _ (forthcoming Oct. 1995). -for crimes
he did not commit.
A. The Prosecutor's Case At Trial, According to the Trial
Prosecutor: Anthony DiLisio
Mr. Spaziano was convicted and condemned to die for the
1973 murder of Laura Lynn Harberts.
Mr. Spaziano's murder conviction and death sentence were
bottomed on the testimony of a sixteen-year-old drug abuser who
hated Mr. Spaziano and who was granted immunity, and who was
twice hypnotized by a police hypnotist, before he "remembered" a
bizarre and inconsistent tale about Mr. Spaziano allegedly taking
him to a body and making inculpatory statements about the vic-
tim's death. The witness is Anthony DiLisio, and all agree that
without his testimony there was no case against Mr. Spaziano.
In a pre-trial motion before the judge, the trial prosecutor said
that if they could not get the testimony of Anthony DiLisio admit-
ted into evidence, they would have no case: "If we can't get in the
testimony of Tony DiLisio, we'd absolutely have no case here whatso-
ever....So either we're going to have it through Tony, or we're not
going to have it at all." Tr. 14. The state's case at trial was "bot-
tomed," in the words of the prosecutor, on the testimony of
Anthony DiLisio.
In closing argument in the guilt/innocence phase, the prose-
cutor told the jury that Anthony DiLisio was "the most important wit-
ness in this case," and told the jury "if you don't believe DiLisio, then
find the defendant not guilty in 5 minutes. "T. 775-76.
The key to the state's case, therefore, was Anthony DiLisio.
Mr. DiLisio's testimony consisted of two components: (1) inculpa-
tory statements allegedly made by Mr. Spaziano, and (2) a harrow-
ing trip to a dump site that Mr. DiLisio testified he took with Mr.
Spaziano so that Mr. Spaziano could, according to Mr. DiLisio,
show Mr. DiLisio the bodies of women that Mr. Spaziano had
bragged about having killed. The believability of Mr. DiLisio's tes-
timony about the alleged inculpatory statements depended entirely
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[sic]on the trip to the dump. Without the trip to the dump, not
even Mr. DiLisio believed Mr. Spaziano's bravado statements.
Without the trip to the dump, the statements are rendered
meaningless.
The prosecutor's final argument urging the jury to recom-
mend death consisted entirely of the trip to the dump. At the re-
sentencing, the prosecutor said "this case is bottomed on the testi-
mony of Anthony DiLisio." R.T. 245-46. The prosecutor later
argued that the alleged trip to the dump with Mr. Spaziano is "what
makes DiLisio's testimony more than just idle gossip. The defendant was
actually bragging and showing him his handiwork .... [It's] not some-
one sitting in a bar somewhere, the defendant is not telling this in a
bar, he's not bragging." (R. 257).
And on direct appeal, countering Mr. Spaziano's claim that
the evidence was legally insufficient: "the exact cause of death was
presented through the testimony of Anthony DiLisio .... The Ap-
pellant bragged to Mr. DiLisio that he tortured and murdered
some girls and took Mr. DiLisio to the Altamonte dump to view the
bodies and confirm his statements. "Direct Appeal Brief of Appellee,
at 10. The Florida Supreme Court agreed. Spaziano v. State, __
So. 2d ., _ (Fla. 1981). Ralph DiLisio, Tony's father,
also wanted to testify about generic statements made by Mr. Spazi-
ano about alleged atrocities he allegedly committed against alleged
(but unnamed) "girls" - in other words, DiLisio, the father,
sought to testify about the same hearsay about which DiLisio the
younger was permitted to testify. The father said he never believed
Mr. Spaziano's Outlaw braggadocio - but neither did DiLisio the
son.
Judge McGregor ruled the testimony of DiLisio senior inad-
missible, and he ordered it stricken. T. 716. The testimony of
DiLisio the son was held admissible.
Why was the hearsay testimony of the elder DiLisio held inad-
missible, but the very similar hearsay testimony of DiLisio the son
held admissible? The only plausible explanation is that the son's
hearsay testimony, unlike the father's, was made to sound credible
and reliable by virtue of the trip to the dump site.
[sic]
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[sic]B. Mr. Spaziano's Sentencing Jury Recommended Life
Imprisonment Because of Lingering Doubts About Mr.
Spaziano's Guilt, Even Though the Jury Knew Mr.
Spaziano was an Outlaw Charged with an Especially
Brutal Murder, But the Jury Did Not Know that DiLisio
Had Been Hypnotized, Much Less that He has Now
Recanted.
When this Court last granted plenary review in Mr. Spaziano's
case - following direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, with
all parties limited to the four corners of the trial record - the
record did not reflect the reasons for the jury's life recommenda-
tion. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). Justice Stevens hy-
pothesized that
while the crime for which petitioner was convicted was quite
horrible, the case against him was rather weak, resting as it did
on the largely uncorroborated testimony of a drug addict who
said that petitioner had bragged to him of having killed a
number of women, and had led him to the victim's body. It may
well be that the jury was ... sufficiently troubled by the possibil-
ity that an irrevocable mistake might be made, ... that the jury
concluded that a sentence of death could not be morally justi-
fied in this case.
Id. at n.34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
We now know, however, that the jury harbored sincere doubt
about guilt - which was in fact a large part of the reason for its life
recommendation. We know that the jury had doubt about Mr.
Spaziano's guilt because a juror has said so. During the course of
postconviction investigation in this case, undersigned counsel filed
Notice of Intent to Interview Jurors in this on November 6, 1985,
and notified the state by proper service. Juror Lorenzano was then
interviewed, and her affidavit was appended to the first state post-
conviction motion. In that affidavit she revealed:
During our jury deliberations at the sentence portion of the Spazi-
ano trial, I voted for a life sentence rather than the death penalty.
Nine or ten jurors felt as I did: that we did not want to see this
man die.
One of the major reasons for most of us favoring a life sentence was
our doubts about whether Mr. Spaziano was guilty of the crime as
charged. I distinctly remember this being expressed as a factor in many
of the juror's minds.
One of our major concerns was the testimony of the 16-year-old boy.
Tony DiLisio, which we didn't entirely believe at the time of the trial.
[sic]
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[sic] Had we known his testimony was prompted by hypnosis, I believe it
would have made a difference.
C. DiLisio's Secret 1995 Recantation of the Weight-Bearing
Beam of His Key Trial Testimony
In June, 1995, DiLisio - unbeknownst to Mr. Spaziano or his
counsel - recanted his crucial testimony. The recantation was un-
beknownst to Mr. Spaziano because it occurred in the course of a
secret police investigation initiated, sua sponte, by Governor Lawton
Chiles.
When Mr. Spaziano's counsel learned of media reports about
DiLisio's secret recantation, he made repeated requests of the po-
lice and the governor for the videotape of DiLisio's interrogation.
They refused. The governor's general counsel was quoted in the
media as saying that DiLisio had not, in fact, recanted.
This was a lie. We know this because undersigned counsel ob-
tained, through his own sources, a portion of the videotape. The
recantation could not be clearer.
In 1995, in connection with Mr. Spaziano's out-of-time motion
to rehear the court's opinion on the first Rule 3.850 motion, Mr.
Spaziano filed with the court, under seal, the videotape of FDLE's
1995 interrogation of Mr. DiLisio. In that videotape, Mr. DiLisio
disavows his crucial testimony: the trip to the dump. The video-
tape contained the following passages:
INTERVIEWER
Ok, going back to that same time when you were with the police
officers. Did at some point in time before hypnosis did you take them to a
place where the body of this young lady that was killed...
ANTHONY FRANK DILISIO
They took me there.
INTERVIEWER
They took you there?
ANTHONY FRANK DILISIO
They took me there, and a ... I remember that. I do remember that.
I remember that.. .and the - God, like cut up pieces of a
tree. It was kind of like dump but not a dump. Not a dump for
trash, more like a dump for lawn stuff or you know what I mean.
INTERVIEWER
Was the body... .still there?
[sic]
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[sic]ANTHONY FRANK DILISIO




The cops brought me there. The cops brought me there. I had never been
there in my life until they brought me there. And they made it look like
that a guy that they arrested, Crazy Joe, brought me there. They are the
ones that showed me where the dump was, they were the ones that
brought me to the dump. And I remember that I didn't do something
right the first time that they brought me back to that office, and that
doctors, and so they left, and they brought me back to the dump. And
then brought me back to the office and I did really good.
INTERVIEWER
Do you recall what you told them after that experience?
ANTHONY FRANK DILISIO
No, I don't remember.. .that experience ...no, it was almost like
buddy, buddy, you know, they played me then.
INTERVIEWER
Uh, uh... did they, did you give them a description of the body
or anything before hypnosis?
ANTHONY FRANK DILISIO
No, they told me what he did to the girl.
INTERVIEWER








You never saw Sporanzo (sic) with her or heard Joe talk of Laura or




What was your relationship with Sporanzo (sic)?
[sic]
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D. The Florida Supreme Court's September 8 Opinion: No Stay
of Execution; Denial of Appointment of Counsel; No
Defense Access to Secret Police Investigation File;
Evidentiary Hearing in Seven Days, Under Active
Death Warrant
The Florida Supreme Court held that Mr. Spaziano is not enti-
fled under Brady v. Maryland to access to the FDLE videotape of
DiLisio's recantation, or to any other aspect of the secret police
investigation. Spaziano, Appendix A. The court also held that the
Attorney General need not be recused from this litigation. Id.
In its Sept. 8 opinion, the Florida Supreme Court denied a stay
of execution but remanded for an evidentiary hearing under war-
rant. The subject of the hearing was to have been DiLisio's recan-
tation. Under the court's opinion, Mr. Spaziano's counsel would
not have access to the secret report at the hearing.
The three dissenters wrote:
I agree with virtually all that is said in the majority opinion
except that portion imposing an unrealistic time frame for
resolving what we all have now agreed is a cognizable claim for
postconviction relief. Such a restriction is without precedent in
our case law and tends to create an atmosphere of panic for
resolution of an issue that requires calm and deliberate resolu-
tion.9" Indeed, this is an issue demanding the most careful of
attention because its end result could be the state-sponsored tak-
ing of a man's life when his guilt has now been called into
question.
As the United States Supreme Court itself has noted, "death
is different." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 96 S. Ct. 2909,
2932, 49 L. ed. 2d 859 (1976). Unique in its finality, the death
penalty therefore is circumscribed by extraordinary procedural
safeguards designed to prevent an arbitrary or capricious appli-
cation of this most irrevocable or punishments. I cannot see
[sic]
90 It is interesting that when the executive branch was presented with this prob-
lem, it put the entire case on hold while investigating the claim. We should do no
less, and certainly should not force a quick decision that only enhances the further
risk of error. (footnote in original)
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[sic] how this core policy is being served by an unseemly rush to
execute a man despite a sworn affidavit by the State's chief wit-
ness that Mr. Spaziano was convicted on falsified evidence.91
This conclusion is all the more compelling here because the re-
cantation is only the latest in a string of troubling doubts that
have surrounded Mr. Spaziano's conviction from the outset, re-
vealing it to be a text-book example of how capital trials and
postconviction reviews should not be conducted.
Today we are presented with a grossly disturbing scenario: a
man facing imminent execution (a) even though his jury's vote
for life imprisonment would be legally binding today, Cochran v.
State, 547 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1989), (b) with his conviction resting
almost entirely on testimony tainted by a hypnotic procedure
this Court has condemned, Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 18 (Fla.
1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 894, 107 S. Ct. 295, 93 L. Ed. 2d 269
(1986), (c) with the source of that tainted testimony now swear-
ing on penalty of perjury that his testimony was false, and (d)
without careful consideration of this newly discovered evidence
under the only legal method available, Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 3.850 or 3.851.92
While each of these standing alone is cause for grave con-
cern, the apparent recantation of the State's chief witness is the
most disturbing. The role played by this witness was vividly ex-
plained by this Court's own words on direct appeal:
The principal witness for the state was Ralph DiLisio (sic), a
sixteen-year-old acquaintance of the appellant. DiLisio testified
that Spaziano often bragged about the girls he had mutilated
and killed, and on the occasion DiLisio and another individual
accompanied appellant to the Altamonte dump site where
DiLisio saw two corpses, both covered with blood. DiLisio stated
that Spaziano claimed responsibility for these killings [.]
With reference to the contention that the evidence is insuf-
ficient, the appellant asks us to reject in totality the testimony of
DiLisio. DiLisio led authorities to the dump where the bodies
were found two years after he observed the, with appellant.
Both the jury and the trial judge had a superior advantage point
to weigh the credibility of DiLisio's testimony. We find the evi-
dence in this record was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict.
Spaziano v. State, 393 So. 2d 1119, 1120 & 1122 (Fla. 1981).
[sic]
91 The affidavit, quoted in the majority opinion, is in irreconcilable conflict with
DiLisio's testimony at trial, as quoted below from this Court's opinion on direct ap-
peal. (footnote in original).
92 For reasons not adequately explained, counsel for Mr. Spaziano did not file
under Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 or 3.851, but sought relief under a "motion"
of his own invention. (footnote in original).
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[sic] I think this excerpt more than amply refute any claim that
Spaziano's conviction is adequately supported by evident apart
from DiLisio's testimony. Were that the case, this Court in 1981
would hardly have pegged its entire analysis of the evidence's suf-
ficiency on DiLisio's credibility. And today, when the credibility
of that testimony has been called into question in the strongest
possible manner - from DiLisio's own mouth - I think there
is only one reasonable conclusion: This conviction bears a possi-
ble taint that must be investigated and explained before Spazi-
ano can be electrocuted.
In oral argument, the State made much of the "speculative"
nature of the allegations before us. While there certainly may
be elements of speculation in what we are reviewing here, I am
not at all satisfied the entire claim is groundless. DiLisio's affi-
davit alone tends to refute that contention. And in any event, it
is the trial court's responsibility as fact-finder to weed out the
speculative from the meritorious, not ours. Out sole duty at this
point is to determine is a prima facie claim has been made,
which is clearly has.
More to the point, we are talking about a man's life here.
And in that sense, we are also talking about the moral underpin-
nings of the death penalty itself: an abiding faithfulness to the
heightened procedural safeguards, an absolute requirement of
the certainty of guilt, and an overriding commitment to the
proposition that society should never descend into lawlessness
in an effort to eliminate the lawless. Ends do not justify means.
Quite to the contrary, the means chosen almost always color and
shape the ends achieved. This is true even when we are talking
about someone like Mr. Spaziano, whose life has hardly been a
model. One question is at issue here, and one question alone:
Was Mr. Spaziano lawfully convicted of the murder of Laura
Harberts?
All that can be said with finality about this case today is that
it remains mired in serious doubt. Because of the irrevocable
nature of the death penalty, I am utterly unwilling to dismiss
those doubts without adequate inquiry into their source. The
present record presents at least a prima facie showing that the
State's chief witness has recanted, and I thus agree that the trial
court must review the claim presented here pursuant to Rule
3.850 or 3.851. Any other ruling would countenance an execu-
tion in the face of serious evidence that Mr. Spaziano was ille-
gally convicted.
Because of the seriousness of the claim, I further believe
this Court should enter an indefinite stay of execution to permit
the parties to develop their cases without facing the pressures
[sic]
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[sic] of an active death warrant, if the Governor does not stay or
withdraw his warrant in light of our opinion today. Experience
teaches that claims of this magnitude cannot be fully investi-
gated nor a case prepared in one week. In any event, if the ma-
jority's time table proves inadequate, counsel clearly still has the
ability to seek a stay from the trial court or this Court at a later
time.
Finally, as the majority indicates, the Office of Capital Col-
lateral Representative continues to be statutorily responsible for
this case. Therefore it must at least provide volunteer counsel
with the usual resources that would be available in a typical case
handled by that agency.
93
E. The Florida Supreme Court's September 12 Opinion,
and the Court's "Firing" of Mr. Spaziano's Pro Bono
Appellate Counsel and Appointment of a Hack
Public Defender's Office With a Track
Record of Botching the Factual Investigation into Mr.
Spaziano's Innocence
Undersigned pro bono counsel refused to participate in an evi-
dentiary hearing under those circumstances.94 See Appendix C. So
[sic]
93 I do not find persuasive counsel's claim that the Office of Capital Collateral
Representative has a conflict. (footnote in original).
94 Counsel circulated the following on September 10:
MEMORANDUM
DATE: September 10, 1995
TO: BDNMCB Group ("The Best Defense No Money Can Buy")
FROM: Michael Mello
RE: Snatching Defeat From the Jaws Of Victory
(or How We Won In The Worst Possible Way)
Ugh. This is a hard memo to write, but I'm going to try to explain how
we really lost in court on Friday.
First, the evidentiary hearing was ordered to address the question of
Anthony DiLisio's reaction. That means the only question before the court
will be this: Was Tony DiLisio lying when he testified at Joe's trial 20 years
ago, as he now says he was, or is he lying now about lying 20 years ago? Tony
will be called to the stand, and will testify quite powerfully that he was lying
atJoe's trial and is telling the truth now.
Here comes the hard part. Dexter Douglass has already indicated to the
media that the state intends to call some of its super-secret witnesses, and we
can assume they will be used to try to discredit Tony's recantation. They will,
in essence, testify that Tony was telling the truth at Joe's trial, and is lying
now. We would then have an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses
and attempt to discredit their testimony - except that we don't know who
those witnesses are!
Further, even ifwe were given the identities of those witnesses first thing
Monday morning - an event which is extremely unlikely, given the pattern of
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[sic] did every one of the dozen law firms counsel asked to consider
jumping into this case under death warrant - including Holland &
Knight, the firm that agreed to do the hearing once the case was no
longer under warrant.
Undersigned counsel argued in his original rehearing motion
that the "hearing" ordered by the Florida Supreme Court was more
than unfair; it was unlawful under the principles of U.S. v. Cronic.
Cronic held that "[c] ircumstances... may be present on some occa-
sions when, although counsel is available to assist the accused dur-
ing trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent
one, could provide effective assistance is so small, that a presump-
tion of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual con-
duct of the trial." United States v. Cronic, 446 U.S. 648, 659-60
(1984) .95
[sic]
state misconduct in this case - 96 hours is not enough time for us to investi-
gate those witnesses, their backgrounds, their relationship to Tony, and the
validity of their testimony. In short, 96 hours is simply insufficient time to
prepare any meaningful cross-examination of critical witnesses.
Our inability to prepare for this sham "hearing" will be the surest thing
to kill Joe. If we try - if we rush around blindly, trying to find out what we
can, however ewe can, and wind up doing a lousy investigation of anony-
mous witnesses - we go into court ill-prepared, at best, and we will be un-
able to discredit the state's witnesses. And if we are unable to discredit those
witnesses, the judge will make a factual determination that Tony is lying now,
and was telling the truth 20 years ago at Joe's trial. That ruling will be pre-
sumptively correct - which means it is completely unreviewable by any other
court, even the Supreme Court of the U.S. In short, if we rush this and blow
it, Joe is dead. Since there is absolutely no way in which we can be prepared
for a hearing in 96 hours, and given the grave consequences of a slip-shod
attempt, we must prevent the hearing from happening on Friday. On this
basis I have filed a motion to stay the execution and hold the evidentiary
"hearing" in abeyance. We need more time.
In addition, I am an appellate attorney, not a trial lawyer. Since I
learned of the court's opinion, I have been trying to find a trial attorney
willing and competent to represent Joe at the "hearing" ordered by this
court. As of this writing, no experienced, competent attorney is willing to do
so under the unreasonable time constraints established by the court. I will
keep looking for one.
95 The following cases either applied the rule from Cronic to presume prejudice or
refused to presume prejudice when the state interfered with defendant's assistance of
counsel. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986) (Court held that under Cronic,
lower court's exclusion of exculpatory evidence regarding the circumstances of de-
fendant's confession "deprives a defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's
case encounter and 'survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.'"); United
States v. Minsky, 963 F.2d 870, 874 (6th Cir. 1992) (an ex parte bench conference was
found to be a Sixth Amendment violation); Jackson v. James, 839 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir.
1988) (in a footnote, court stated that trial court's decision to permit appointment
counsel to withdraw on morning of trial, resulting in defendant being unrepresented
during critical stages of proceeding, made trial fundamentally unfair under Cronic);
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[sic] On September 12, the Florida Supreme Court stayed the
execution indefinitely, moved the evidentiary hearing back two
and one half months, to November 15, "fired" undersigned coun-
sel as Mr. Spaziano's pro bono appellate counsel, and forced upon
[sic]
Green v. Am, 615 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (a Constitutional error was
committed without having to establish prejudice when the judge was informed of peti-
tioner's counsel's scheduling problem and chose to proceed with the prosecution of
the action without counsel); Walburg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (7th Cir. 1985)
(trial judge's hostility toward defendant's attorney justified presumption of prejudice
under Cronic); Perry v. Leeke, 109 S. Ct. 594, 597 (1989) (Court affirmed appellate
court's ruling that prejudice should not be presumed under Cronic when trial court
directed defendant not to consult with anyone, including his lawyer, during fifteen-
minute afternoon recess); Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F. 2d 1477, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991)
(trial court's interference with defense attorney's calling of witnesses and overall con-
duct of defense did not justify presumption of prejudice under Cronic and not costly
to litigate); May v. Collins, 948 F.2d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1991) (while the structure of
Texas sentencing statute may have caused the defense counsel's tactical decision not
to present mitigating evidence, the court did not think this rose to the level of direct
government interference with their ability to conduct the defense); Stano v. Dugger,
921 F.2d 1125, 1154 (11th Cir. 1991) (trial court's acceptance of defendant's guilty
plea, even after the defense counsel informed him that he had not received full dis-
covery from the State and could not advise defendant of wisdom of plea, did not
reach Cronic exception to Strickland rule, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984); defendant's attorney was an experienced public defender, and gave defend-
ant appropriate advice regarding guilty pleas that defendant elected to enter); Brown
v. Rice, 693 F. Supp. 381, 398 (W.D.N.C. 1988) (court held that State's interference
with defense counsel's investigation of the case was not of sufficient magnitude to
justify presumption of prejudice under Cronic when fruits of police investigation were
made known to defendant through discovery); Kelly v. United States, 820 F.2d 1173,
1175-76 (11th Cir. 1987) (trial court's denial of defendant's continuance and attor-
ney's entry into case one day before trial did not create sufficient reason to presume
prejudice under Cronic); Hammonds v. Newsome, 816 F.2d 611, 613 (11th Cir. 1987)
(trial court's refusal to appoint defendant's counsel during preliminary hearing did
notjustify presumption of prejudice because error was harmless; harmless error analy-
sis, as applied to preliminary hearings, is still good law despite Cronic and Strickland);
Crutchfield v. Wainwright, 803 F. 2d 1103, 108-09 (11th Cir. 1986) (trial court's denial
of defendant's access to counsel during afternoon recess did not justify presumption
of prejudice under Cronic when record did not show any objection to court's denial,
or any evidence that defendant wanted to speak with his attorney during the recess);
Griffin v. Aiken, 775 F.2d 1226, 1229-31 (4th Cir. 1985) (court refused to presume
prejudice when trial court denied continuance and public defender had little time to
prepare for trial); Johnson v. Lumpkim, 769 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Cronic for
the proposition stated above and remanding to trail court for determination of
whether federal agents insistence that defendant not advise his attorney of defend-
ant's role in the FBI investigation interfered with defendant's sixth amendment
rights); Chadwick v. Green, 740 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1984) (trial court's denial of contin-
uance, resulting in attorney's inability to investigate and assert insanity defense, did
not give rise to presumption of prejudice because "any failure to investigate and pur-
sue all avenues of defense is best characterized as a failure by counsel in the perform-
ance of his investigatory duties, which is to be analyzed under Strickland. ").
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[sic] Mr. Spaziano a hack public defender office with a track record
of botching the factual investigation in this case.
The three dissenters wrote:
I fully agree with the majority's conclusion that in light of
attorney Mello's inability or refusal to comply with this Court's
decision of September 8, 1995, the office of the Capital Collat-
eral Representative shall represent Spaziano in all post-convic-
tion matters relating to this case.
I disagree with the November 15, 1995, deadline the major-
ity places on the trial court for conducting an evidentiary hear-
ing on Spaziano's claim of recantation. As pointed out by
Justice Kogan in his opinion concurring in part, dissenting in
part with this Court's decision of September 8, 1995, this is a
highly unusual case:
Today we are presented with a grossly disturbing scenario: a
man facing imminent execution (a) even though his jury's vote
for life imprisonment would be legally binding today, (b) with
his conviction resting almost entirely on testimony tainted by a
hypnotic procedure this Court has condemned, (c) with the
source of that tainted testimony now swearing on penalty of per-
jury that his testimony was false, and (d) without a careful con-
sideration of this newly discovered evidence under the only legal
method available....
Spaziano v. State, No. 67,929, slip op. at 9 (Fla. Sept. 8, 1995)
(Kogan J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citations
omitted). The problems presented in this case are further exac-
erbated by recent events as outlined in the majority opinion.
In light of the unusual procedural history of this case, the
critical nature of the evidentiary issue before the trial court, and
recent events, I would leave the time frame for conducting an
evidentiary hearing to the trial court's discretion. The trial
court is far better suited than we are to determine the logistical
requirements of such a hearing.
I concur in the remainder of the majority opinion.
Undersigned counsel attempted to point out the factual and
legal errors in its September 12 opinion (including the fact that
the Florida Supreme Court lacked the legitimate power to "fire"
the undersigned, since the undersigned's client was Joseph Robert
Spaziano, not the Florida Supreme Court). Counsel provided the
court with retainer letters from Mr. Spaziano, his mother, and his
niece. The court refused even to file the pleadings submitted by
the undersigned, explaining, in a letter dated Sept. 20, that only
[sic]
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[sic] the public defender can file papers as Mr. Spaziano's counsel.
See Appendix TT.
F. Alone in the Electric Chair: Florida's Crisis of
Postconviction Counsel; and The CCR Public
Defender's Office Devolution into a Lapdog
for the Governor and the Mask
of the Executioner
This Court recognized in McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568
(1994), Texas' crisis in the provision of postconviction counsel for
death row prisoners. Since McFarland was decided, the death pen-
alty resource centers throughout the nation have been defunded.
The Florida Supreme Court seems to think that Florida has no
counsel crisis because the legislature created the Office of the Cap-
ital Collateral Representative (CCR). See generally, Mello, Facing
Death Alone, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 3 (1988) (tracing counsel crisis that
led to creation of CCR). But, as Mr. Spaziano's case illustrates,
Florida does have a counsel crisis, the Florida Supreme Court's de-
nial notwithstanding. Florida's resource center died the day after
Governor Chiles signed Mr. Spaziano's most recent death warrant.
Joseph Robert Spaziano is indigent. He was represented in
the lower court by undersigned counsel, an experienced capital
postconviction litigator who is intimately familiar with the gigantic
record in this 19-year-old case. See Appendix BB.
Undersigned pro bono counsel is a full-time law teacher in Ver-
mont. Until the day after Governor Lawton Chiles signed Mr.
Spaziano's fifth death warrant - August 24, 1995 - counsel re-
ceived the crucial secretarial, logistical, and investigative support
from the Volunteer Lawyers' Resource Center of the state of Flor-
ida (VLRC). VLRC ceased to exist on August 25, 1995, as Mr.
Spaziano - supplemented by an amicus brief - documented in
the Florida Supreme Court.
The Florida Supreme Court denied the undersigned counsel's
motion for appointment of counsel and provision of funds for in-
vestigation of the facts proving Mr. Spaziano's innocence. See Ap-
pendices AA-QQ. Then when pro bono counsel was unable
physically to comply with the court's demands for a complex evi-
dentiary hearing under death warrant, at which the state could rely
on a secret police investigation - the court purported to "fire" the
undersigned and to force upon Mr. Spaziano a public defender
office that (1) had already botched this case almost beyond repair;
[sic]
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[sic] (2) had multiple conflicts of interest; (3) had as its director a
political appointee of Governor Lawton Chiles - the man who has
signed two death warrants against Mr. Spaziano over the past six
months; (4) has a history of tepid and inept representation of Flor-
ida death row clients, leading many to think of the office as being a
lapdog of law firm for the governor who periodically tries to kill its
clients, a reality that most likely results when a capital litigant (the
governor) gets to choose who his opponents' lawyer will be.
The undersigned has found a law firm, Holland & Knight, will-
ing to serve as trial counsel at the evidentiary hearing; he will re-
main as lead appellate counsel in this court and in the Florida
Supreme Court - without the assistance of the now-dead VLRC.
Chiles' stay of execution lasted two months. Based on the se-
cret FDLE investigation, Chiles signed a fifth warrant. The execu-
tion was scheduled for September 21, 1995 at 7:00 a.m. On
September 8, the Florida Supreme Court denied a stay and or-
dered an evidentiary hearing for seven days hence - under war-
rant. As set out in his rehearing motion (see Appendix B), Mello
declined the court's invitation to attempt the impossible; he re-
fused to participate in such a hearing. The reason Mello defied
the Florida Supreme Court's order for a new hearing was his inabil-
ity to prepare adequately in such a short time without support or
resources.
As Mr. Spaziano would prove at an evidentiary hearing, there
have been two institutions which provide legal services for capital
cases in Florida. Volunteer Lawyers Resource Center (VLRC) was a
federally funded resource center for pro bono lawyers in capital ap-
pellate and post-conviction work. Although an excellent program,
funding for this organization ended on the day after Governor
Chiles signed Mr. Spaziano's fifth death warrant. This was devastat-
ing to Mello's attempts to represent Mr. Spaziano effectively. The
other legal service is the Office of the Capital Collateral Represen-
tative (CCR), Florida's public defense office for capital work.
Mello worked for CCR from 1985 to 1987, but since that time it has
deteriorated until it is now as useless as the defunct VLRC,
although for a very different reason.
CCR still exists physically, but this is the kind of "help" pro bono
lawyers can expect. Not only did CCR refuse to help me in any way
with Mr. Spaziano's representation, but CCR mounted an aggres-
sive campaign to take over the case - against the emphatic wishes
of Mr. Spaziano, his mother, his daughter, his sister, his niece, and
[sic]
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[sic]his lawyer (me). This raises one question, and leads to a sec-
ond, about CCR. First, if CCR is as overworked as it complains
incessantly that it is, why would CCR force itself upon a con-
demned man who would rather have no lawyer than a CCR lawyer?
Second, my experience in Mr. Spaziano's case has led me to sus-
pect that CCR does not work as hard as they complain they do, so
why do we not require CCR to document their work by producing
its personnel time records, under oath?
The Florida Supreme Court's September 12 opinion correctly
noted that Mr. Spaziano did not (and does not now) want CCR as
his lawyer, but the court ignored the good reasons why Mr. Spazi-
ano reasonably believes that having CCR as your lawyer is worse
than having no lawyer at all. CCR's performance in Mr. Spaziano's
case does notjust suggest that the agency is overworked; it suggests
the agency is inept. Two weeks in advance of Mr. Spaziano's sched-
uled execution - on a fourth death warrant - CCR had con-
ducted no fact investigation of any use (notwithstanding a wealth
of leads, provided mainly by the Miami Herald's own independent
investigation, which was initiated over the strong misgivings of CCR
and with no help whatsoever from CCR), CCR had drafted no
pleadings, CCR had developed no strategy, and CCR's director,
Michael Minerva, was telling reporters (and the governor) that all
he wanted for his factually innocent client ("innocent" in that he
did not commit the crime) was a reduction in sentence from death
to life in prison.
As undersigned counsel told the Florida Supreme Court, he
would rather go to jail for contempt than allow CCR to handle Mr.
Spaziano's case. This is because CCR has become a pawn of the
institutional powers in Florida attempting to kill Mr. Spaziano.
CCR says it zealously represents its clients, but its zealousness
is a pose. CCR's director, Mike Minerva is not a fighter; he plays a
fighter on television. To accomplish what CCR did when Mark Ol-
ive and Scharlatte Holdman were running the place requires cour-
age and incredibly hard work.
The alternative to aggressive defense lawyering is an unbear-
able coziness with power. As Mr. Spaziano would prove at an evi-
dentiary hearing, CCR has suffered the same homogenizing doom
suffered years ago by the Legal Service Corporation. With one eye
on the governor to whom they owe their jobs and with the other
shut tightly, CCR lawyers have gone the way of deadening medioc-
rity. Everything that cannot be made palatable to the institutional
[sic]
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[sic]powers is killed outright. Spoiled and corrupted by the illu-
sion that it has the "ear" of Governor Chiles, CCR seems to have no
patience to hear my declaration that ninety-six hours is an absurdly
paltry amount of time to prepare for a complex evidentiary
hearing.
Mr. Spaziano would prove at an evidentiary hearing that the
blame for CCR's devolution into a hack public defender office
rests with its leadership, not with its front-line litigators. This lead-
ership constrained the aggressive litigators, making CCR a pariah
among the best capital defenders. Now CCR, although vastly over-
funded and under-worked, feeds the deadly illusion that Florida
does not have a counsel crisis because Florida has CCR. The fact is
that Florida has a counsel crisis worse than Texas precisely because
of CCR. In Texas, everyone can see death row has no lawyers. In
Florida, it is worse than having no lawyers, CCR provides the com-
fortable illusion that death row has aggressive lawyers.
In its brief, CCR pointedly told the Florida Supreme Court
that it was not "conspiring" with me to save Mr. Spaziano's life.
That is true: CCR certainly wasn't working with undersigned coun-
sel; they were doing all they could to give the Florida Supreme
Court pretexts for throwing him off Mr. Spaziano's case. If Mi-
nerva was "conspiring" with anyone, he was conspiring with the
governor who appointed him, the prosecutors he's in bed with,
and the courts whose boots he licks. CCR sure wasn't working with
undersigned.
Minerva's name sounded familiar to anyone familiar with the
kind of lawyers the state of Florida wants as its opponents in capital
cases. When Theodore Bundy as arrested in Florida, he wanted
Millard Farmer as his lawyer. Farmer is the best capital trial lawyer
in the United States, which is why the Florida courts found a legal
technicality to throw him off Bundy's case. And whom did the state
want to be Bundy's lawyer? The local public defender, who was...
Mike Minerva. Most serious students of Bundy believe that the dif-
ference between Farmer and Minerva meant the difference be-
tween life and death for Bundy. Now, undersigned counsel is no
Millard Farmer, and God knows, Mr. Spaziano is no Theodore
Bundy. But Mike Minerva is still Mike Minerva, and anyone who'd
entrust his life to Minerva is too dumb to live.
How different our wold would be had Chiles chosen Mark Ol-
ive, rather than Mike Minerva, to head CCR. Chiles would never
choose Olive as his adversary, any more than Florida would have
[sic]
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[sic] chosen Farmer as its opponent in Bundy. All of them - those
who will kill even an innocent man - would rather be going up
against Mike Minerva. And with very good reason.
Florida thought it had solved its counsel crisis when it created
CCR in 1985. Mr. Spaziano's case indicates otherwise.
One way or another, Florida will have to find a way to provide
logistical support and expertise for pro bono lawyers willing to take
these cases when the bar and the Supreme Court come asking for
help. And they will come asking.
The capital defense bar is entering a crucial time, one that
offers a chance to define our agenda for the coming crisis for capi-
tal representation. Mr. Spaziano's case suggests that the ideas, the-
ories, and institutions of the past are no longer adequate to answer
the challenges and questions before us. For decades, Florida de-
fense lawyers have jumped in and represented condemned prison-
ers. Perhaps the time has come to stop pretending that capital
punishment is a legal system at all. If the system is as worthless as
we say, perhaps the best response is to refuse to play the game any-
more. Perhaps the time has come to say, "On strike. Shut it
down."
On September 12, 1995, Mr. Spaziano's 50th birthday, the
Florida Supreme Court entered an order staying the execution in-
definitely and removing Mello as Mr. Spaziano's lawyer.96 The
Court purported to fire Mello from the case and to force Mr. Spazi-
ano to be "represented" by CCR. It did not work; the Florida
Supreme Court lacks the power to fire Mello, because his client is
Mr. Spaziano, not the Court. And Mr. Spaziano most emphatically
does not want to be represented by CCR, as he and his family have
made clear in writing.
This case involves the question what kind of lawyer an inno-
cent man on death row is entitled. Michael Mello only asked the
Florida Supreme Court to help defray his enormous out-ofpocket
expenses or, in the alternative, to give him some time to find a law
firm willing to provide essential resource support.
Lawyers are not fungible. Mr. Spaziano understands this, even
[sic]
96 Rene Stutzman, Spaziano's Lawyer Files New Requests, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept.
11, 1995, at Cl; Larry Kaplow, Legal Gamble Wins Spaziano Stay, PALM BEACH POST,
Sept. 13, 1995, at 1A; Lori Rosza, Crazy Joe is Granted a Reprieve, MIAMI HERALD, Sept.
13, 1995, at IA; Mark Silva, Court Faces Quandy on Spaziano, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 8,
1995, at IB;John MacKinnon, Spaziano Lawyer: Hearing a "Sham, "MIMI HERALD, Sept.
8, 1995, at lB.
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[sic] if the Florida Supreme Court does not. As Mr. Spaziano would
prove at an evidentiary hearing, for the past 12 years, Mr. Mello has
come to know more than Mr. Spaziano's case. Mello came to
know, and to believe in, Mr. Spaziano's innocence. Mr. Spaziano
and his family trust Mello, and they do so for good reasons. The
latest temporary stay of execution may not last-odds are it will not
last for long. Another death warrant will be signed, and it will be
carried out. But, in an odd way, that will not nullify the impor-
tance of the stay that resulted from the Herald's coverage, no mat-
ter how transitory or ephemeral that stay proves to have been.
There is something grotesque in the Florida court's removal
of Mr. Spaziano's longtime and trusted lawyer a week before Mr.
Spaziano has been scheduled to be killed by the state. It was Jus-
tice Lewis Powell, of all people, who recognized in Skipper v. South
Carolina, that death row prisoners are not exactly like other in-
mates: Condemned people are not just litigating; they are also pre-
paring for death - especially when they are on a fifth death
warrant, as Mr. Spaziano was when the Florida Supreme Court
"fired" Mello and forced CCR upon Mr. Spaziano.
Even when the stays are temporary and even when they do not
result in eventual victory-a life sentence or a new trial-this sort of
litigation can buy the inmate time, sometimes as little as five min-
utes and sometimes as much as years. This may not be what lawyers
usually mean when we talk of "winning." But redefinition of the
notion of winning is an important way of coping with a system that
is often indifferent and increasingly hostile.
For the near-dead, a lifetime can be lived in five extra,
snatched minutes; intimacy with death can carry with it a corre-
sponding new intimacy with life; a love of life, and a lust to live.
Paul Monette, writing of people with AIDS, got it exactly right: "I'm
so rapacious of time .... I wander graveyards now like a math quiz
figuring who we've beaten."97 During that time, new evidence ben-
eficial to the condemned person's case may be found by post-con-
viction counsel and presented in the post-conviction system. Also
during that time, the condemned, like the rest of us, feels joy and
sorrow, has hopes and dreams, grows and changes. In short, they
live their lives. At some moments they are able to take Lambert
Strether's advice in The Ambassadors to live all they can because it is
[sic]
97 Paul Monette, New Year's at Lawrence's Grave, in WEST OF YESTERDAY, EAST OF
SUMMER 37 (1994).
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[sic]a mistake not to. 98
Living one's life, even in the close confines of death row, is
always much more than a legal matter. This is particularly so in the
weeks and months prior to a scheduled execution. It is essential
that the human, extralegal needs of the inmates are recognized
and, when necessary, advocated.
Part of Mello's job as Mr. Spaziano's lawyer - a part CCR can-
not replicate with a client whom despises the office - is to provide
the nonlegal counseling and support help transform an inmate's
appreciation of death from abstract principle to concrete reality,
and so help the inmate-one keeps wanting to write "patient"- pre-
pare to take care Of the unfinished business of this lifetime. This
also places the legal struggle in perspective. We fight not only
scheduled death, but also despair. Mello's goals are to ensure that
the person he represents knows all hope is not lost, the battle con-
tinues, he will not be abandoned, but also the outlook is grim and he
should be preparing himself to die.
Experienced capital postconviction litigators know that there
is a self-defensive instinct to distance one's self from a friend who is
about to die. Yet such distancing is the one luxury we cannot per-
mit ourselves to feel. At the very time when virtually everyone else
is distancing himself from our dying(?) clients, we cannot do so,
even for self-protective reasons, especially for self-protective reasons.
They would be able to tell. That brand of disloyalty risks becoming
a self-fulfilling prophecy.
As Mr. Spaziano would prove at an evidentiary hearing, it is
not really-or maybe one means not only -dying at the hands of the
state. It is living the best possible life knowing that the state is try-
ing to kill you. When one is about to be killed by the state, hope is
both a luxury and a necessity. Erica Goods made the point with
regard to the survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing, but it holds
true as well for my clients. Hope can be like a drug, keeping the
survivors going when the shock and waves of adrenaline are not
enough, protecting them for a few more hours against the oncom-
ing tidal wave of grief. They cling tightly to their illusions. As in
war, hope is critical: without it you die. In court, we defense law-
yers wear the poker face of the war room, slipping into the official
language designed to keep the actuality of devastation at bay: the
[sic]
98 HENRYJAMES, THE AMBASSADORS (1970).
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[sic]moment when a waiting family was informed of a loved one's
execution is "notification"; crisis counseling for our clients' fami-
lies, and for ourselves, is called "debriefing." Yet the office was hit
not by war but by something that had no ready blueprint for how
to act or what to think. People did the best they could. We think
we understand; they think they understand. For people involved in
this sort of killing, even normal gestures of everyday life can move
far beyond reach. As the hours wind down, and the execution
draws closer, hope cannot last.
G. On Lies, Secrets adn Silence
The limited evidentiary hearing ordered by the Florida
Supreme Court is still scheduled to occur on November 15. At that
hearing, Mr. Spaziano will be represented by pro bono trial counsel.
The Florida Supreme Court's ipse dixit notwithstanding, the un-
dersigned remains as Mr. Spaziano's chief appellate counsel in this
Court and in the Florida Supreme Court.
The Florida Supreme Curt's determination to force on Joseph
Spaziano a hack public defender office that is a lapdog for the gov-
ernor who is trying to kill Mr. Spaziano is not unrelated to the
Brady question presented to this court. The court's actions de-
prived Mr. Spaziano's counsel of any ability to challenge effectively
the secret case the state says it has built against Mr. Spaziano. For
the second time in three months, Joseph was scheduled to die in
Florida's electric chair. Governor Chiles signed a new death war-
rant on August 24, apparently based on alleged unidentified (and
uncrossexaminable) sources whose alleged statements to FDLE
were summarized in a secret FDLE report - secret to Mr. Spazi-
ano's attorney, at any rate. In a secret letter Chiles wrote on Au-
gust 17 - the existence of which counsel learned on August 25th,
the day after Chiles signed the warrant and two days after he leaked
the report to the Orlando Sentinel - Chiles directed FDLE that its
investigative materials "may not be inspected or copied" by Mr.
Spaziano's counsel or by any media organization other than those
reporters selected by Chiles himself. See Appendix J.
Thus, the only aspect of the secret investigation Mr. Spaziano
has been able to obtain on his own - no thanks to the govern-
ment, which lied about the contents of the videotape, when the
government believed that counsel would never see the videotape
itself - has proven to be exculpatory in the extreme.
This petition asks the Court to grant Mr. Spaziano access to
[sic]
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[sic] the rest of the secret police report. If the only item we were
able to bootleg was as exculpatory as the videotaped recantation,
what else is there that the state is attempting to keep from Mr.
Spaziano by labeling the police investigation into guilt/innocence
a part of a "clemency" proceeding?
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. GOVERNMENT IN THE DARKNESS, OR THE RUBY RIDGE
FBI WHITEWASH AND THE STAR CHAMBER COME TO TAL-
LAHASSEE: FDLE'S SUPER-SECRET "INVESTIGATION" OF UN-
IDENTIFIED WITNESSES OF UNKNOWN CREDIBILITY OR
SOURCES OF INFORMATION: THAT STILL INADVERTENTLY
UNEARTHED EVIDENCE THAT WAS EXCULPATORY IN THE
EXTREME BUT WHICH WAS NEVER GIVEN TO MR. SPAZI-
ANO'S COUNSEL BY THE STATE - NOT TO THIS DAY
A. On Lies, Secrets and Silence: The Sole Aspect Of
FDLE's "Investigation" Mr. Spaziano Has Been Able
To Obtain On His Own, No Thanks To The
State, Has Been The FDLE Videotape Of
DiLisio - And That Videotape Is Exculpatory In The
Extreme: A State May Not Evade the Dictates of Brady v.
Maryland by Labeling as "Clemency" a (1) Secret Police
Investigation Based on Secret Witnesses into (2)
Whether a Condemned Person - as Opposed to
Another Person - Committed the Capital Murder
Itself, and Whether the State's Obligations under Brady
v. Mayland Continue Through the Post-conviction
Proceedings in a Capital Case?
Mr. Spaziano presents this Court with a rare opportunity to
address an issue of critical importance to not only an innocent man
on death row, but to the very integrity of collateral review of every
state imposed sentence of death. He presents that issue free from
ancillary considerations which could cloud, confuse, or skew a
clear resolution by this Court. Mr. Spaziano is not currently under
warrant of death. The existence of the sought exculpatory material
is howingly obvious. By its citation to Asay, the Supreme Court of
Florida has stated unequivocally that the Brady issue and it alone is
dispositive. This Court can, with a single succinct decision, both
resolve the case and controversy before it and provide guidance to
[sic]
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[sic]state courts which are increasingly becoming the primary arbi-
ter of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause.
Mr. Spaziano, twice scheduled to be destroyed within the past
six months, has a right to know. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), requires the State to release any and all records in its pos-
session which are exculpatory in nature. This obligation extends to
all subdivisions of the State and does not end with affirmance on
direct appeal. Where state law enforcement entities, such as the
FDLE or the Florida Board of Executive Clemency, have discovered
exculpatory material during the course of a post-conviction investi-
gation of a capital case, that material is subject to disclosure so that
the same may be considered by an independent judiciary in post-
conviction proceedings. As the Florida Supreme Court noted re-
cently in Asay, one of only two cases the Florida Supreme Court
cited as authoritative in rejecting Mr. Spaziano's claim:
The preliminary issue we must address is whether the Clemency
Board's records are of a type that can trigger the requirements
of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U. S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d
215 (1962), and its progeny.... This is apparently a case of first
impression. Moreover, the federal Brady issue, and it alone, is dis-
positive of this case.
We have read the cases cited by petitioners, including United
States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and Miller v. Dug-
ger, 820 F.2d 1135 (11th Cir. 1987). Like Ritchie, all focus on
state-sponsored investigations that have gathered evidence
within the same basic time frame as the police investigation and
trial, even if only disclosed much later. Florida clemency investi-
gations, however, by their very nature gather materials well after
the trial and appeals have ended, except for those materials ac-
tually contained in the trial court and appeals records review-
able by the Clemency Board. We find this to be a critical
distinction between this case and those cited by petitioners and
reason enough to deny this petition.
Moreover, Ritchie itself suggested that records afforded a high
degree of confidentiality may be immune from the Brady re-
quirements. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57-58, 107 S.Ct. at 1001-02.
Under Florida law, clemency records enjoy a similarly high level
of confidentiality. Lockett. The state has a strong policy to main-
tain that confidentiality based on the unusually sensitive nature
of some clemency evidence and the exclusive authority of clem-
ency given to the executive by the Florida Constitution. Art. IV,
[sic]
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[sic]§ 8, Fla. Const. This, too, is reason enough to deny the
petition.
Furthermore, the decision in Brady has been in existence since
1963. In that time, no reported case apparently has ever sug-
gested that clemency-related investigations occurring well after
trial and appeals have ended may be the subject of a Brady
claim. The lack of precedent even from lower courts is a strong
indicator that Brady was never intended to apply in this context.
Accordingly, we decline to extend the rule, and we bold that
Brady has no application to clemency proceedings in Florida.
Secrecy is a petri dish for corruption and miscarriages ofjus-
rice. Under such cover, a less trustworthy administration easily
could sell pardons. It happened in Tennessee under Ray Blanton.
Ruby Ridge has taught many of us that police agencies cannot be
trusted to investigate themselves in secret. But Mr. Spaziano's case
shows that this lesson of Ruby Ridge has been lost on Florida's
FDLE, Governor, and Attorney General.
At present, there are almost 3,000 persons sentenced to death
in 38 states, 389 in Florida alone. In each of these states, the gover-
nor, acting alone or in concert with a board of pardons or some
other administrative body, has the power to commute these death
sentences to lengthy prison terms. Governors (as opposed to par-
don boards) have the final say in 24 of the 38 death penalty states;
eleven states require the concurrence of another body with the
governor; the remaining four death penalty states vest the entire
power in a board of pardons. Note, Reviewing Mercy in the Structure
of Capital Punishment, 99 YALE L.J. 389, 392 (1989).
Each of these death row prisoners has the privilege or the
right to some form of clemency review by the chief executive or
other official body. "The laws governing the exercise of clemency
are diverse among the jurisdictions but they share these basic fea-
tures: Clemency decisions are standardless in procedure, discre-
tionary in exercise, and unreviewable in result. As a result, the
clemency hearing in capital cases constitutes a terminal stage of
lawlessness in criminal justice decisionmaking that is symmetrical
with the lawlessness of the initial stage, controlled as it is by the
prosecutor's comparably unregulated and discretionary decision
making authority." Hugo Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in
Death Penalty Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOCIAL CHANCE, 255, 256-
57 (1990-91).
Mr. Spaziano is not challenging the "lawlessness" of the clem-
[sic]
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[sic]ency "procedure;" he is not asking the Court to impose due
process procedures upon Florida's clemency system. What Mr.
Spaziano is asking for is access to exculpatory material that comes
into possession of the state as a result of operation of the clemency
process. No matter how states choose to structure clemency proce-
dures, exculpatory evidence that is generated by those procedures
must be given to the condemned person - particularly here, where
the state's highest court has mandated a judicial evidentiary hear-
ing on the basis of information produced by the secret police
"clemency" investigation into Mr. Spaziano's guilt or innocence.
1. Brady and Truth
The state has an affirmative obligation to deliver exculpatory
evidence whenever and wherever found. "[A] fter a conviction the
prosecutor . . .is bound by the ethics of his office to inform the
appropriate authority of after-acquired or other information that
casts doubt upon the correctedness of the conviction." Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n. 25 (1976); Walton v. Dugger, 634 So.
2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 1993) (addressing public records disclosure in
post-conviction proceedings and "emphasiz[ing] that the State
must still disclose any exculpatory document within its possession
or to which it has access, even if such document is not subject to
the public records law") (citing Brady); See also Moore v. Kemp, 809
F.2d 702, 730 (11th Cir. 1987) (defendant who was not given Brady
material in postconviction proceedings did not get "full and fair"
hearing in that proceeding); Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988)
(there is no procedural default when the state fails to disclose evi-
dence supporting the post-conviction petitioner's claim; the evi-
dence should be heard when it comes to light); Thomas v.
Goldsmith, 979, F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the state's
argument that the defendant/petitioner should have sought Brady
material and have made a Brady claim earlier because the informa-
tion sought was "under control of the state" and the defendant/peti-
tioner could not "make the showing which would justify" relief
without it -"We do not believe that [the Brady claim is defeated by
this conundrum. Rather, we believe the state is under an obligation to
come forward with any exculpatory .. .Evidence. ') (emphasis sup-
plied); id. at 750 (the constitutional "duty to turn over exculpatory
evidence" applies in post-conviction proceedings.); Walker v. Lock-
hart, 763 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (relief granted under
Brady twenty years after conviction where it took that long for evi-
[sic]
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[sic] dence which the state had earlier failed to disclose to come to
light) (emphasis supplied).
In the 30 years after Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)
(per curiam), the Court identified an important class of due pro-
cess rights now commonly referred to as the Brady doctrine. The
state has an obligation to disclose any evidence which tends to ne-
gate a defendant's guilt. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963);
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Through this series of
cases, the Court has uniformly condemned the prosecution's pres-
entation of evidence that is false, that is known to create a false
impression and the suppression of evidence that is favorable or ex-
culpatory to the defense.
The Mooney Court recognized that due process is violated
when "a state has contrived a conviction ... through a deliberate
deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony
known to be perjured." 294 U.S. at 112. Less than ten years later,
the Court held that the same principle extended beyond the pres-
entation of false evidence to include the prosecution's "suppres-
sion ... of evidence favorable to" a defendant. Pyle v. Kansas, 317
U.S. 231, 216 (1942).
In Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (per curiam), the prose-
cution suppressed information which would have "impeach [ed the
state's witness'] credibility," and could have "corroborate [d] the
petitioner's contention." 355 U.S. at 31. The Court held that the
prosecution's presentation of evidence that creates a "false impres-
sion" and the suppression of evidence that 'corroborates" the de-
fendant's theory of defense violates due process under the
principles enunciated in Mooney and Pyle. Id.
In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the court held that
there is no difference between false evidence offered by the state
and false evidence offered by the state and false evidence that goes
"uncorrected when it appears," 360 U.S. at 268. The Court accord-
ingly held that the rule of Mooney
that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including
false testimony .... does not cease to apply merely because the
false testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness. The
jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given wit-
ness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is
upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in




NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
[sic] In the landmark case of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963), the Court framed the holdings of the above cases into a
general principle. The Court again noted the prosecution's obliga-
tion to disclose any evidence in its possession that is favorable to
the defense or that may "tend to exculpate [the defendant] or re-
duce the penalty." Id. at 88. Brady held
that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request violates due process where the evi-
dence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
373 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added).
The Brady rule is quintessential truth-seeking. An individual's
right to a fair trail requires that the false or suppressed evidence be
disclosed so that a defendant is assured "of the basic right to have
the prosecutor's case encounter and 'survive the crucible of mean-
ingful adversarial testing." Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91
(1986) quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984).
The truth-seeking policy underlying the Brady doctrine mandates
that it encompass two situations: the prosecution's offering of evi-
dence that it knew or should have known to be false and the prose-
cution's suppression of evidence favorable to the defense. Because
each type of prosecutorial misconduct perverts and "corrupt[s] ...
the truth-seeking function of the trial process." United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), the Court has uniformly and ada-
mantly denounced both.
When an individual raises a claim of prosecutorial misconduct
under the rule of Brady forbidding suppression of evidence, the
inquiry necessarily takes into consideration the reliability of the
verdict and specifically asks whether confidence in the jury's ver-
dict is undermined. In order to prove a due process violation, a
petitioner must show that the prosecution failed to disclose mate-
rial evidence that was favorable or exculpatory to the defense. The
test for materiality was first announced in United States v. Agurs,
supra, and was later refined in United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667
(1985).
Bagley reformulated the criterion for materiality in light of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), an ineffective assist-
ance of counsel case involving "undisclosed evidence" that high-
lighted the importance of the fact finders' ability to arrive at a just
result based upon all probative evidence. The Bagley plurality held:
The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability
[sic]
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[sic]that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reason-
able probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confi-
dence in the outcome.
Bagley, at 682. The inquiry seeks to determine "whether there is a
reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the fact finder would
have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." Bagley, at 682 n. 13,
quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 695.
This test is not outcome-determinative. An individual
need not show that the [error] more likely than not altered the
outcome of the case. The result of the proceeding can be ren-
dered unreliable, and hence the proceeding unfair, even if the
[suppression of the evidence] cannot be shown by a preponder-
ance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.
Strickland, 66 U.S. at 693-94; accord Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct.
838, 842 (1993) (the essence of the inquiry considers whether the
error caused the verdict to be unreliable or the proceedings unfair
rather than a "mere outcome determination").
Bagley requires the reviewing court to consider whether the
prosecutor's suppression of evidence has "adverse[ly] affect[ed]
the defendant's ability to subject the state's case to meaningful ad-
versarial testing and to present evidence in his favor. 473 U.S. at
683. The reviewing court must "assess the possibility that [an ad-
verse] effect might have occurred in light of the totality of circum-
stances" paying due respect to the "difficulty" of speculating how
the trial would have evolved absent the suppression. Id.
2. The Irrelevancy of How The Government Acquires The
Exculpatory Information Showing that the State is
About to Execute the Wrong Man: Calling a
Police Investigation "Clemency" Does Not
Nullify Brady
a. Brady Matters; Labels Do Not
This Brady obligation does not magically disappear simply be-
cause the state labels the police investigation into guilt/innocence
"clemency." The state's label "clemency" does not alter the charac-
ter of what happened here: A governor, acting sua sponte, ordered
the police to reinvestigate whether the police correctly identified
the right person as Laura Harberts' killer 23 years ago.
As a threshold matter, it is hard to see why this police investi-
gation had anything to do with "clemency." Governor Chiles stayed
[sic]
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[sic] Mr. Spaziano's execution on his own - no stay application or
clemency petition were pending when Chiles acted. Mr. Spaziano
certainly did not request an FDLE investigation, secret or other-
wise; undersigned counsel protested the nature, character, and in-
tegrity of the investigation as early as June - two months before
FDLE reported its secret results to Governor Chiles.
It is no answer to suggest that the FDLE "investigation" exists
in a world separate from this litigation. Attorney General But-
terworth acknowledged as much when he moved the Florida
Supreme Court to hold this case in abeyance pending FDLE's in-
vestigation - a motion this court granted. Further, by leaking the
FDLE report to specific journalists, the State of Florida - be it in
the form of General Butterworth, Governor Chiles, or FDLE has
forged an intimate connection between the unchallengeable asser-
tions supposedly made by their super-secret sources and Mr. Spazi-
ano's attempts to prove his innocence in this litigation.
The DiLisio videotape is exculpatory in the extreme. The
state continues to hide the videotape, along with the rest of its "in-
vestigative" materials. What else is exculpatory? Mr. Spaziano's at-
torney doesn't know. It's a secret.
Two months ago, the governor stayed Mr. Spaziano's execu-
tion after evidence of innocence arose. The Governor investigated
with tons of resources, sealed the results, and re-scheduled the exe-
cution. Undersigned counsel for Joseph R. Spaziano, Michael
Mello, is a distant lawyer who took the case only when a warrant did
not exist, because no-one else had done anything, and because
VLRC was available. Now, for Mr. Spaziano, there is no VLRC, no
CCR, and a new death warrant that could be signed any day.
If Joe Spaziano had a fair trial, so did Randy Weaver, his wife
and his child - and so did the Salem witches. It is useful to recall
that a few years after the "witches" were executed, they were
exonerated.
For 302 years, no other American has been put to death on
the unsupported testimony of an addicted teenager. The state's
only witness now insists he lied under the influence of police pres-
sure, hypnosis and possibly drugs at Spaziano's murder trial 21
years ago. Yet the governor has ordered Spaziano's electrocution
to proceed Sept. 21. How can Lawton Chiles, a decent and consid-
erate man, be so certain. Even the jurors weren't. They recom-
mended life.
Because this killing will be done in our names, we had all bet-
[sic]
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[sic] ter pray that Spaziano really is the man who raped and butch-
ered Laura Lynn Harberts. But even if he is, there are serious im-
plications that will far outlive him. It will be the first time in
memory that someone went to his death on the strength of secret
evidence. Secret evidence! Even the Salem witches were condemned
entirely in public.
Well, not totally secret - notwithstanding the relentless at-
tempts by the government to keep it so. The only piece of FDLE's
"investigation" Mr. Spaziano's counsel has been able to obtain -
independently of the governmental actors - is the videotape of
FDLE's interrogation with Anthony DiLisio, which Mr. Spaziano
has provided to this court. But before undersigned counsel was
able to obtain a copy of the FDLE videotape, Dexter Douglass, Gov-
ernor Chiles' general counsel, lied to reporters about what was in
the tape. When Douglass was confident that Mr. Spaziano's attor-
ney would never see the videotape, the governor's lawyer said, re-
peatedly, that DiLisio did not recant his critical trial testimony -
that critical trial testimony was the trip to the dump with Mr.
Spaziano.
So: the governor's office willfully misrepresented the truth
about the one component of FDLE's investigation I have been able
to obtain, notwithstanding the relentless stonewalling and dis-
information campaign by Florida's governmental officials. The ob-
vious question becomes: If Chiles' office lied about the videotape,
why should we believe any of their other new "evidence" - espe-
cially when they insist on cloaking it in secrecy?
Counsel for Mr. Spaziano obtained the videotape from sources
other than FDLE or the governor's office. Counsel filed this copy
of the videotape under seal; when counsel learned that the govern-
ment had leaked the videotape to the Orlando Sentinel, he withdrew
the sealing request. See Appendices L-Q.
However, the videotape Mr. Spaziano's counsel provided to
the court might well have been tampered with, and selectively ed-
ited, by the government before it was given to the private citizen
who provided it to Mr. Spaziano's attorney. The videotape counsel
filed in this court was 50 minutes long. But Dexter Douglass was
quoted in the Palm Beach Post as saying the videotape lasted almost
twice as long: an hour and 45 minutes.
This is no minor 18-1/2 minute gap. Douglass says the video is
almost twice as long as the videotape possessed by Mr. Spaziano's
attorney. Mr. Spaziano's counsel cannot explain the discrepancy,
[sic]
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[sic]because as stated, FDLE and Chiles still refuse to provide us
with their version.
When governmental officials are this relentless in keeping
something this secret, it is usually because they have something to
hide. The government's disinformation about the videotape belies
its claim that secrecy is needed because their new "witnesses" fear
retribution from the big, bad bikers. There is a simple, more com-
mon sense explanation: The government doesn't want Mr. Spazi-
ano's lawyers to know even the identities of their new, secret
"witness" because those witnesses could easily be exposed as wrong
or as liars.
The governor has a Florida Department of Law Enforcement
report supposedly showing that the key witness, Tony DiLisio, was
telling the truth then (and not now) when he testified that Spazi-
ano took him to the dump and boastfully showed him the corpses
of Harberts and another woman who was never identified. The
FDLE's new "witnesses" have never been heard or cross-examined
in any court, however. They never will be, if the governor has his
way, because FDLE promised them confidentiality.
It is claimed they are afraid of Spaziano's former associates in
the Outlaws motorcycle gang. This is a cowardly smokescreen:
courts have ways of putting witnesses on the stand withoutjeopard-
izing them. For example, one of the governor's secret witnesses is
said to be another former Outlaw already in the federal govern-
ment's witness protection program as an FBI informant. He says
- according to the governor's news release - that Spaziano had
admitted to him before standing trial that he had killed the two
women and had showed their bodies to a young man who he
feared would betray him.
Very interesting. For all we know, it could have been this wit-
ness himself who killed the women. Is this justice? We don't know.
It's a secret.
The governor's secret witnesses also supposedly include
friends and family members who assert that the police and their
hypnotist didn't manipulate DiLisio and that he had told the story
he now denies before the hypnosis, before the trial, and for 20
years since. That may be true, although Douglass' misrepresenta-
tion about the contents of the videotape do not inspire confidence.
But the governors' secret evidence also includes the FDLE's video-
tape of a June 14 interview with DiLisio in which he insists in force-
ful terms that what he says NOW is the truth. Such conflicts belong
[sic]
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[sic]in open court rather than a secret file - especially when a life
is at stake. In the unofficial transcript of the taped interview,
DiLisio says of the crucial visit to the dump that "The cops brought
me there. I had never been there in my life until they brought me
there."
Did Spaziano ever take him?
"No, never."
Had he ever told the police anything before being
hypnotized?
"No, all the facts that I had I got from them to be able to read
them back to them."
Throughout the transcript, the FDLE's crack agent repeatedly
refers to Spaziano as "Foranzo," "Sporanzo," or Spilanzo," until
DiLisio eventually corrects him. Could that be one of the reasons
why the governor doesn't want the file made public? What else did
the FDLE get wrong? What other exculpatory evidence are they
hiding - besides the FDLE videotape, that is.
And what has happened to the nation's best open-government
laws? Relying on a 1993 revision that caught the media lobby nap-
ping, Chiles invokes a total exemption for any record having to do
with executive clemency. How convenient. Clemency happens to
be one of the black holes of American jurisprudence. The Florida
Supreme Court won't touch it. For all the courts care, the governor
could go to Doak Campbell stadium at half-time and let the crowd
decide Spaziano's fate with thumbs up or thumbs down, Roman
style.
The governor's spokesman, Ron Sachs claims that it is not a
secret report because the governor and his staff have reviewed it
"thoroughly." Indeed.
Maybe DiLisio is lying now in his recantation, even though in
doing so he has nothing to gain and everything to loose.
But God help us all, what if he is telling the truth?
b. FDLE: The Keystone Cops
As the DiLisio videotape demonstrates, the FDLE investigation
did reveal exculpatory information. Such was inadvertent.
Again, Ruby Ridge is a fair metaphor for the quality and relia-
bility of the FDLE "investigation." Whatever faith we initially pos-
sessed in the objectivity or integrity of the Florida Department of
Law Enforcement investigation into what actually happened in this
case in the mid-1970's had evaporated even before its secret find-
[sic]
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[sic]ings were transmitted to Gov. Chiles and leaked by him to se-
lected newspapers - to newspapers that could be counted upon to
serve as journalistic bulletin boards for the governor, printing un-
critically whatever his staff spoon fed them, and printing it on page
one, complete with convenient bullet points. The "investigation"
was a whitewash. First, FDLE's institutional and bureaucratic bias
in favor of validating earlier state governmental actors - police
and prosecutors - is too obvious to require much comment. In
the "investigation," Florida governmental agents are investigating
the alleged misconduct of other Florida governmental agents, and
the outcome of such "investigation" may be expected to be thud-
dingly predictable. Such bias in favor of the police and prosecu-
tors in 1975 and 1976 is the simplest explanation for the way in
which FDLE has carried out its "investigation." Second, FDLE ini-
tially said that it was anxious to polygraph DiLisio, but when we
insisted that such polygraph ought to be reliable and professionally
done, the FDLE lost interest.
Third, the thrust of FDLE's investigation appears to be an at-
tempt to smear and discredit Anthony DiLisio, by interviewing
friends and his family members, apparently with an eye to discred-
iting Anthony DiLisio's memory of today, as opposed to attempting
to ascertain why and under what circumstances Mr. DiLisio was
manipulated by the police in the mid-1970's. Fourth, four months
have now gone by since FDLE videotaped its interview with Mr.
DiLisio, and the repeated requests by counsel for both Mr. Spazi-
ano and Mr. DiLisio for a copy of the videotape have been met with
a stone wall of silence. Rather, state officials have selectively leaked
supposed information supposedly said by Mr. DiLisio on the sup-
posed videotape. Fifth, Governor Chiles' chief legal advisor, Dexter
Douglass, told the Orlando Sentinel that DiLisio hadn't recanted his
testimony and that there is nothing to show that Mr. Spaziano was
wrongly convicted. "The record to me is clear," Douglass told the
newspaper. "This man tortured and killed this young woman.
Nothing I have seen or heard from Mr. DiLisio or anyone else
changes that." Douglass said that after Spaziano's execution was
stayed, agents with the FDLE questioned DiLisio again. "All he has
told FDLE is that he can no longer remember" his testimony,
Douglass said. "That, to me, does nothing to discredit the testi-
mony of 1976." These facts - and the logical inferences about the
quality and the integrity of FDLE's "investigation," do not inspire
confidence that the FDLE's agenda was anything more than a
[sic]
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[sic] maneuver designed to provide political cover for the signing
of another death warrant.
After two months of intensive investigation, conducted at an
undisclosed expense to Florida taxpayers, FDLE made the ex-
traordinary discovery that ... Tony DiLisio is a liar and a manipula-
tor and a general ratbag. None of this is news. The fact that Tony
DiLisio was a ratbag was the central point that Mr. Spaziano's de-
fense lawyer was attempting to make about the state's only real wit-
ness 20 years ago, at the original trials. So, 19 and 20 years after the
trial, the state's law enforcement bureaucracy had finally learned
that Mr. Spaziano was right about Tony DiLisio 20 years ago. Bet-
ter late than never.
Of course, FDLE was conducting its investigation in 1995, and
was limiting that investigation to the 37-year-old, comparatively ma-
ture, dried-out and sobered-up Tony DiLisio. So imagine what
DiLisio was like 20 years ago, when he was a teenager, in trouble
with the police for drugs and for criminal activity that included
breakings and enterings, and the like. That Tony DiLisio - Tony
DiLisio the younger - was the pathetic instrument that Florida po-
lice and prosecutors used to frame Joseph Robert Spaziano. If
Tony DiLisio is the scumbag described by FDLE in 1995, just imag-
ine what Tony DiLisio was like and what Tony DiLisio was 20 years
ago, when the cops and the prosecutors used him to frame Joseph
Spaziano for a rape and a murder he did not commit.
All 38 states which have authorized capital punishment have
constitutional or statutory provisions for executive clemency. Her-
rera v. Collins, 113 S.Ct. 853 (1993). Like Florida, all have post-
conviction mechanisms for either the presentation, or investiga-
tion, of evidence which would tend to show that the accused is in-
nocent, has been unfairly tried and/or convicted, or is otherwise
undeserving of the death penalty. Indeed, under Florida law, that
post-conviction mechanism presents the only state court opportu-
nity for capital defendants to present claims arising outside the rec-
ord on appeal. Nixon v. State, 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1990); Cumper
v. State, 506 So. 2d 89 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1987); Whitaker v. State, 433
So. 2d 1352 (Fla. App. 3 Dist 1983). The decision of the Florida
Supreme Court allows the State of Florida to conceal exculpatory
evidence relevant to not only Mr. Spaziano's right to post-convic-
tion review, but also to the integrity of his conviction and sentence.
The decision leaves Florida's post-conviction proceedings neither
full nor fair and deprives death-sentenced individuals of the due
[sic]
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[sic]process afforded under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution.
In other capital cases, General Butterworth has, with thudding
predictability, contended: namely, that a defendant may not raise a
challenge to a conviction based upon a state suppression of evi-
dence if the state successfully suppresses it long enough. The
subargument presented by the state is that it is the defendant's re-
sponsibility to look under the correct shell for evidence, not the
state's trial and post-trial obligation to deliver exculpatory evidence
whenever found.
This proposition is incorrect. It turns on itself - the fact that
the state successfully hides evidence is the proof of, not a defense
to, a Brady or a newly discovered evidence claim.
B. Brady and Its Progeny Are Applicable to the FDLE
Police and the Florida Board of
Executive Clemency
In Brady, the Court specifically held that "the suppression by
the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." Brady, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-1197. Brady's meaning on the
surface is obvious - the prosecution has an obligation to disclose
favorable evidence to the defendant if requested. The true signifi-
cance of Brady, however, is found outside the literal statement of
the prosecutor's obligation. As indicated by the Supreme Court,
the requirement that the government disclose exculpatory evi-
dence is grounded in notions of due process:
The principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society
for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the
accused. Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when
criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration ofjustice suffers
when any accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of
the Department ofJustice states the proposition candidly for the
federal domain: 'The United States wins its point whenever jus-
tice is done its citizens in the courts.'
Brady, 83 S.Ct. at 1197 (emphasis added).
In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Court em-
phasized that "[t]he Brady rule is based on the requirement of due
process. Its purpose is not to displace the adversary system as the
primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a
[sic]
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[sic]miscarriage of justice does not occur." Bagley, 105 S.Ct. at
3379-3380 (footnote omitted). If the proceeding is unfair, the ac-
cused has not received due process. The accused does not receive
a fair judicial proceeding, nor due process, if material exculpatory
evidence is withheld, regardless of where the evidence is located.
U.S. v. Spagnoulo, 960 F.2d 990, 994 (11th Cir. 1992) ("this court
has declined to draw a distinction between different agencies
under the same government"); Martinez v. Wainwright, 621 F.2d
184, 186-88 (5th Cir. 1980) (different "arms" of the government
are not "severable entities").
Disclosure obligations thus should be held to extend beyond
the actual prosecutor. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 107 S.Ct. 989
(1987), this Court framed the issue as follows:
The question presented in this case is whether and to what ex-
tent a State's interest in the confidentiality of its investigative
files concerning child abuse must yield to a criminal defendant's
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover favorable
evidence.
Id. at 993-994.
At issue is Ritchie were the files of the Children and Youth Serv-
ices [hereinafter CYS], a protective service agency established to
investigate cases of suspected child mistreatment and neglect. CYS,
an agency created by the state, was an unrelated third party to the
criminal action, as are the FDLE and the Board of Executive Clem-
ency in the case at bar. CYS did not have any prosecutorial func-
tion. In fact, the Supreme Court specifically noted that "[t] here is
no suggestion that the Commonwealth's prosecutor was given ac-
cess to the file at any point in the proceedings, or that he was aware
of its contents." Ritchie, 107 S.Ct. at 994 n.4.
In Ritchie, this Court was faced with CYS's failure to comply
with the defendant's subpoena requesting exculpatory information
contained in its files, because it claimed its records were privileged
and confidential under a state statute. After recognizing that it tra-
ditionally evaluated claims such as those raised by Ritchie under
the broader protections of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment," Ritchie, 107 S.Ct. at 1001, it acknowledged
that "[i]t is well-settled that the government has the obligation to
turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the
accused and material to guilt and punishment." Id. at 1001 (em-
phasis added). This Court went on to note that "[m]oreover, the
duty to disclose is ongoing; information that may be deemed immaterial
[sic]
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[sic] upon original examination may become important as the proceedings
progress, and this court would be obligated to release information material
to the fairness of the trial." Id. at 1003 (emphasis added).
Under Ritchie, the Brady obligation is on the government, not
just the prosecutor.
At this stage, of course, it is impossible to say whether any information
in the CYS records may be relevant to Ritchie's claim of innocence, be-
[sic] cause neither the prosecution nor defense counsel has seen the infor-
mation, and the trial judge acknowledged that he had not reviewed the
full file. The Commonwealth, however, argues that no material-
ity inquiry is required, because a statute renders the contents of
the file privileged. Requiring disclosure here, it is argued,
would override the Commonwealth's compelling interest in con-
fidentiality on the mere speculation that the file 'might' have
been useful to the defense.
Although we recognize that the public interest in protecting this
type of sensitive information is strong, we do not agree that this
interest necessarily prevents disclosure in all circumstances.
Id. at 1001 (emphasis added).
The court concluded that "Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS
file reviewed by the trial court to determine whether it contains
information that probably would have changed the outcome of his
trial." Id. at 1002.
The Court's recent decision in Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.Ct. __,
57 Cr.L. 2003 (1995), affirms that the strictures of Brady apply to
the government, not just the prosecuting attorney. Kyes states:
While the definition of Bagley materiality in terms of the cumula-
tive effect of suppression must accordingly be seen as leaving the
government with a degree of discretion, it must also be under-
stood as imposing a corresponding burden. On the one side,
showing the prosecution knew of an item of favorable evidence
unknown to the defense does not amount to a Brady violation,
without more. But the prosecution, which alone can know what
is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility
to gauge the net effect of all such evidence and make disclosure
when the point of "reasonable probability" is reached. This is
turn means that the individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of
any favorable evidence known to others acting on the government's
behalf, including the police.
Id. 57 Cr.L. at 2008. (Emphasis supplied).
None of the concerns expressed by the Florida Supreme Court
justify a departure from this rule. As to the contention that clem-
ency records are unusually sensitive: The Florida government's
[sic]
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[sic]decision to withhold its materials from counsel - but not
from its selected journalistic bulletin boards - evinces the
govermnent's bad faith in this case. So does its selectivity:
AFFIDAVIT OF IAN HAIGLER
STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF LEON
I, Ian Haigler, having been duly sworn, hereby depose and say:
1. My name is Ian Haigler, and I have been employed by the Volun-
teer Lawyers' Resource Post-Conviction Defender Organization
(previously known as the Volunteer Lawyers' Resource Center)
for over six years. Among various other duties, part of my re-
sponsibilities have been the collection and maintenance of
records relevant to cases on which the office has worked.
2. In the course of my employment I have very often requested and
been given access to clemency records on capital cases. This has
generally been accomplished by an informal telephone call to
the Governor's Legal Office at The Capitol; I would tell a repre-
sentative of that office which case I was interested in either re-
viewing or having photocopied. Usually, within one or two days,
I would either review the file in a conference room to determine
what items we wished to have copied or request that the entire
file be copied (in cases where the file was very large, arrange-
ments would be made for it to be copied by a private business).
3. Within the past few months, protocol for these requests changed
slightly; I was asked to address a letter to the governor requesting
access to the files. In two instances, I sent letters by facsimile
transmission and was thereafter given access to the files. In the
first instance, I requested that the entire file be copied and ar-
rangements were made with a private firm; in the second, I was
given the file to review in a conference room and thereafter
made copies, personally, of those materials which I had been in-
structed to find.
4. I have never been denied access to original clemency records or
have them photocopied; in fact, it has always proven a very casual
process. Even in those two instances for which written requests
were required, I was very soon thereafter given free access to
what was originally represented to me as full and complete clem-
ency files.
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Mr. Spaziano does not necessarily seek a wholesale disclosure
of clemency records, rather in camera review by an independent
judicial tribunal and, after such a review, disclosure of only excul-
patory material. As to the fact that the Florida state constitution
vests clemency power in the executive branch of state government,
the state constitution cannot trump the federal constitution.
Furthermore, under Florida law, the Attorney General of the
State of Florida, the same person prosecuting Mr. Spaziano during
both direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings, is one of the
members of the clemency board and has access to the very materi-
als being denied petitioner. It is simply impossible to seriously con-
tend that it does not violate the Constitution of the United States
of America for the State of Florida to allow capital defendants to be
marched through the post-conviction process while opposing
counsel conceals exculpatory material under a claim of state execu-
tive privilege. Even if Brady applied only to information within the
prosecutor's personal knowledge, it would apply to the FDLE and
the Board of Executive Clemency.
C. Brady and Its Progeny Require the State to Disclose
Exculpatory Material Discovered After Affirmance
on Direct Appeal.
In Asay, the Florida Supreme Court rested its decision primar-
ily upon a determination that Brady and its progeny do not require
the state to disclose exculpatory information acquired by the state
after a capital conviction and sentence has been affirmed on direct
appeal.
People whom the government are trying to kill are entitled to
due process beyond the parameters of their trial. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana discussed
this precept in Monroe v. Butler, 690 F.Supp. 521 (E.D.La. 1988):
Although Brady dealt with trial conduct, its theoretical focus
deals more broadly with the fairness of the proceeding in which
the condemned conduct occurred. In Brady, that occurred at
trial. The State has never disputed the fact that the nondis-
closed evidence is favorable to Monroe. Nor does the State con-
tend that the evidence is not exculpatory. And this Court found
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[sic] that the evidence was material; it had all the conceptual un-
derpinnings of Brady-type facts.
Nonetheless, the State argued that Brady did not apply because
the nondisclosure did not occur until after the trial. It is instruc-
tive to note that nothing in Brady or its progeny limits its doc-
trine of fact-characterization to the pre-conviction context.
Brady doctrinally stands for the notion that it is fundamentally
unfair for the prosecution to withhold material, exculpatory evi-
dence from the defendant and that the proceeding in which the
unfairness occurred should be overturned so that the merit of
the Brady facts can be considered. Clearly, such nondisclosure is
as unfair where it prevents a defendant from taking full advan-
tage of post-conviction relief as it is when it results in the forfei-
ture of the defendant's right to a fair trial. The prosecutor's
duty to disclose material, exculpatory evidence continues
through the period allowed by the State for post-conviction re-
lief. Any other conclusion would, in the words of the Brady
Court, "cast [ I the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a
proceeding that does not comport with the standards of jus-
tice...." 373 U.S. at 88, 83 S.Ct. at 1197.
Id. at 525 (footnote omitted).
AsJustice Marshall observed in his denial of petition for writ of
certiorari in Monroe v. Blackburn, 476 U.S. 1145 (1986), any other
reading of the rule would be contrary to the basic tenets of Brady:
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215
(1963), this Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution
of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to pun-
ishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prose-
cution." Id., 373 U.S., at 87, 83 S.Ct., at 1196-1197. In United
States v. Agurs, supra, we recognized that
"there are situations in which evidence is obviously of such
substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires
it to be disclosed even without a specific request. For though
the attorney for the sovereign must prosecute the accused with
earnestness and vigor, he must always be faithful to his client's
overriding interest that justice shall be done." Id., 427 U.S., at
110-111, 96 S.Ct., at 2401 (footnote omitted).
The message of Brady and its progeny is that a trial is not a mere
"sporting event"; it is a quest for truth in which the prosecutor,
by virtue of his office, must seek truth even as he seeks victory.
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S.Ct. 3375,
[sic]
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[sic]3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). (Brady rule to "ensure that a
miscarriage of justice does not occur").
The quest for truth may not terminate with a defend-
ant's conviction. In Louisiana, a convicted defendant
must receive a new trial whenever "[n] ew and material
evidence that, notwithstanding the exercise of reason-
able diligence by the defendant, was not discovered
before or during the trial, is available, and if the evi-
dence had been introduced at the trial it would proba-
bly have changed the verdict or judgement of guilty."
La.Code Crim. Proc.Ann., Art. 851(3) (West 1984).
When the sovereign has decided that justice will best be served
by qualifying the finality of a conviction so that a convicted de-
fendant may yet prove his innocence, its attorney is not free to
choose otherwise. And until factfinding proceedings, or the
possibility of them, is terminated, the State remains bound by
the rules of simple fairness that Brady held to be of constitu-
tional dimension. It would hardly make sense to hold the State
to a special duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in any adver-
sarial proceeding and then permit the State to avoid this obliga-
tion by suppressing the very evidence that would enable a
defendant to trigger such proceedings.
In this case there can be no doubt that petitioner's due process
rights were violated by the State's failure to disclose to him the
information that Detective Gallardo related to the New Orleans
police. That the information lay undisturbed in the files of the
police and not those of the prosecutor should make no differ-
ence. This police files that so readily provided the State with the
incriminating material to convict a defendant cannot be turned
into a deadletter repository where evidence of innocence is con-
cerned. See Moore v. Illinios, 408 U.S. 786, 810, 92 S.Ct. 2562,
2575, 33 L.Ed.2d 706 (1972) (MARSHALL, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Smith v. Florida, 410 F.2d 1349, 1351
(CA5 1959). If by now police are not fully aware of their consti-
tutional obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence even in the
absence of a specific request by the prosecutor or defense coun-
sel, this Court should seize this case as a chance to educate
them.
The State of Florida's obligation to place all favorable evi-
dence in the crucible of an adversarial testing does not disappear
when an individual's conviction and sentence of death have
[sic]
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[sic]been affirmed on direct appeal. The post-conviction process
affords Mr. Spaziano his only opportunity to have extra-record
claims considered by the Florida state courts. That opportunity is
neither full nor fair if the state can conceal favorable evidence
from an independent judiciary. Insofar as the state has maintained
that its state post-conviction remedies are entitled to deference, it
cannot be heard to say that it can skew those remedies by conceal-
ing relevant exculpatory evidence.
D. The Ipse Dixit of Labeling this Police Investigation into
Guilt Innocence as "Clemency," and Herrera v.
Collins' Magnification of the Importance that
Clemency Procedures Be Reliable and Fair.
1. The Right Not to be Killed by the State for a Crime You
Did Not Commit: Merely a "Liberty" Interest or a
Fundamental Right to "Life" Itself
The role of clemency as an integral part of our justice system
was reaffirmed by the Court in Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853
(1993). In Herrera, the Court considered whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitled the petitioner to a
new trial or to a vacation of his death sentence in light of newly
discovered evidence supporting his claim that he was innocent. By
a six to three vote, the Court held that the Constitution did not
require that Herrera's execution be stayed pending an evidentiary
hearing on his innocence. The Justices in the majority wrote four
separate opinions, three of which focused primarily on what the
Justices considered to be the overwhelming evidence of Herrera's
guilt.99 However, Chief Justice Rhenquist in his opinion for the
Court suggested that Herrera was not entitled to a new trial on due
process grounds because of the availability of clemency
"[c]lemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of
law, and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of jus-
tice where judicial process has been exhausted. Id. at 866 (foot-
notes omitted). Thus, executive clemency, which is available in all
thirty-six states which authorize capital punishment, is the "'fail
safe' in our criminal justice system." Id. at 867-68 (quoting
[sic]
99 Chief Justice Rhenquist delivered the opinion of the court, with Justice
O'Connor concurring and filing an opinion in which Justice Kennedy joined, Justice
Scalia concurring and filing an opinion in which Justice Thomas joined, Justice White
concurring in the judgement, and Justice Blackmun dissenting and filing an opinion
in which Justices Stevens and Souter joined in part. Id.
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[sic] KATHLEEN D. MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUB-
LIC INTEREST 131 (1989)). Justice Scalia similarly observed that
although the Constitution would allow the execution of an inno-
cent person who had received all the process that our society has
traditionally deemed adequate, convincing evidence of innocence
would undoubtedly result in an executive pardon being granted.
Id. at 875.
The Court's reasoning in Herrera suggests that the due process
protections of Brady apply to capital clemency decisions. ChiefJus-
tice Rhenquist's reliance on clemency as the historical "fail safe" in
our justice system is justified only if meaningful review of capital
clemency requests is mandated by the Constitution. The petitioner
in Herrera had not yet availed himself of a Texas procedure for
seeking clemency because of innocence. Id. at 868-69. But what if
the State of Texas failed to provide a fair procedure for consider-
ing capital clemency applications and simply decided whether to
grant such requests by lottery? Or if it conducted a secret police
investigation, generated evidence that the state was trying to kill
the wrong person, would Brady require Texas to disclose such ex-
culpatory evidence to the defense?
Given that clemency is an essential part of our system of jus-
tice, the assumption that it could be wielded in a blatantly arbitrary
or discriminatory manner is simply anachronistic. An analogy can
be drawn to executive discretion in deciding whether to prosecute
a particular case. Although the executive has broad, some might
say "unfettered" discretion to determine whether to enforce the
laws in a specific case, it cannot exercise this discretion in a selec-
tive manner that violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-09 &
n.9 (1985) (holding that, although the executive has broad discre-
tion as to whom to prosecute, a decision to prosecute selectively
may violate "ordinary equal protection standards"); United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 & n.9 (1979) (holding that selectivity
in the enforcement of federal criminal laws is subject to equal pro-
tection constraints). In like fashion, the broad executive discretion
that exists at the other end of the punishment continuum to de-
cide after conviction whether to commute a sentence does not
mean that the clemency authority can be exercised in an arbitrary
or discriminatory fashion. But cf Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 301
(1983) (asserting that an executive "may commute a sentence at
any time for any reason without reference to any standards"). The
[sic]
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[sic]Supreme Court implicitly recognized as much when it noted
that the president may freely exercise the clemency power in a
manner "which does not otherwise offend the Constitution." Schick
v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974); see also Daniel T. Kobil, The
Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King,
69 TEx L. REv. 569, 617-18 (1991) (arguing that equal protection
constraints apply to use of the clemency power); Elkan Abramowitz
& David Paget, Note, Executive Clemency in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 136, 181-82 (1964) (suggesting that racial discrimination in
granting clemency may give rise to an action for violation of consti-
tutional rights).
In view of existing constitutional precedent and the important
role clemency plays in our system ofjustice, it appears that die pro-
cess protections do apply to clemency procedures, at least in capi-
tal cases. Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454
(1989) is illustrative of the analysis currently employed by the
Supreme Court in procedural due process cases. The Court in
Thompson utilized a two-step test, asking first whether there exists "a
liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the
State," and second, "whether the procedures attendant upon that
deprivation were constitutionally sufficient." Id. at 460 (citations
omitted).
Applying this test to the process employed when determining
whether to commute a death sentence, the question arises, is the
applicant asserting a "liberty" interest, or an interest in life itself?. As
the above quotation from Thompson illustrates, the Court has omit-
ted mention of the protection of life from most discussions of pro-
cedural due process. Moreover, virtually all lower courts that have
considered due process challenges to capital clemency procedures
have analyzed the interest being asserted as one in "liberty." Spinkel-
link v. Wainwright, 578 F. 2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 967 (1979); Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F. 2d 1402 (11th Cir. 1988),
and Otey v. State, 485 N.W. 2d 153 (Neb. 1992). Generally, these
courts rely on Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458
(1981) which characterized the respondents' alleged interest in
commutation of their life sentences as "liberty interests." 100 In
Dumschat, the Court held that the respondents' interests in liberty
[sic]
100 Based on the facts in Dumschat, in which respondents were seeking relief from
their confinement,rather than preservation of their life or protection of their prop-
erty, the Court undoubtedly was correct in identifying the asserted interest as one in
"liberty."
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[sic]via commutation could only be revived by state rules or stat-
utes creating a "right' to clemency °1 because no state statute cre-
ated such a right, the respondents lacked requisite liberty interest
and due process protections were therefore not triggered.
By contrast, it is difficult to say that one who seeks commuta-
tion of a sentence of death lacks the requisite protectable interest.
An unfavorable decision by the clemency authority will deprive
him of life, an interest he presently has (unless we are prepared to
make the harrowing admission that for purposes of the Due Pro-
cess Clause he is already dead).102 Justice Stevens' natural law ar-
gument in Dumschat, that a liberty interest continues while one is in
the legal custody of the state, has greater force with respect to a
"life" interest, since life quite obviously had its "roots" in a source
deeper than state law or rules. Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 468-69 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). Recognition that the asserted interest in life
also vitiates whatJustice Stevens has characterized as the unsatisfac-
tory distinction, employed for purposes of determining when due
process is triggered, between losing what one has and not getting
what one wants. Id. at 470 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Under this ap-
proach, originally put forward in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal
and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979), when one is de-
nied what one has (i.e. when punishment is imposed), due process
applies, but when one is denied what one wants, (i.e. when commu-
tation is denied), due process is not triggered. A capital clemency
applicant clearly still has life, the loss of which will directly and
inevitably follow a denial of clemency. Consequently, the clemency
process in a capital case would implicate an interest specifically
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and any procedure em-
ployed in deciding whether to grant clemency would have to com-
port with due process.
[sic]
101 Dumschat, 452 U.S. at 464-65. Presumably this is because, as later cases have indi-
cated, prisoners'liberty diminishes following incarceration. Hewitt v. Helms, 459
U.S.460,467 (1983).Later cases suggest that liberty interests may also be created inde-
pendently of state law by the Due Process Clause itself. E.g.,Kentucky Department of
Corrections v. Thompson,490 U.S.454,460 (1989).
102 Along this line,one might argue that once an individual has been convicted ad
sentenced to death in accord with constitutional procedures, his life is effectively for-
feited. Thus,in order to be protected by the due process, his "life interest (as distinct
from mere life) must be resurrected through some reasonable expectation based on
state rules or statutes or the Fourteenth Amendment.Such an argument, as my col-
league William Bluth has dryly remarked, would seem to be the ultimate legal fiction.
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[sic] 2. The Inapplicability of Dumschat
However, even if the Court was to determine that capital clem-
ency decisions implicate "liberty" interests, we believe that the pro-
cedural due process requirements of Brady are nevertheless
applicable. As we discuss below, Dumschat v. Connecticut Board is not
[sic] dispositive of the issue of whether a capital clemency applicant
has a right to fair procedure. As the Eighth Circuit pointed out in
Otey v. Hopkins, 972 F. 2d 210, 212 (8th Cir. 1992) the respondents
in Dumschat were alleging that, because of the frequency with
which clemency was granted in Connecticut, the Board of Pardons
had to explain its reasons for denying commutation in a particular
case. The majority in Dumschat responded to this argument by not-
ing that, although commutations in the past may have been readily
forthcoming, the absolute discretion of the Board to grant or with-
hold clemency undercut the prisoners' assertion that they had a
right to clemency which triggered due process. 452 U.S. at 465-67.
By contrast, the argument for procedural due process advanced in
this article is not based on any expectation by the applicant of actu-
ally receiving clemency. The relevant expectation which triggers
the Due Process Clause is the his capital clemency request will be
given meaningful consideration by the ultimate decisionmaker.
10 3
Such an expectation may be rooted either in the Due Process
Clause itself or in specific state procedures used in evaluating re-
quests for clemency in-capital cases.
Although the Court has never held that a capital clemency ap-
plicant has a liberty interest in his request being given meaningful
consideration, the Court should recognize such an interest under
the Due Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment. The Due Pro-
cess Clause seems to be the most logical source of such a right.
However, in its recent death penalty jurisprudence, the Court has
used the Eighth Amendment's proscription of "cruel and unusual
punishment" to impose procedural requirements on the use of
capital punishment. E.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405
(1986). Thus, any challenge to capital clemency procedures should
also take into account the protections of the Eighth Amendment.
Because clemency is an integral part of our federal constitutional
scheme and all state systems of justice, it ought to function in a
[sic]
103 In Otey v. State, 485 N.W. 153, 166 (Neb. 1992), the Nebraska Supreme Court
held that the relevant expectation is merely to "seek a commutation." However, such
a right to "seek" clemency would be empty if it did not presuppose that an application
for capital clemency will receive meaningful consideration.
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[sic]meaningful way. If a criminal punishment system which in-
cludes the death penalty, but not executive clemency, is indeed "to-
tally alien" to American notions ofjustice, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 199 n.50 (1976) (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).then it
would seem that the dispensing of clemency must be more than a
sham or perfunctory exercise. The Court has held that a con-
demned prisoner has no due process right to an adversarial hear-
ing when the governor has the sole responsibility for determining
the sanity of a person as a prerequisite to execution. Solesbee v.
Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950). However, Solesbee would not be control-
ling in the context of an executive clemency decision in a capital
case today. The Supreme Court effectively overruled Solesbee in
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 339 (1986), in which it held that the
Eighth Amendment prevents states from executing insane prison-
ers; thus, the state must employ substantial procedural protections,
including an adversarial hearing, when making a sanity determina-
tion. 477 U.S. at 416-18. Justice Frankfurter's careful, well-rea-
soned dissent in Solesbee, which relied heavily on historical analysis
and the practices used by most states, clearly has more vitality than
Justice Black's terse majority opinion. This is particularly true in
death penalty cases where there is a heightened need to be sensi-
tive to the values underlying the Due Process Clause and where
clemency is historically the vehicle for preventing miscarriages of
justice. Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 866 (1993). Justice Harlan
remarked in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 77 (1957) (Harlan, J., con-
curring) that capital cases stand on entirely different footing that
other offenses, and thus the law is especially concerned with proce-
dural fairness in these cases. Just as the process afforded to one
faced with a fine or prison offense may not satisfy the requirements
of the Constitution in a capital case, so to due process interests may
be implicated in a capital clemency case that are not extant in
other clemency requests. Such a distinction is neither "novel, nor
is it negligible, being literally that between life and death." Id.
Recognition of the unique nature of the death penalty under-
lay the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in McGee v. Afizona State
Board of Pardons and Paroles, 376 P. 2d 779, 781 (Ariz. 1962) (en
banc) which held that a prisoner applying for commutation of a
death sentence is entitled to die process in the form of notice, an
opportunity to be heard, and a meaningful hearing. The court
noted that if the State is to justify taking a human life, an act that
has long been considered immoral, "it must not be done with less
[sic]
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[sic] formality that the spirit and traditions of the law contemplate."
Id. Evidently, the McGee court believed that imposing formal proce-
dural protections benefits not only the individual, but society as
well, for these protections give the condemned "his full measure in
the struggle against the pubic's will." Id. Therefore, the court or-
dered that the Board of Pardons and Parole grant McGee a hear-
ing at which he would be allowed to present evidence that had
bearing upon his application for commutation.
Although the opinion in McGee does not offer a wealth of rea-
sons supporting its holding, the court appears to have been con-
cerned with the intrinsic value of due process in "generating the
feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has
been done." Marshall v. Jericho, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980)
(quotingJoint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
172 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). As Justice Blackmun has
noted, imposing procedural protections may enhance our sense of
a decision's legitimacy. O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447
U.S. 773, 801 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgement).
And society, no less than the prisoner condemned to death, has an
interest in enduring that capital clemency applicants are "person-
ally talked to about the decision rather than simply being dealt with.
TRIBE, supra note 10. § 10-7, at 667 (emphasis in original).
Just as importantly, procedural protections serve society's in-
terest in assuring that accurate decisions are made in cases involv-
ing deprivations of important rights. Id. at 666-67. Generally, in
capital proceedings the Court has required that procedures aspire
to a higher standard of reliability because death if "the most irre-
mediable and unfathomable of penalties." Ford v. Wainuright, 477
U.S. 399, 411 (1986). Thus, due process should require meaningful
consideration of capital clemency requests because such decisions
are the last chance for the State to identify instances of wrongful
conviction or other circumstances that would merit remission of
this absolute punishment.
Florida has promulgated rules governing the procedure for
considering death penalty commutation requests. 1992 Florida
Rules of Executive Clemency applicable to commutation of death
sentences. These rules, although less comprehensive than the ones
previously in force, still provide for a thorough investigative report
by the Parole Commission, a hearing before the Clemency Board
with requisite notice to the condemned inmate's attorney, and an
opportunity for the applicant to present evidence at the hearing.
[sic]
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[sic]Id. However, the rules also specify that they are not to be con-
strued as limiting in any way the powers of the Parole Board and
they suggest that the investigation and hearing provisions are trig-
gered only at the Governor's discretion. Id. at Rule 15 ("The inves-
tigation shall begin immediately after the Commission receives a
written request from the Governor."). Suppose that the Governor,
for whatever reason - personal animus, political expediency, or
perhaps administrative oversight - did not request that an investi-
gation and hearing be conducted by the Clemency Board in a capi-
tal clemency case. In such an event, would the Constitution allow
the application to be summarily denied? We do not believe that it
would. Since the state has raised an expectation that requests for
commutation of the death sentence will be meaningfully consid-
ered, the Due Process Clause imposes a requirement that proce-
dures to ensure meaningful consideration be employed.
In Connecticut Board ofPardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981)
the United States Supreme Court considered whether due process
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to non-capital
clemency decisions. The Court in Dumschat reversed a decision of
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Dumschat v. Board of Pardons,
618 F. 2d 216, 218-22 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (holding that
because inmates had demonstrated a legitimate expectation of
commutation, procedural due process protections attached)) and
held that prisoners sentenced to life in Connecticut prisons did not
possess a protectable liberty interest in having their sentences com-
muted and, hence, were not entitled to procedural due process
from the Connecticut Board of Pardons.
The respondents had argues successfully in the courts below
that life prisoners possessed a due process right to written state-
ments from the Connecticut Board of Pardons explaining why they
had been denied commutation of their sentences. See id. at 217-22.
The Second Circuit upheld the trial court's ruling that the Board
of Pardons had created a legitimate expectation of clemency and
release by virtue of the regularity with which the Board granted
clemency to "lifers." The appellate court relied on findings that
more than seventy-five percent of Connecticut's prisoners serving
life sentences had their eligibility for parole accelerated by the
Board through a grant of clemency and that ninety percent of
those inmates were then granted parole within their first year of
eligibility. Id. at 219-20. According to the appeals court, this "al-
most invariable practice" (Id. at 220 (quoting Dumschat v. Board of
[sic]
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[sic]Pardons, 593 F. 2d 165, 166 (2d Cir. 1979)) and the "over-
whelming likelihood" that life inmates would be pardoned and re-
leased before completing their a life terms gave them a liberty
interest in clemency proceedings. Id. The Second Circuit re-
manded to the district court to determine how many years prison-
ers with life [sic]sentences must serve before the probability of
clemency became so significant as to give rise to a protectable lib-
erty interest. Id. at 221.
This Court, by a vote of seven to two, overturned the decision
of the Second Circuit. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452
U.S. 458 (1981). Although the Court recognized that a state-cre-
ated right can, in some circumstances, implicate procedural due
process protections, the historically high probability of being
granted clemency under the generous practices of the State of
Connecticut did not give rise to such a right. Id. at 46365. Accord-
ing to Chief Justice Burger, the respondents and the courts below
had misconceived the nature of the clemency decisionmaking
process:
In terms of the Due Process Clause, a Connecticut felon's expec-
tation that a lawfully imposed sentence will be commuted or
that he will be pardoned is no more substantial than an inmate's
expectation, for example, that he will not be transferred to an-
other prison; it is simply a unilateral hope.
Id. at 465 (footnote omitted).
The mere frequency with which commutations were granted
did not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest; instead,
in the majority's view, such a claim must be based in "statutes or
other rules defining the obligations of the authority charged with
exercising clemency." Id. Justices White and Brennan concurred
separately in the judgement, but both emphasized that protectable
liberty interests may be found in sources other than state statutes
or rules. See id. at 467. (Brennan, J., concurring) (sources of liberty
interests include "statute, regulation, administrative practice,
contractual arrangement or other mutual understand-
ing... particularized standards or criteria [which] guide the State's
decisionmakers"); id. at 468 (White, J., concurring) (not "all liberty
interests entitled to constitutional protection must be found in
state law"). Since the clemency statute did not provide any stan-
dards or criteria and effectively conferred unfettered discretion on
the Board of Pardons to grant or deny clemency,10 4 the Court held
[sic]
104 The Connecticut statute in question provided:
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[sic] that the Connecticut law created no constitutionally cogniza-
ble entitlement.
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Mar-
shall, disagreed with the majority's contention that liberty interests
are created solely by state law. For the dissenting Justices, it was
'self evident' that individual liberty has far deeper roots." 452 U.S.
at 469 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that all persons are en-
dowed with unalienable liberty rights independent of state laws).
Because of its natural law origins, liberty to some extent survives
after conviction regardless of whether state law so provides. Thus,
the dissenters reasoned, the decision of the Board of Pardons to
grant or deny clemency implicates a prisoner's liberty, and the
State violates the Due Process Clause when it acts arbitrarily in
making this decision. Id. at 470-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices
Stevens and Marshall believed that prisoners applying for clem-
ency, unlike ordinary litigants, have few procedural protections
against arbitrary action, and at a minimum, are entitled to a brief
statement of reasons from the Board of Pardons when clemency is
denied.
The Dumschat decision is relevant to, but not dispositive of, the
issue of whether the Brady continues through in capital clemency
cases. First, the case suggests that Fourteenth Amendment proce-
dural protections may apply to the clemency decisionmaking pro-
cess where the discretion of the decisionmaker, unlike
Connecticut, is "fettered" as a matter of state law. The Court found
it relevant that the Connecticut clemency statute "imposes no limit
on what procedure is to be followed, what evidence may be consid-
ered, or what criteria are to be applied by the Board." Id. at 466. By
implication, a clemency scheme which included some or all of
these strictures would create a constitutional entitlement worthy of
due process protections.
Second, the clemency applicants in Dumschat were arguing
that they actually had an expectation of receiving clemency, and
[sic]
(a) Jurisdiction over the granting of, and the authority to grant,
commutations of punishment or releases, conditioned or absolute, in
the case of any person convicted of any offense against the state and
commutations for the penalty of death shall be vested in the board of
pardons.
(b) Said board shall have authority to grant pardons, conditioned
or absolute, for any offense against the state at any time after the impo-
sition and before or after the service of any sentence.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-26 (1981).
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[sic] thus, the Board of Pardons had to explain its reasons for deny-
ing it. Consequently, Dumschat does not answer the question of
whether a capital clemency applicant has an expectation of receiv-
ing meaningful consideration of his clemency request, regardless of
whatever substantive decision is ultimately made.
Perhaps most significantly, the reasoning of the Court in Dum-
schat is applicable only to those cases in which a liberty interest is at
stake. Since Dumschat, the Court has not followed Chief Justice
Burger's notion that protectable interests are created solely by state
law, having held in later cases that liberty interests may also arise
from the Due Process Clause itself. E.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S.
460, 466 (1983) (liberty interests may arise from two sources: the
laws of the states and the Due Process Clause itself). Chief Justice
Burger in his opinion for the majority simply did not respond to
Justice Stevens' assertion that individuals possess a residuum of
constitutionally protected liberty even while in the custody of the
State. 452 U.S. at 469 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Moreover, the ma-
jority's contention that the basis for a protectable liberty interest
must be found in either state rules or statutes defining the obliga-
tions of the clemency authority fails to take into account several
cases in which the Court has found a liberty interest in other
sources. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-74 (1977)
(child's interest in physical integrity is a liberty interest because it
has historically been protected); Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 633 n. 13 (1980) (interest in reputation in conjunction
with dismissal from employment constitutes a liberty interest); Wis-
consin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) ("Where a per-
son's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because
of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity
to be heard are essential."). However, in the case of a clemency
request by a prisoner sentenced to death, is it not an interest in life
that is being asserted, rather than an interest in liberty? But cf.
Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F. 2d 1402, 1423-24 (11th Cir. 1988) (charac-
terizing the interest being asserted as "liberty"); Spinkellink v. Wain-
wright, 578 F. 2d 582, 617-19 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
976 (1979) (rejecting applicability of due process protections to
capital clemency request relying on "liberty interest" cases); Otey v.
State, 485 N.W. 2d 153, 166 (Neb. 1992) (finding that clemency
procedures did not implicate a "liberty interest"). A life interest
would seem to be extant so long as the person draws breath, re-
gardless of state rules or regulations which might be significant in
[sic]
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[sic]determining whether an interest in liberty continues. In his
short concurring opinion in Dumschat, Justice Brennan stated that
the clemency decisionmaker "can deny the requested relief for any
constitutionally permissible reason or for no reason at all." Dum-
schat, 452 U.S. at 467 (Brennan, J., concurring). Thus, he believed
that no liberty interest in a pardon existed and due process would
not be implicated.
However, it seems unlikely that Justice Brennan would have
extended such reasoning to clemency decisions in capital cases.
For example, could a decision to deny capital clemency be made in
an entirely arbitrary manner? Notwithstanding the vast discretion
typically vested in clemency decisionmakers, surely a governor or
pardon board could not decide to spare the life of every person
whose name begins with the first ten letters in the alphabet. While
this might arguably provide a basis for an equal protection chal-
lenge, such a practice would most clearly run afoul of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
E. The Florida Supreme Court's Penchant for Secrecy in
Deciding Who Dies, and for Lying About What
Happens in Its Secret Proceedings.
Federalism and comity are based on trust. Past experience
teaches that Florida government cannot be trusted to decide who
dies - at least not when those death decisions are made following
secret police investigation of police investigation into whether the
police and prosecutor sent an innocent man to death row and has
kept him there for 19 years (and counting) and five death warrants
(and counting).
The principal legal authority for Mr. Spaziano's claim that he
ought not be killed on the basis of super-secret "information,"
presented and represented by the government as being inculpatory
provided to law enforcement by unidentified people, who allegedly
provided such information under unknown circumstances-un-
known to Mr. Spaziano and his counsel, that is-are Gardner v. Flor-
ida and Ford v. Wainwright, which extended Gardner's principles to
Florida's executive clemency/death warrant "process." Perhaps it
is no coincidence or accident that Gardner and Ford both arose out
of Florida.
This court has had occasion to invalidate Florida's repeated
attempts to base death decisions on secret evidence. Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977), is the most obvious example, but Alvin
[sic]
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[sic]Ford's case is both more recent and more germane. Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), presented a powerful record that
a condemned inmate had become insane following his conviction.
The Governor of Florida proposed to execute him anyway, re-
jecting his lawyers' evidence of his insanity after executive proceed-
ings that had none of the attributes of a fair hearing. The
constitutional claim might have been cast in either of two ways: (1)
as an argument that due process requires fair procedures for deter-
mining the sanity of a condemned inmate who asserts that s/he is
mentally incompetent to be executed (even if the right not to be
executed while mentally incompetent is purely a matter of state
law); and (2) as an argument that there is a substantive Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment right not to be executed while insane;
that a deferral habeas corpus court is obliged by Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293 (1963), and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) to make an in-
dependent determination of sanity for this purpose unless the
State employs full and fair procedures to determine the facts bear-
ing upon a death-row inmate's mental competency; and that the
Florida Governor's procedures in Ford were neither full nor fair.
However, the decision whether to make both forms of argument
was quite complicated. Among other concerns, there was a risk
that the first argument, while easier to win because of its limited
implications for other cases, would commend itself to the courts as
a compromise but leave Ford exposed to execution after a second
Governor's hearing, employing improved procedures, produced
the same predictable determination by partisan state officials that
Ford was mentally sound as a bell. Ford's lawyers did eventually
choose to make both arguments but refined them by emphasizing
that a competency hearing conducted by partisan executive offi-
cials could meet neither habeas due process requirements nor the
Townsend-§ 2254 standards requiring federal habeas courts to defer
to state factfindings made pursuant to "full and fair" hearing proce-
dures. In this form, the second constitutional argument was proba-
bly narrower in its implications than the first, and it prevailed in
the Supreme Court.
Commentators have, in recent years, acknowledged that the
Florida Supreme Court's treatment of Gardner v. Florida has been
less than forthright. David von Drehle; Neil Skene. The court's
fullest elaboration of Gardner concerned the infamous "Brown
issues."
The so-called "Brown" (Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327
[sic]
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[sic] (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1000 (1981)) claim was the follow-
ing: a constitutional challenge to the Florida Supreme Court's se-
cret, ex parte solicitation of psychological screening reports on
Florida death row prisoners. The reports, prepared by the Florida
prison system as part of its routine procedures for handling new
prisoners, wound up in the Florida Supreme Court files of at least
25 capital inmates between 1976 and 1978. Neil Skene, Review of
Capital Cases: Does the Florida Supreme Court Know What It's Doing?, 15
STETSON L. REv. 263, 286 (1986); see also Brown v. Wainwright, 454
U.S. 1000, 1000-03 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). The problem apparently began as early as 1975. See
Ford, 696 F.2d at 874 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). The information had not been disclosed to defense
counsel who were appealing the inmates' convictions and
sentences to the Florida Supreme Court.
Soon after the court's secret practice came to light-fortui-
tously during an oral argument before the Florida Supreme
Court-all 123 inmates then on Florida's death row, at various
stages of their appeals and postconviction proceedings, filed a class
action petition for habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court.
Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1000 (1981). Prisoners able to prove that information in their
cases had in fact been secretly solicited relied upon Gardner v. Flor-
ida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) which recognized a defendant's right to
see and challenge information used against him in capital sentenc-
ing proceedings. Inmates who could not demonstrate that secret
information had actually been obtained by the Florida Supreme
Court in their cases argued that the use of the screening report in
some cases tainted the overall fairness of capital sentencing and
required the invalidation of all death sentences in Florida. Brown,
392 So. 2d at 1328-30. Since Joseph Green Brown was first on the
alphabetical list of class members, the case became styled Brown v.
Wainwright, and the claim became known as the "Brown issue."105
(Ironically, Joseph Green Brown was most likely innocent of the
[sic]
105 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1000 (1981). Richard Blumenthal, If
An Innocent Person Can Be Executed, the Death Penalty is Unworkable, Hartford [Conn.]
Courant, May 17, 1987, at DI; Styron, Death Row, N.Y. Times, May 10, 1987, at A25, col.
1; Siegal, Sentencing the Wrong Man to Die, LA. Times, May 10, 1987, at Al, col. 1; Fink,
Given New Life After Death Row, Man Fights Capital Punishment, Hartford [Conn.] Cou-
rant, Mar. 19, 1987, at Al; Krasnow, Ex-Inmate Wants Story To Be Told, Florida Times-
Union/Jacksonville Journal, Mar. 14, 1987, at Al; Port, Freed Prisoner Talks of Brush With
Death, St. Petersburg [Fla.] Times, Mar. 14, 1987, at Al.
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[sic]offense for which he was sentenced to death; in 1986, the Elev-
enth Circuit mandated retrial due to prosecutorial misconduct, the
state elected not to retry Green, and he was released from prison in
1987).
As to the class action "Brown issue" the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida denied the habeas petition on the merits, as a matter of law.
106
The court stated that "the doctrines of constitutional law here ar-
gued are singularly unpersuasive." Id. at 1331. Moreover, the court
held that "[e]ven if petitioners' most serious charges were accepted
as true," that would not change the court's decision: "[A] s a matter
of law our view of the non-record information petitioners have
identified is totally irrelevant either to our appellate function in
capital cases as it bears on the operation of the statute, or as to the
validity of any individual death sentence." Drawing a distinction be-
tween sentence "review" and sentence "imposition, the court con-
cluded that" [s]ince we do not 'impose' sentences in capital cases,
Gardner presents no impediment to the advertent or inadvertent
receipt of some non-record information .... [N]on-record infor-
mation we may have seen, even though never presented to or con-
sidered by the [trial] judge, the jury, or counsel, plays no role in
capital sentence 'review'." Id. at 1332-33. Accordingly, "[a]s we
view the case.., appellate review can never be compromised ... by
the receipt of any quantity of non-record information." Id. at 1333
n. 16. All relief was denied to each petitioner.
Because Florida Governor Robert Graham signed his death
warrant, Alvin Ford became the first member of the 123-prisoner
Brown class to reach the Eleventh Circuit. Ford v. Strickland, 676
F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1982), vacated by operation of law for rehearing en
banc, 696 F. 2d 804 (11th Cir. 1983) (en banc). A panel of the
Eleventh Circuit had temporarily stayed Ford's then-imminent exe-
cution to allow for review, but subsequently denied substantive re-
lief. See Ford v. Strickland, 676 F. 2d 434 (11th Cir. 1982). By a
narrow 6-5 vote, with Judge Vance casting the decisive sixth vote,
[sic]
106 Brown, 392 So. 2d at 1333. The court criticized the procedure ofjoining multi-
ple habeas corpus petitioners in a single petition, and said that "[i]n the future, at-
tempts to create a class action habeas corpus proceeding in situations such as this will
be rejected summarily." Id. at 1330. However, in the present case "[t]o avoid absurd
technicalities," the court "decline[d] to treat each petition as if it were separately filed
and enter a separate order or opinion on each. Rather, [the] disposition of Brown's
petition effectively dispose[d] of all claims for relief of those petitioners who have
joined with Brown." Id. The court's final order was that "It ] he petitions of Brown and
the others for writs of habeas corpus and for other extraordinary relief are denied."
Id. at 1333.
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[sic]the en banc Eleventh Circuit found Florida's procedure con-
stitutionally tolerable. Ford, 676 F.2d at 808-11. It based that deter-
mination on Alice Through the Looking Glass reasoning that the Flor-
ida Supreme Court deliberately and regularly obtained ex parte infor-
mation of an important nature, but then failed to "use" it. Judge
Vance at oral argument had been "obviously unsatisfied by these
verbal distinctions. 'I'm trying desperately to understand you,' he
intejected [into the prosecutor Charles Corces' argument]. 'Ijust
want one plausible explanation." DAVID VON DREHLE, AMONG THE
LOWEST OF THE DEAD: THE CULTURE OF THE CONDEMNED 176 (Ad-
vance Readers' Edition Random House 1995). Von Drehle wrote
that "under attack, Corces fell back on his gut-level argument-the
dignity of the state supreme court. 'We are not dealing with a law-
suit with private citizens. We are talking aboutjudges. Judges who
have almost absolute immunity,' he said. Corces appealed to the
court's sense of itself, of the station and integrity of their office as
judges. An institution as lofty as the Florida Supreme Court must
be given the benefit of the doubt, he insisted. 'When they say they
did not consider it, we have to accept it."'
The Eleventh Circuit majority view was expressed in two opin-
ions. The plurality opinion assumed that resort by an appellate
court to secret materials in reviewing capital sentences would vio-
late Gardner v. Florida. Id. at 809-10. However, the plurality read
the Brown opinion as a statement that the Florida Supreme Court
did not "use" the materials it had solicited. Id. at 811. Judge
Tjoflat concurred specially. He determined that the Florida court
had read the materials but that it had not relied on them. Id. at
832-33 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.) The
concurring opinion then noted that the outcome might have been
different had Mr. Ford separately alleged that "as a matter of fed-
eral constitutional law, members of the Florida Supreme Court
should be forced to step down in this situation on the ground of
appearance of impropriety." Id. at 833.
The logic of the plurality would be laughable were it not so
important to the lives of six score human beings. Twenty-three
members of the Brown class have since been executed DEATH Row,
U.S.A. (listing all post-Furman executions); Brown v. Wainwright,
392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla.) (style of case listing class members), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1000 (1981): Nollie Lee Martin, Carl Shriner,
Daniel Thomas, Aubry Adams, David Funchess, James Raulerson,
Raymond Clark, Marvin Francois, James Adams, Anthony Antone,
[sic]
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[sic]Bernard Bollander, Theodore Bundy, Arthur Goode, Timothy
Palmes, Roy Stewart, Robert Sullivan, Buford White, Jesse Tafero,
Willie Darden, Ronald Straight, Johnny Witt, Ernest Dobbert, and
David Washington. All were members of the Brown class. At least
17 others remain under sentence of death: Douglas Meeks, Robert
Heiney, Marvin Johnson, Bobbie Lusk, Jimmie Lee Smith, Gregory
Mills, Raleigh Porter, McArther Breedlove, Levis Aldridge, Paul
Scott (scheduled to be executed on November 12, 1994), Terry
Sims, William White, Gary Alvord, Stephen Booker, Carl Jackson,
Frank Smith, and Walter Steinhorst
1 1
7
The Ford plurality's major premise was that the Florida
Supreme Court did not "use" the ex parte materials that it had solic-
ited. Yet, as Justice Marshall wondered in dissent from the denial
of certiorari in Brown, "if the [Florida Supreme] [C]ourt does not
use the disputed nonrecord information in performing its appel-
late function, why has it systematically sought the information?"
Brown v. Wainwtright, 454 U.S. 1000, 1002 (1981) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari). Further, the Florida Supreme
Court in Brown did not quite say otherwise. Eleventh Circuit Chief
Judge Godbold noted (charitably) "the intractable ambiguity" of
the Florida court's Brown opinion. Ford, 676 F.2d at 821 (Godbold,
C.J., dissenting in part and specially concurring in part). He ob-
served that a majority of Eleventh Circuit judges inferred that the
Florida Supreme Court had not used the secret material; another
circuit judge said the Florida court "actually did consider" the ma-
terial; and still another judge said the Brown opinion raised a "pre-
sumption" that the material had been used.
The secret practice itself betrays the hollowness of the plural-
ity's semantic distinction between "use," on the one hand, and "so-
licit," "receive," "see," "read," "review," and "consider," on the
other. Word games aside, the 6 to 5 majority's conclusion in Ford
that the Florida Supreme Court did not "use" the materials was
belied by actual experience. The oral argument before the Florida
Supreme Court that inadvertently revealed the practice to the
outside world made the point. Paul Magill had been sentenced to
death. At oral argument on direct appeal before the Florida
Supreme Court, Magill's attorney urged that a life sentence should
have been imposed. She relied, in part, upon psychiatric informa-
[sic]
107 Telephone conversation with Dr. Michael Radelet, Professor of Criminology,
University of Florida, May 29, 1991. Some of these inmates (Jimmie Lee Smith, Ste-
phen Booker and Frank Smith, for example) are pending resentencing.
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[sic] tion presented to the trial court. Counsel was then questioned
by Florida Supreme Court justice about an inconsistent, extra-rec-
ord psychological evaluation"'8 that the Florida Supreme Court
had secretly obtained from the prison. See Skene, supra, at 286 (cit-
ing Scott Justices Saw Confidential Psychological Profiles of Death Row
Innmates, St. Petersburg [Fla.] Times, Aug. 19, 1980, at IB). David
von Drehle provides the history behind-the-scenes in AMONG THE
LOWEST OF THE DEAD: THE CULTURE OF THE CONDEMNED (Ran-
dom House Advance Reader's Ed. Feb. 1995). That is "use." Res
ipsa loquitur.
F. Anatomy Of A Whitewash: The Flipside of Brady, and
the State's Super-Secret "Process" and the Super-
Secret Witnesses That "Process" Produced: 'J.J.
Hall," For Example? Mr. Spaziano's
Attorney Doesn't Know: It's A Secret
Governor Chiles signed the active death warrant on Joseph R.
Spaziano based on alleged information allegedly provided to FDLE
agents by unidentified - but really really trustworthy and reliable
our government officials demand us to take on faith - people who
live their lives in the federal witness protection program. For all we
know, J.J. Hall - or a dirtball like him - was FDLE's and Gover-
nor Chiles' super-secret "information" that formed the basis of the
active death warrant. Mr. Spaziano does not know, of course, who
these secret witnesses are against him. But we do know the kind of
secret witnesses that state and federal law enforcement have used
in the past, particularly one J.J. Hall. As set out in Appendix -'
the J.J. Hall example does not inspire confidence.
G. Without Access to Crucial Public Records, Mr. Spaziano
Cannot Effectively Respond to the Government's
Stealth Assault Against Him in the Media.
The Florida Supreme Court requires that a prisoner whose
case has become final receive criminal investigative police records
as provided in Chapter 119. See Anderson v. State, 627 So. 2d 1170
[sic]
108 The exchange between the justice and Magill's lawyer was preserved on the au-
dio tape of the oral argument. Florida Supreme Court oral argument tapes are avail-
able to the public and may be obtained from the court clerk's office in Tallahassee,
Florida.
The published opinion resulting from the oral argument is reported as Magill v.
State, 386 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981). The Magill opin-
ion sheds no light up on the Brown issue.
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[sic] (Fla. 1993); Muhleman v. Dugger, 623 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1993);
Walton v. Dugger, 634 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1993); State v. Kokal, 562 So.
2d 324 (Fla. 1990); Provensano v. Dugger, 561 So. 2d 541 (Fla.
1990). See also Mendyk v. State, 592 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 1992). An
evidentiary hearing may be required on the public records issues.
Walton v. Dugger, 634 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1993). The Court will ex-
tend the time period for filing Rule 3.850 motions where public
records have not been properly disclosed. Jennings v. State, 583 So.
2d 316 (Fla. 1991); Engle v. Dugger, 576 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 1991);
Provenzano, supra.
Crucial public records have not been released to petitioner.
Once such information is released counsel will respond to General
Butterworth's factual contentions. Cf Brown (Lary) v. State, 596 So.
2d 1026 (Fla. 1992); Woods v. State, 531 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1988). See
also Rule 3.851 (b) (3) ("[T]his time limitation shall not preclude
the right to amend or to supplement pending pleadings pursuant
to these rules.")
The State of Florida is required to provide counsel to death
row inmates to prepare and file post-conviction actions. Death-sen-
tenced inmates are entitled to the effective assistance of such coun-
sel. Spalding v. Dugger, 526 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1988).
As set out in documents filed previously with this court, the
Capital Collateral Representative - the state agency charged with
the representation of death-sentenced inmates - does not repre-
sent Mr. Spaziano.
Undersigned counsel has accomplished very little of that to
which Mr. Spaziano is entitled. This incomplete motion is filed
because it is required to be filed before Mr. Spaziano is scheduled
to be killed. Petitioner believes that this motion contains grounds
upon which relief must be granted. However, this motion does not
contain all the grounds upon which relief must be granted, and the
claims as presented herein will have to be amended, due to Peti-
tioner not yet having received the assistance required by Florida
law.
The Florida Supreme Court and the Florida rules recognize
that circumstances arise under which it is impossible for a mean-
ingful Rule 3.850 motion to be filed within the time limitations
provided in Rule 3.850. When problems with the representation of
a death-sentenced inmate arise which make it impossible or im-
practical for that inmate to be meaningful represented, the Court
will extend the time for the filing of a Rule 3.850 motion. See Wick-
ham v. Singletay, No. 73,508 (Order entered May 20, 1994); Routly
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[sic] v. Wainwright, No. 69,089 (Order entered December 30,
1986); Wright v. State, No. 64,391 (Order entered January 21,
1988); Atkins v. State, No. 65,974 (Order enteredJanuary 19, 1989);
Dufor v. State, No. 65,694 (Order entered February 1, 1989).1°9
II. THE FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL MUST RECUSE IT-
SELF FROM THIS LEGAL CASE BECAUSE OF A CONFLICT
OF INTEREST ARISING FROM ITS MANDATED ROLE AS A
MEMBER OF FLORIDA'S CLEMENCY BODY?
Florida Attorney General Butterworth's last motion for exten-
sion of time in the Florida Supreme Court evinced his pre-judg-
ment of Mr. Spaziano's pending application for executive
clemency. Clemency in Florida requires a recommendation by the
governor and four votes from the executive cabinet. The attorney
general is one of seven members of the cabinet, any one of which
can call for a clemency hearing.
General Butterworth's long-standing position before the state
and federal courts - that procedural technicalities preclude judi-
cial consideration of Mr. Spaziano's evidence of innocence - com-
promises any pretense of neutrality when he acts in his capacity as a
member of the executive cabinet. This Court lacks the constitu-
tional power to remove General Butterworth from his position as
judge of Mr. Spaziano's clemency.
But the Court does have the constitutional power to remove
General Butterworth from his role as zealous advocate for Mr.
Spaziano's execution without need for a new trial. This Court has
the constitutional duty to ensure that law firms practicing before
this court are not burdened by conflicting interests. In the interest
of ensuring General Butterworth's actual and apparent neutrality in
his role as cabinet member, Mr. Spaziano moves for this court to
remove General Butterworth, and the law firm over which he pre-
sides, from Mr. Spaziano's case, and to permit the state courts to
appoint a special prosecutor not burdened by General But-
terworth's conflicting institutional functions.
[sic]
109 Under Rule 3.851, a death-sentenced inmate is entitled to have counsel assigned
to his or her case and "addressing the petitioner's postconviction issues within thirty
days after the judgement and sentence becomes final." An extension of time is ex-
pressly provided for "if the petitioner's counsel makes a showing of good cause for
counsel's inability to file" the postconviction pleadings in a timely manner. Id., at sub-
section 3. Furthermore, Rule 3.851 expressly provides for amendment and supple-
mentation of pending Rule 3.850 motions.
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[sic] Governor Chiles' denial ofJoseph Spaziano's most recent
clemency application does not moot the conflict of interest prob-
lem set out by Mr. Spaziano's previously-filed recusal motion. An-
other clemency application might be filed at any time.
Further, General Butterworth, through his Assistant Attorney
General, Margene Roper, responded to Mr. Spaziano's recusal mo-
tion by making factual representations about the lines of communi-
cation within the Attorney General's office.
Putting such facts into dispute, is, of course, the tactical pre-
rogative of General Butterworth. However, now that General But-
terworth has chosen to pierce the veil of confidentiality of the law
firm - by raising factual issues concerning what of the firm's law-
yers knew what, when they knew it, and what they did with that
knowledge - Mr. Spaziano is entitled to full discovery on the fac-
tual issues that General Butterworth has raised. Ms. Roper's willful
misrepresentation of the truth concerning her idiotic "service of
process" claim - contained in her latest motion to delay judicial
consideration of this case, rebutted in Mr. Spaziano's reply to Ms.
Roper's response, and not disputed in any way in Ms. Roper's sub-
sequent filings - do not inspire confidence in her latest factual
representations.
Further, the Florida Attorney General's office has a history of
lying to courts about even the public records in this case (as op-
posed to the super-secret information about which Florida's gov-
ernmental officials ask us to take at their word). Mark Menser, Ms.
Roper's predecessor counsel in this case, was compelled to own up
to factual misrepresentations of the truth he made during oral ar-
gument in Spaziano v. Florida in the United States Supreme Court,
in 1984.
April 20, 1984
Alexander L. Stevas, Clerk
United States Supreme Court
First and Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20543
Re: Spaziano v. State of Forida
Case No. 83-5596
Dear Mr. Stevas:
During oral argument in the above-referenced case, I inadver-
tently stated that Spaziano had been convicted of certain crimes
[sic]
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[sic]for which he was still a suspect. His correct record is con-
tained in the pre-sentence investigation filed in the joint
appendix.







United States Supreme Court
First and Maryland Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C.
Re: Spaziano v., Florida,
Case Number: 83-5596
Dear Mr. Stevas:
This second letter is being submitted because of information ob-
tained upon full review of the record.
As noted in my first letter, I represented during oral argument
that Mr. Spaziano was involved in some homicides and bomb-
ings, without mentioning he was still under investigation (or, as
suspect). Since then, I have reviewed his presentence investiga-
tion more thoroughly and have detected a second error.
The young lady Mr. Spaziano attacked in Orlando was stabbed
around the eyes as characterized in oral argument. However, I
did not recall the fact that her eyesight was restored (or saved).
[sic]While these facts do not relate directly to the legal ques-
tions before the court, I wish to correct any error or misimpres-
sion caused by my mistakes. I am deeply embarrassed by the
errors and assure you that they were the product of a bad mem-
ory (and stage fright) and not any desire or intention to mislead
the court.
I would like to file a corrective pleading, if you think it necessary
to make certain the record is clear.
Again, I deeply regret the error and wish my apologies to be
[sic]
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III. THIS COURT'S NEW PAGE LIMIT OUGHT NOT APPLY
TO DEATH ROW PRISONERS SEEKING PLENARY REVIEW
BY THIS COURT: LIMITING MR. SPAZIANO'S CERTIO-
RARI PETITION TO FORTY PAGES WOULD VIOLATE MR.
SPAZIANO'S RIGHTS TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF APPELLATE COUNSEL, AND REQUIRE COUNSEL TO
VIOLATE NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR COMPETENT
PERFORMANCE OF PRO BONO CAPITAL APPELLATE
COUNSEL.
This Court has repeated the conventional wisdom that appel-
late counsel should narrow the range of issues to be considered by
an appellate court, Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1983), but
has never addressed counsel's responsibilities to narrow issues in
the death penalty context. Counsel maintains that he would vio-
late national standards for competent performance of capital ap-
pellate counsel to do less than raise all issues he wished to raise and
to raise them fully for reversal. Both the American Bar Association
and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association agree that
capital appellate counsel
should seek, when perfecting the appeal, to present all arguable
meritorious issues, including challenges to any overly restrictive
appellate rules.
ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, Guideline 11.9.2.D (1989); National Legal Aid and
Defender Association, Standards for the Appointment and Performace
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Standard 11.9.2(d) (1989). The
reason for this strategy stems from the dual role of counsel in
death cases: On the one hand, counsel must persuade the appel-
late court that prejudicial error occurred, but at the same time
counsel must preserve all arguable issues for review.
Defense counsel cannot anticipate with any certainty future
capital punishment law: It is still of recent origin, bewilderingly
complex, and subject to frequent change. Faced with strict default
[sic]
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[sic]rules and confusing constitutional commands, counsel can
only conclude that his client will more likely face execution if is-
sues are "narrowed." The ABA and NLADA explain:
Traditional theories or appellate practice notwithstanding, ap-
pellate counsel in a capital case should not raise only the best of
several potential issues. [Footnote omitted.] Issues abandoned
by counsel in one case, pursued by different counsel in another
case and ultimately successful, cannot necessarily be reclaimed
later. When a client will be killed if a case is lost, counsel (and
the courts) should not let any possible ground for relief go
unexplored or unexploited.
Guidelines, supra at Guideline 12.9.2.D Conunentary; Standards, supra
at Guideline 12.9.2(d) Commentary.
Taking from capital defense counsel the power of deciding
how many issues to raise counsel and in what form violated Mr.
Spaziano's right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. Even
when the federal court acts to protect a strong state interest, orders
impingimg on the professional judgment of counsel must give way
to ensure the right to counsel. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80,
87 (1976) (important judicial interest in no coaching of defendant
before testimony does not overcome interest of defendant in his
right to confer with counsel).
Likewise, when counsel believes briefing many issues is in his
client's best interest, the right to counsel outweighs the interest of
the appellate courts in having short briefs or petitions. Interfering
in this professional judgment would require - and in this case did
require counsel to forgo substantial factual and legal arguments.
professional judgment, partly based upon the ABA and NLADA'
standards of competent performance, distinguishes this case from
Jones v. Barnes. In Jones, this Court held that defense counsel need
not raise eery colorable claim requested by a client. However, the
Court's holding in Jones - while partly based on the benefits of
[sic]narrowing issues - raised heavily on counsel's professional
judgment, which in this case is that all colorable issues must be
raised. Mr. Spaziano suggests that it would conflict with the hold-
ing in Jones to say that it is the business of the courts, not counsel,
to decide how many issues should be raised.
Although courts may have an interest in controlling the size of
a party's brief, they cannot legitimately require counsel to fully
brief complex constitutional and factual issues on pain of default
- and then limit the briefs size. This Court's guidance is needed
on this unresolved issue, one which is likely to recur in light
[sic]
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[sic]of the evolving ABA and NLADA standards for capital appel-
late counsel.
Rules which interfere with functions properly exercised by
counsel violates the sixth amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). When counsel finds numerous errors in a death
penalty case, a court order to reduce a brief as drastically as in this
case guarantees that counsel will forgo substantial factual and legal
arguments. The ABA has adopted the standard that counsel
should seek to present all arguable issues in a capital appeal.
[sic] Moreover, this Court has recognized that a capital appeal must
be thorough to ensure meaningful access to postconviction relief.
The order at issue here required counsel to ignore his proper
function to persuasively brief the issues presented. If he keeps all
his issues but reduces arguments thereon, so much substance will
be cut as to render the result unreliable. If he drops or lists issues,
or files a supplemental brief, his claims will likely be defaulted.
The length of the brief counsel wished to file in this case was
due to counsel's choice to raise certain significant issues and,
equally important, to raise such issues adequately. Such a decision
follows national standards for competent performance by appellate
counsel. Compliance with the court's page limit would require
counsel to consider the workload interests of the court over the
client's interests, interfered with the proper fimction of counsel in
deciding which issues to brief. Counsel professionally and compe-
tently chose to raise Mr. Spaziano's issues in reasonable space, con-
sidering the enormous complexity of the case. No suggestion has
been made that counsel has raised any frivolous issues. The Court
should issue its writ of certiorari to prevent he usurpation of coun-
sel's authority.
The issues presented here by Mr. Spaziano are important and
appear to be of first impression.
CONCLUSION
Joseph Robert Spaziano is innocent. The state possesses evi-
dence showing his innocence. The principles of Brady require the
state to reveal that evidence to Mr. Spaziano; Brady must require
hte state to disclose all evidence suggesting it is attempting to kill
an innocent man.
The fact that the state has chosen to label the state-ordered
police investigation into whether Mr. Spaziano is innocent as part
[sic]
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[sic] of a "clemency" proceeding does not nullify the state's duty of
disclosure under Brady.
The one bootleg piece of the secret police investigation Mr.
Spaziano's counsel has been able to obtain on his own - the FDLE
videotape- is exculpatory in the extreme. When Governor Chiles
thought Mr. Spaziano would never see the videotape, he lied about
the contents of the videotape, claiming DiLisio did not recant on
the videotape. Now the state asks us to accept, on its word of
honor, that nothing else exculpatory came into possession in the
[sic]course of its sua sponte police investigation into Mr. Spaziano's
guilt or innocence.
Brady requires the state to reveal what other exculpatory evi-
dence it acquired in its secret police investigation. The writ should
issue.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL A. MELLO 1 °
Vermont Law School
South Royalton, VT 05068
(802) 295-5724
Pro Bono Appellate Counsel for
Joseph R. Spaziano[sic]
110 Joseph Spaziano, his family and his counsel wish to express our gratitude to a
group of current and former Vermont Law School students, who generously worked,
pro bono, on all aspects of the conceptualization and creation of this petition and who
fomred themselves into a pro bono "law firm" called BDNMCB ("The Best Defense No
Money Can Buy"): Deanna Peterson, Katherine Clarke, Daniel Factor, Christopher
Gilmore, Douglas Gould, Cahteryn Brigid Lynch, Thomas Malone, Sharon Pappas,
Laurie Rosenweig, Elyse Ruzow, Tanja Shipman, Alexandra Varlay, Emilia Vargas-
Ashby.
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XI. UNFILED MOTION TO RECUSE FOUR JUSTICES OF THE FLORIDA
SUPREME COURT, DECEMBER 22, 1995111
I attempted to file this motion in the Florida Supreme Court
on December 22, 1995. As you now know,112 the clerk refused to
file this motion because the court ruled on September 12, 1995
that I had "effectively withdrawn" as Mr. Spaziano's representative.




THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent-Appellee.
Case No. 67,929
MOTION TO RECUSE FOUR JUSTICES OF THE FLORIDA
SUPREME COURT
I. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A fair hearing before an impartial tribunal is a basic require-
ment of due process. Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238 (1980); In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 333 (1955); Porter v. Singletay, 49 F.3d 1483,
1487-88 (11th Cir. 1955). "Every litigant [ ] is entitled to nothing
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." State ex rel.
Mickle v. Rowe, 131 So. 2d 332, 332 (Fla. 1930). Absent a fair tribu-
nal there is no full and fair hearing. Suarez v. Dugger, 527 So. 2d 190
(Fla. 1988) teaches that even the appearance of prejudgment is suffi-
cient to warrant reversal. In capital cases, judicial scrutiny must be
more stringent than it is in non-capital cases. The impartiality of
the judiciary is particularly important in "this first-degree murder
case in which [Mr. Spaziano's] life is at stake." Livingston v. State,
441 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (1983).
In Livingston and Suarez, this court concluded that the failure
of the judge to disqualify himself was error due to apparent pre-
judgment and bias against counsel, and predetermination of the
facts at issue. Consequently, the supreme court reversed and the
matter was remanded for proceeding before a different judge. In
[sic]
111 The relevant portions of the text of this Motion and notes 113-19 appear in
their original form. They have not been altered in any way, as indicated by the use of
[sic] (copy on file with the New York City Law Review).
112 See supra pp. 261, 314-17, 341-42 and notes 6-7, 51-75, 78-82.
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[sic] Suarez, the issue arose before a post-conviction hearing in a
capital case, and concerned a judge's comments to the media
about a pending death warrant. There the trial court erred in fail-
ing to grant a motion to disqualify after expressing an opinion as to
the issues before the court prior to receiving testimony.
As this court reiterated only three months ago, a judge must
recuse him or herself if a "party fears that he or she will not receive
a fair trial or hearing because of specifically described prejudice or
bias of the judge." Cave v. State, 660 So. 2d. 705, 707 (Fla. 1995)
(quoting Fla. R. Crim. Proc. 2.160). The court in Cave also set out
the procedure judges must follow when faced with motions to re-
cuse. Rule 2.160 of the Rules of Judicial Administration became
effective January 1, 1993. It replaced the differing rules governing
disqualification of judges that had been contained in the Civil,
Criminal, and Juvenile Rules of Court. The Florida Bar Re: Amend. To
Fla. Rules, 509 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1995). Under new Rule 2.160, a
party is entitled to the disqualification of one, i.e., an initial, judge
purely on procedural grounds; recusal motions after the initial one
are judge on substance, not procedure.1 3 Mr. Spaziano success-
fully moved to recuse trial judge Robert McGregor. This is his first
motion to recuse an appellate judge.
Undersigned counsel respectfully moves for the recusal of the
four justices of this court who formed the majority in the court's
September 8 opinion in this case, demanding that Mr. Spaziano's
pro bono appellate attorney violate his ethical duties to Mr. Spazi-
ano as a precondition of the court's "permission" for the under-
signed to continue as Mr. Spaziano's appellate attorney. Spaziano v.
State, 660 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. 1995). This court's September 8 and
September 12 opinions evince these justices' animus towards Mr.
Spaziano and his counsel. Reasonable people reading this court's
opinions in this case, combined with this court's refusal even to file
pleadings submitted by Mr. Spaziano's appellate counsel, could
fairly question these justices' neutrality in this case.
[sic]
113 The judge against whom an initial motion to disqualify ... is directed shall
determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion and shall not pass on the truth of
the facts alleged. If the motion is legally sufficient, the judge shall immediately enter
an order granting disqualification and proceed no further in the action.
[A] successor judge shall not be disqualified based on a successive
motion by the same party unless the successor judge rules that he or she
is in fact not fair or impartial in the case. Such a successor judge may
pass on the truth of the facts alleged in support of the motion.
Rule 2.160(f) and (g).
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[sic] A complicated counsel crisis developed in this court during
the last death warrant. Undersigned counsel's reasons for refusing
to participate in the Florida Supreme Court's sham "hearing"
under warrant are set out in three documents appended to this
motion: (1) the rehearing motion filed in this court on September
8 and misrepresented in this court's September 12 opinion; (2) a
memorandum dated September 10; and (3) a law review article. See
Appendices A, I and J.
As set out in Mr. Spaziano's previous filing, Joseph Spaziano
has spent the past 19 years on death row for crimes he did not
commit. But for the investigative reporting of the Miami Herald
over the past few month, Mr. Spaziano would have been killed at
7:00 a.m. On June 21, 1995. See generally Michael Mello, Death and
His Lawyers, 20 VT. L. REv. 19 (1995), Mello, The Hypnotized Witness
and the Condemned Man, __ FLA. ST. U. L. REv. __ (1996);
Mello, Outlaw Attorney, __ STETSON L. REv. __ (1996); Mello,
On Lies, Secrets and Silence: The Florida Supreme Court Deals With Death
Row Claims of Factual Innocence, __ STETSON L. REv. _ (1996).
Mr. Spaziano's conviction was based on the testimony of
Anthony DiLisio. Mr. Spaziano's previous filings, in June 1995,
DiLisio - unbeknownst to Mr. Spaziano or his counsel - re-
canted his crucial testimony. The recantation was not known to
Mr. Spaziano because it occurred in the course of a secret police
investigation initiated, sua sponte, by Governor Lawton Chiles.
A. This Court's September 8 Judgement: No Stay of
Execution; Denial of Appointment of Counsel; No
Defense Access to Secret Police Investigation
File; Evidentiary Hearing in Seven Days.
In its September 8 opinion, this court denied a stay of execu-
tion but remanded for an evidentiary hearing under warrant. Spazi-
ano, supra at 1366. The subject of the hearing was to have been
Anthony DiLisio's recantation. Under this court's opinion, and
over the express objections of Mr. Spaziano's counsel, Mr. Spazi-
ano's counsel would not have access to the secret FDLE report,
including the videotape of DiLisio's recantation, at the hearing. Id.
Additionally, this court demanded that Mr. Spaziano's pro bono
counsel investigate the case for less than a week before participat-
ing at the evidentiary hearing ordered by the court. In contrast,
FDLE, with combined human, fiscal and information resources,
[sic]
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[sic] took 2 1/2 months to conduct its investigation, and the Miami
Herald's investigation has lasted six months - and counting.
Until the day before Governor Chiles signed Mr. Spaziano's
fifth death warrant, "volunteers" who represent indigents in state
and federal post-conviction proceeding had been supported by the
VLRC. The VLRC is the agency that had been funded by Congress
at the request of the Committee on Defender Services to assist pro
bono lawyers in investigating and preparing their cases. The VLRC
has since been dismantled, as even this court can no longer deny.
Spaziano, supra at 1366 n.6.
B. This Court's September 12Judgement: The Court's
"Firing" Mr. Spaziano's Pro Bono Appellate Counsel;
and Appointment of a Hack Public Defender's
Office With a Track Record of Botching the
Factual Investigation into Mr. Spaziano's Innocence.
For reasons set out in the appendices, undersigned pro bono
counsel refused to participate in an evidentiary hearing under the
circumstances set out above. So did every one of the dozen law
firms counsel asked to considerjumping into this case under death
warrant - including Holland & Knight, the firm that subsequently
agreed to do the hearing once the case was no longer under
warrant.
On September 12, this court stayed the executing indefinitely,
moved the evidentiary hearing back two and one half months, to
November 15, "fired" undersigned counsel as Mr. Spaziano's pro
bono appellate counsel, forced upon Mr. Spaziano a hack public
defender office with a track record of botching the factual investi-
gation in this case and a possible conflict of interest. Spaziano v.
State, supra at 1368-71.
Undersigned counsel attempted to point out the factual and
legal errors in the Florida Court's September 12 opinion (includ-
ing the fact that the Florida Supreme Court lacked the legitimate
power to "fire" the undersigned, since the undersigned's client was
Joseph Robert Spaziano, not this court). Counsel provided the
court with retainer letters from Mr. Spaziano, his mother, and his
niece. The court refused even to file the pleadings submitted by
the undersigned, explaining, in a letter dated Sept. 20, that only
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[sic] C. CCR's Conflicts of Interest, Alleged Misconduct and
Purported "Overload"
As set out in Mr. Spaziano's September 8 rehearing and his
other filing, CCR's conflicts of interest had three independent
sources: (1) CCR's misconduct, as alleged by Anthony DiLisio; (2)
CCR's general mishandling of Mr. Spaziano's case; and (3) CCR's
self-proclaimed case "overload." See In re: Order of Prosecution, 561
So. 2d 1130, 1135 (Fla. 1990).
1. What CCR Has Become
CCR's investigators are alleged to have engaged in unethical,
and quite possibly illegal, conduct in attempting to coerce Anthony
DiLisio, the state's key witness against Mr. Spaziano at trial, into
recanting his trial testimony. Mr. DiLisio described CCR's miscon-
duct in a videotaped interrogation he did with FDLE.
CCR's strongarm tactics did not succeed, but failure to coerce
is no defense to a charge of witness tampering or obstruction of
justice. Mr. DiLisio did eventually recant, and the FDLE investi-
gated the truthfulness of his recantation.
As part of its investigation, FDLE interrogated CCR personnel.
CCR unilaterally waived their client's (Mr. Spaziano's) privilege of
confidentiality and spoke with the members of the FDLE. CCR im-
peached DiLisio's credibility as to his allegations concerning CCR's
misconduct. As a result, FDLE later submitted a report to Gover-
nor Chiles, concluding that DiLisio's recantation was untruthful.
When confronted by Mr. Spaziano's counsel with DiLisio's al-
legations against CCR, CCR denied them and misrepresented what
DiLisio had told the FDLE. When confronted with the videotape
itself, CCR changed its tactics and minimized its conflicts of inter-
ests. It did so in pleadings filed in the Florida Supreme Court.
Based on CCR's misrepresentations, the court found that CCR had
no conflict of interest and acceded to CCR's request that it take
over Mr. Spaziano's case from the undersigned. Undersigned
counsel filed two discovery requests with CCR seeking information
regarding their conflicts of interest in this and other capital cases.
To date, CCR has ignored those reports.
CCR was Mr. Spaziano's sole counsel from January to June
1995. CCR also did an oral argument on Mr. Spaziano's behalf in
the federal court of appeals, do primarily to the fact that the un-
dersigned was too ill to do it. CCR also represented Mr. Spaziano
nine and ten years ago, when the undersigned was a Senior Assis-
[sic]
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[sic]tant on CCR's staff. Then in May 1995 Governor Chile's
signed Mr. Spaziano's fourth death warrant.
Two weeks in advance of Mr. Spaziano's scheduled execution
- on a fourth death warrant - CCR had conducted no fact inves-
tigation of any use. This occurred despite the wealth of leads, pro-
vided mainly by the Miami Herald's , independent investigation.
The Herald's investigation was initiated over the strong misgivings
of CCR and with no help whatsoever from them. CCR had drafted
no pleading; CCR had developed no strategy; CCR's director,
Michael Minera, was telling reporters (and the governor) that all
he wanted for his factually innocent client ("innocent" in that he
didn't do the crime, period), was a reduction in sentence from
death to life in prison.
Undersigned counsel sent a detailed letter to CCR, which they
never responded to. When the undersigned received CCR's files in
this case, he learned why: CCR had done none of the basic investi-
gative tasks set out in the letter, much less initiated CCR's own fol-
low-up of the multitude of promising leads indicated by the Miami
Herald's extensive investigative reporting into Mr. Spaziano's claim
of absolute innocence.
2. CCR's "Overload"
The ineptitude of CCR's investigation and handling of this
case was obvious even to CCR's condemned client. Mr. Spaziano
and his family asked the undersigned to undertake Mr. Spaziano's
pro bono representation. Undersigned counsel agreed.
But CCR later attempted to supplant the undersigned as Mr.
Spaziano's lawyer. In aid of its hostile takeover CCR misrepre-
sented facts to the Florida Supreme Court. The court relied upon
those misrepresentations when it purported to remove the under-
signed from Mr. Spaziano's case and assign the case to CCR.
CCR's relentless campaign to take over Mr. Spaziano's case
was in direct opposition to the clearly stated written wishes of Mr.
Spaziano and his family. Mr. Spaziano's refusal to have CCR as his
lawyer was entirely reasonable and based on his recent experience
with CCR's botched and inept factual investigation into Mr. Spazi-
ano's innocence.
CCR's campaign to take over Mr. Spaziano's case is puzzling in
one respect. At the very time CCR was attempting to force itself
upon Mr. Spaziano, the agency was telling this court, in pleadings,
that the office was so overloaded that it could not undertake any
[sic]
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[sic]new cases. See infra note 2. This court recently rejected CCR's
complaints about overwork, perhaps because those complaints
were belied by CCR's relentlessness to add Mr. Spaziano's case to
its already "overloaded" docket.
It is unsurprising that General Butterworth would prefer to
have CCR as his "adversary" of choice. The Governor appointed
the current director of CCR, and Chiles appointed him because he
could be trusted to be good lapdog. He has not disappointed his
patron. CCR has already botched this case, perhaps beyond repair.
Neither General Butterworth nor Governor Chiles nor the Florida
Supreme Court has the legitimate power to force a hack public
defender office upon an innocent man who is litigating for his life
and who is not so crazy as to permit CCR to represent him.
II. THE LAW
A party may present a motion to disqualify at any point in the
proceedings as long as there remains some action for the judge to
take. If the motion is legally sufficient, "the judge shall proceed no
further." Lake v. Edwards, 501 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
(quoting Fla. R. Civ. P. 1. 432(d)). Florida Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 3.230(d) contains virtually identical language to Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.432(d). See also Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.160.
The Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where a
movant meets these requirements and demonstrates, on the face of
the motion, a basis for relief, a judge who is presented with a mo-
tion for disqualification "shall not pass on the truth of the facts
alleged nor adjudicate the question of disqualification." Suarez v.
State, 527 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 1988) (emphasis added); Livingston v.
State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1983); Brady v. Rudd, 366 So. 2d
440 (Fla. 1978). Rather, to establish a basis for relief, a movant:
need only show "a well grounded fear that he will not receive a
fair trial at the hand of the judge. It is not a question of how the
judge feels; it is a question of what feeling resides in the affiant's
mind and the basis of such feeling." State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell,
131 Fla. 566, 579 So. 2d 694, 697-98 (1938). See also Hayslip v.
Douglas, 400 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The question of
disqualification focuses on those mater from which a litigant
may reasonably question a judge's impartiality rather than the
judge's perception of his ability to act fairly and impartially.
Livingston, 441 So. 2d st 2086. Rule 2.160 of the Florida Rules of
Judicial Administration specifically provides:
[sic]
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[sic] (f) Determination-Individual Motion .The judge against
whom an initial motion to disqualify under subdivision (d) (1) is
directed shall determine only the legal sufficiency of the motion
and shall not pass on the truth of the facts alleged. If the mo-
tion is legally sufficient, the judge shall immediately enter an
order granting disqualification and proceed no further in the
action ....
Fla R. Jud. Admin. 2.160(f)
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the basis
constitutional precept of a neutral, detached judiciary.
The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial
and disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. This
requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceeding safeguards
the two central concerns of procedural due process, the preven-
tion of unjustified or mistake deprivations and the promotion of
participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the deci-
sion making process. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-262,
266-267, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 1043, 1050-1052, 1053, 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d
22, (1978). The neutrality requirement helps to guarantee that
life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the basis of an erro-
neous or distorted conception of the facts or the law. See Mat-
thews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344, 96 S. Ct. 893, 907, 47 L.Ed.2d
18 (1976). At the same time, it preserves both the appearance
and reality of fairness, "generating the feeling, so important to a
popular government, that justice has been done." Joint Anti-Fas-
cist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172, 71 S.Ct. 624, 649. 95
L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), by ensuring that
no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a
proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that
the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
Due process guarantees the right to a neutral and detached
judiciary in order "to convey to the individual a feeling that the
government has dealt with him fairly, as well as to minimize the
risk of mistaken deprivations of protected interests." Carey v.
Piphus, 425 U.S. 247, 262 (1978). The United States Supreme
Court has explained that in deciding whether a particular judge
cannot preside over a litigant's trial:
the inquiry must be not only whether there was actual bias on
respondent's part, but also whether there was "such a likeli-
hood of bias or an appearance of bias that the judge was unable
to hold the balance between vindicating the interests of the
court and the interests of the accused." Ungar v. Sarafite, 376
[sic]
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[sic]U.S. 575, 588, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed. 2d 921 (1964). "Such a
stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no
actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales
of justice equally between contending parties," but due process
of law requires no less. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 76
S.Ct. 523, 624, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955).
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974).
The purpose of the rules of disqualification emanates from
the directive of the judicial canons that a judge must avoid even
the appearance of impropriety. Canon 3(C) of Florida's Code of
Judicial conduct states:
(1) A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including
but not limited to instances where:
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party,
or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceeding;
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter or controversy, or a
lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served
during such association as lawyer concerning the mat-
ter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material wit-
ness concerning it ....
Fla. Code of Judicial conduct, Canon 3(C) (1) (a) and (b). The
commentary to this provision specifically provides, moreover:
A lawyer in a governmental agency does not necessarily
have an association with other lawyers employed by that agency
within the meaning of this subsection; a judge formerly em-
ployed by a governmental agency, however, should disqualify
himself in a proceeding if his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned because of such association.
The purpose of the disqualification rules direct a judge must
"avoid even the appearance of impropriety."
It is established law of this States that every litigant, includ-
ing the State in criminal cases, is entitled to nothing less than
the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. It is the duty of the
court to scrupulously guard this right of the litigant and to re-
frain from attempting to exercise jurisdiction in any matter
where his qualification to do so is seriously brought into ques-
tion. The exercise of any other policy tends to discredit and
place the judiciary in a compromising attitude which is bad for
the administration of justice. Crosby v. State, 97 So. 2d 181 (Fla.
1957); State ex rel. Davis v. Parks, 141 Fla. 516, 194 So. 613
[sic]
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[sic] (1939), Dickenson v. Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459 (1932);
State ex rel. Mickle v. Rowe, 100 Fla. 1382, 131 So. 3331 (1930).
The prejudice of a judge is a delicate question for a litigant
to raise but when raised as a bar to the trial of a cause, if predi-
cated on grounds with a modicum of reason, the judge in ques-
tion should be prompt circumstances is warranted in sitting in
the trial of a cause whose neutrality is shadowed or even ques-
tioned. Dickenson v.Parks, 104 Fla. 577, 140 So. 459 (1932); Sate
ex. rel. Aquiar v. Chappell, 344 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
State v. Steele, 348 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). In capital cases,
judicial scrutiny must be more stringent than in non-capital cases.
The impartiality of the judiciary is particularly important in "this
first-degree murder case in which [Mr. Spaziano's] life is at stake.
Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d at 1087.
III. WHAT HAPPENED TO JERRY WHITE WOULD HAVE HAP-
PENED TO JOSEPH SPAZIANO-HAD UNDERSIGNED
COUNSEL FOLLOWED THIS COURT'S DICTATES
Two series of events confirm counsel's decision to defy this
court's "hearing" under the September warrant. The first is the
killing of Jerry White. The second are subsequent events in Mr.
Spaziano's case.
CCR's special blend of cowardice and ineptitude came very
close to killingJoe Spaziano. It did kill a man named Jerry White in
December 1995. The parallels between White and Spaziano are
frightening, and Mr. White's fate shows what would have happened
to Mr. Spaziano had undersigned counsel followed the Florida
Supreme Court's dictates and handed the case to CCR under death
warrant.
Like Mr. Spaziano, Mr. White had, prior to the warrant, been
represented by volunteer, pro bono counsel. As in Spaziano, in
White CCR told this court that it could not competently represent
Mr. White due to CCR's caseload;' 4 this court has recognized that
[sic]
114 Motion for Relief by CCR, In Re: Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, No. 82, 322
(Filed in Fla Sup. Ct. June 23, 1995); Supplemental to Motion for Relief, supra, at 2
("Even before the closing of the Resource Center was announced, CCR had notified
this court of its inability, due to underfundings to carry out the statutory mandate of
representing all its present and potential clients within the time limits established by
Rule 3.851"); CCR's Motion for Clarification and clarication, supra at 3 ("We respect-
fully reassert that we are not adequately funded due to the confluence of the one-year
filing time with unprecedented rate of direct appeal affirmance": Pleading Regarding
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[sic] "when excessive caseload forces the public defender to choose
between the rights of various indigent criminals defendants he rep-
resents, a conflict of interest is inevitably created," In re: Order on
Prosecution, 561 So. 2d at 1135. As in Spaziano, in White this court
(with two dissenting justices) disbelieved CCR's overload represen-
tations and ordered CCR to represent Mr. White anyway, under
warrant. As in Spaziano, CCR then folded its counsel arguments
and undertook the representation-under circumstance which
CCR itself had just told this court it could not render effective
assistance of counsel. See supra note 2.
There the comparison between White and Spaziano ends. In
Spaziano, undersigned counsel refused to permit CCR to take over
as counsel . No one was there to prevent CCR from taking
overwhite. So it did-while confessing its own conflicts, see supra
note 2. CCR dashed from court to court, pretending that it could
and was representing Mr. White effectively.115 Mr. White was exe-
cuted on December 4. (The electric chair malfunctioned during
Mr. White's electrocution; he screamed, and his scream was heard
by the execution witnesses. Another CCR client, Philip Atkins, was
[sic]
Status of Counsel, In re: Jerry White, No. 86, 706 (filed Oct. 19, 1995), at 1-2 (" . . .
Jerry White is currently unrepresented and is therefore without counsel to assist him
during his pending death warrant. [CCR] further notifies the Court that [CCR] ... is
presently unable to fulfill its statutory mandate obligation to provide "the effective
assistance of counsel to Mr. White during this critical warrant period . . ."); id. at 8
("These warrant have come at a time of great vulnerability and crisis for those at-
tempting to provide counsel to approximately 200 death - sentenced ... "); id. at 10
(". . . CCR is so swamped it has not assigned counsel to twenty-five clients when such
assignment is required . . . Thus [sic] inadequacy of resources for post-conviction
counsel has been brought to this Court's attention in the recent past. The deteriorat-
ing situation as described . . ."); id. at 12 ("The stream of new clients likely to be
coming to CCR in the ensuring months as volunteer lawyers drop off portends a con-
stant tension between clients already assigned to CCR and ones which come here
from other counsel in various stages of litigation, including those like Jerry White with
an active warrant but no lawyer"); id. at 14 ('Jerry white has a death warrant and no
attorney. CCR cannot give him adequate representation in the time remaining before
the execution. Attempting to do so forsakes the interests of some other client or cli-
ents. This predicament is a direct result of an unusually large number of affirmed
death sentences coupled with the legislature's failure to increase CCR budget at all");
id. at 16 ("CCR cannot render effective representation to Mr. White"); id. at 27
(same); Summary of Initial Brief, White v., State, No. 86, 900 (filed Dec. 1, 1995), at
72 ("It has become apparent during these past several weeks that Mr. White has not
been receiving the effective assistance of counsel"); id. at 77 ("Mr. White is not receiv-
ing the effective assistance of counsel")
115 For example of an argument that underfunding might generate system-wide in-
effective assistance of counsel, see Samuel Stretton, Defense of the Indigent Criminal De-
fendant: When Does the System Become Unethica, THE CIHAMPION, Sept. .Oct. 1991, at 26.
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[sic]executed 22 hours later.)"6 Whether effective counsel could
have prevented Mr. White's execution we will never know. Jerry
White's killing makes it a moot point anyway. 1 7
In White, CCR had told this court it could not render the effec-
tive assistance of counsel. See supra note 2. Yet, CCR represented
Mr. White anyway, after this court ordered it to do so. This means
that CCR either (1) lied to this court about its inability to represent
Mr. White effectively, or (2) CCR wasn't able to, and didn't repre-
sent Mr. White effectively. There are no other possibilities. Jerry
White's execution is a pretty good metaphor for how CCR works
today.
IV. WHAT DID HAPPEN IN THIS CASE: REASONABLE
GROUNDS FOR FEARING BIAS
What happened in White was precisely what undersigned coun-
sel was afraid would happen in Spaziano. That is why counsel defied
this court's demand that he hand Mr. Spaziano's case over to CCR.
Counsel is convinced that, had he done so, Joseph Spaziano would
have been killed at 7:00 a.m. on September 17, 1995.
Events in Mr. Spaziano's own case have proven the correctness
of undersigned counsel's argument to this court that a complicated
evidentiary hearing on six days notice was no hearing at all. This
court gave undersigned pro bono counsel 96 working hours to in-
vestigate and prepare for the hearing under warrant. By contrast,
in its September 12 opinion, the court gave CCR-a law firm with
22 attorneys and a multi-million dollar budget-two months to pre-
pare for the hearing. And, when Florida's largest law firm, Hol-
[sic]
116 The execution of Mr. White and Mr. Atkins reduced CCR's caseload by two, but
it is indecent to contemplate the possibility that CCR would, in light of its overload
representations to this court, now accept two new clients to "replace" Mr. White and
Mr. Atkins. To offer CCR's slots left by its two most recently executed clients-to offer
such spots to Mr. Spaziano or anyone else-would compound CCR's existing and self-
confessed conflicts of interest, see supra note, 2, with a conflict that would be
macabre.
117 CCR's ineptitude in White carried through to the very end of CCR's representa-
tion of Phillip Atkins. CCR's director, Michael Minerva, and asked Richard Jorandby,
the Public Defender in West Palm Beach, to witness Mr. Atkin's execution. Jorandby
drove from West Palm to Starke for that sad reason. He arrived in Starke the night
before the execution occurred. But, on the morning of the killing, when Jorandby
arrived at the prison to witness the electrocution ofJerry White, the prison personnel
told Jorandby that he was not on the witness list. Bureaucratic foul up, but not the
prison's. CCR had forgotten to putJorandby or the witness list. He was escorted off
prison grounds by five prison guards.
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[sic]land & Knight, took the evidentiary hearing portion of this
case over from CCR, the firm asked this court for two additional
months. See Appendix K. The court gave it to the law firm. See Ap-
pendix L. Finally, the Miami Herald, Florida's largest newspaper,
has, to date been intensively investigating Mr. Spaziano's case for
eight months. That investigation has disclosed new facts about the
crimes for which the state set up Mr. Spaziano, as evidenced in the
news stories appended to this motion. See Appendices M, N.
So. This court gave me 96 hours-knowing that VLRC was re-
cently dead, that I was representing Mr. Spaziano pro bono, and
that I was on the brink of personal financial bankruptcy. The court
gave Florida's largest law firm four months. Florida's largest news-
paper has taken eight months.
Thus, implicitly and grudgingly, this court has agreed with me
that 96 hours was not enough time for any lawyer-not even Flor-
ida's largest law firm-to investigate and prepare for this complex
evidentiary hearing on whether Florida was about to execute an
innocent man.
A. "Effective Withdrawal": A Doctrinal Fiction
Manufactured in This Case
This court indicated that undersigned pro bono counsel for
Joseph Spaziano has "effectively withdrawn" and that CCR would
now represent Mr. Spaziano in the capital appeals process. Spaziano
v. State, supra. This order is contrary to both the wishes of the af-
fected client, Mr. Spaziano, and his attorney, Michael Mello. An
attorney cannot "effectively withdraw" as representative of a client.
Any withdrawal from representation must be affirmative and,
under certain circumstances, with the permission of the court.
This court "effectively fired" Mr. Spaziano's attorney. The court
erred because it does not have the power to "fire" an attorney, the
client, who hired the attorney, is the sole party who may terminate
the relationship in such a matter.
Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4 -1.16(b) provides the formal
procedures for withdrawal which require a lawyer to take several
affirmative steps to terminate the attorney - relationship. The Flor-
ida Bar v. King, 1995 Fla. LEXIS 1471, *6 (1995) (noting that an
attorney "could not simply stop representing his clients without fol-
lowing the procedures for withdrawal"). [These rules do not indi-
cate that an attorney's actions can imply that he has withdrawn as
the representative of his client's interests. The spirit of the rules
[sic]
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[sic]"presumes that an attorney will follow the representation to
completion unless withdrawal is necessitated by one of the condi-
tions [stated in the rule]." Faro v. Romani, 641 So. 2d 69, 71 (Fla.
1994). Complying with these conditions for withdrawal is so impor-
tant that the Florida Supreme Court has held that an attorney for-
feits his rights to compensation if he withdraws from
representation without having one of the conditions under the
rule occur. Kay v. Home Depot, Inc., 623 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 5th DCA
1993). The Florida Supreme Court seems to generally place a high
value on the procedure involved in withdrawal from representa-
tion. However, the same value was not placed on the procedure in
Mr. Spaziano's case.
There are formal procedures for withdrawing from represen-
tation and even disputes that arise between the client and attorney
require compliance with these procedures. "Once an attorney has
appeared in pending litigation to represent a party, that attorney
cannot withdraw from the case pursuant to discharge by the client
without leave of the court granted by order after due notice to
both the attorney and client." Brown v. Vermont Mut. Ins. Co., 614
So. 2d 574, 579-580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). By requiring close com-
pliance with the procedures for withdrawal in one case, how can
the Florida Supreme Court turn around and imply the same with-
drawal in another case? There are no cases which indicate that the
Florida Supreme Court has the unfettered discretion to hire or fire
the counsel representing parties before the court. There are
checks on the system and the Florida Rule requires compliance
with formal procedures in order to ensure that the client's interests
are preserved. Mr. Spaziano's adamantly wishes that Mr. Mello re-
main his attorney and these rules were made to protect his interest
in this area.
In this case, undersigned pro bono counsel had has not initi-
ated any procedures to withdraw as counsel for Mr. Spaziano. In
fact, he has worked diligently to represent Mr. Spaziano's interests
for over twelve years. The undersigned has not withdrawn as repre-
sentative of Mr. Spaziano's interest and he has not implied this
withdrawal through his actions. To understate, this court erred in
that it may not imply that counsel has "effectively withdrawn" until
that counsel affirmatively states his intention to withdraw.
Florida's statutes and its common law guarantee a right to
post-conviction counsel to death row prisoners. Spalding v. Dugger,
526 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1988). Mr. Spaziano was effectively "without
[sic]
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[sic]counsel who can effectively and reasonably assist him in post
conviction proceedings." Scott v. Dugger, 634 So. 2d 1062 (Fla.
1993). Previously, the Florida Supreme Court has not permitted an
execution to be carried out under such circumstances. Scott, 634
So. 2d at 1064-65; Mendyk v. Dugger, 592 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. 1992)
(Court will not allow "indigent inmates to be executed without
legal representation"); Rivera v. Dugger, 629 So. 2d 105 (Fla. 1993)
(same). In other cases, the Florida Supreme Court has recognized
that this statutory right to counsel carries with it the right to the
effective assistance of counsel. In this case, however, Florida's high-
est court told Mr. Spaziano that, because Florida is not required to
provide him with post-conviction counsel, he had better be satis-
fied with whatever hack lawyers the state, in its generosity, chooses
to give him.
This bait-and-switch scam. It is more than grotesquely unfair
to an innocent indigent man trying to prove his innocence from an
isolated prison cell on Florida's death row. It is unconstitutional as
well. The United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution
are violated when a state guaranteed post-conviction attorney is
forced and required to provide ineffective assistance of counsel to
a death row petitioner at an post-conviction evidentiary hearing to
determine the petitioner's factual innocence
The reason it is unconstitutional may be illustrated by Tippins
v. Walker, 889 F.Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In Tippins, defense coun-
sel, Louis Tirelli, slept through substantial portions of the trial.
Judge Kennan held this to be a per se violation of the habeas peti-
tioner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, reasoning that an "ac-
tual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel constitutes a
per se violation of the sixth amendment." Id. at 93 (citing Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984); Jaour v. United States, 724
F.2d 831, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1984)).
Under the logic of this court's opinion in Mr. Spaziano's case,
the sleeping lawyer in Tippins could move to Florida, take over Mr.
Spaziano's case, botch it as pitifully as he botched Tippins, and this
court would find no problem. Since Mr. Spaziano is entitled to no
lawyer at all, he had better just be satisfied with his sleeping lawyer.
Having a sleeping lawyer is better than having no lawyer at all.
Or is it? Actually, having a sleeping lawyer is worse than having
no lawyer. A sleeping lawyer provides the illusion of having a law-
yer. CCR is not exactly like having a sleeping lawyer, but it's the
[sic]
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[sic]next best thing - as Mr. Spaziano alleged and offered to
prove at an evidentiary hearing.
Undersigned counsel argued in his original rehearing motion
in this court that the "hearing" ordered by the Florida Supreme
Court was more than unfair; it was unlawful under the principles of
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984). In Cronic, the
Court held that "[c] ircumstances... may be present on some occa-
sions when although counsel is available to assist the accused dur-
ing trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent
one, could provide effective assistance is so small, that a presump-
tion of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual con-
duct of the trial." Id. Without VLRC and without the FDLE file, no
lawyer, even a fully competent one, can adequately represent Mr.
Spaziano at the evidentiary hearing. This court has ordered an evi-
dentiary hearing to test the validity of the key witness's recantation,
but has at the same time ruled that Mr. Spaziano has no right to
evidence of Mr. DiLisio's recantation in the state's possession.
In Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986), the United
States Supreme Court held that exclusion of exculpatory evidence
regarding the circumstances of defendant's confession "deprives a
defendant of the basic right to have the prosecutor's case encoun-
ter and survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing." Id.
(quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984)). Mr.
Spaziano counsel's cannot subject the state's case to "meaningful
adversarial testing" at the evidentiary hearing because this court
has denied counsel access to the exculpatory evidence in the hands
of the State. This court's order for the hearing, and its simultane-
ous denial of Mr. Spaziano's right to review the evidence to be
tested at the hearing, violates Mr. Spaziano's constitutional rights
as set forth Cronic and Crane.
B. The Puzzling Analogy of Paul Hill
The court's treatment of Paul Hill's request for counsel of his
choice provides an interesting contrast to its treatment of the same
issue in Mr. Spaziano's case. See Appendix 0. Unlike Mr. Spaziano,
Mr. Hill wants to die. This court granted Mr. Hill's request that he
be represented by a prolife movement lawyer, even though that
lawyer is not a Florida bar member and even though he has no
capital appellate experience whatsoever. See Appendix 0.
The attorney in Hill and Spaziano both made clear to this court
that they were willing to work pro bono, so this court's unwilling-
[sic]
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[sic]ness to spend tax dollars to provide competent counsel for
death row prisoners does not distinguish the two cases. Under-
signed counsel did ask this court for reasonable accommodations
in light of his public service representation of Mr. Spaziano, and he
made such requests because, in the past, this court has recognized
that it is unseemly for this court to bend over backwards to make
such pro bono work as difficult as possible for Florida bar members
who are attempting to discharge their ethical duty to donate their
time and out-of-pocket expenses to represent poor people free of
charge-as this court did in granting Holland and Knight to reason-
able extensions of time for the evidentiary hearing.
There are differences between Hill and Spaziano. First, Mr. Hill
does not dispute the factual basis of his homicide conviction, and
he wants a lawyer to aid him in his goal of becoming a martyr to his
cause. Mr. Spaziano is factually innocent and wants undersigned
counsel in aid of proving his innocence. Second, Mr. Hill's lawyer
is not a Florida bar member, and he lacks any capital appellate
experience. Undersigned is an experienced Florida capital appel-
late litigator. Third, the appellate public defender who otherwise
would have represented Mr. Hill - William McClain - has a long
track record of competence and expertise in capital appeals. This
court's September 12 opinion forced Mr. Spaziano to be repre-
sented by CCR. Fourth, in Hill this court did not place impossible-
to-meet conditions on Mr. Hill's pro bono counsel as a condition
of its "permission" that Mr. Hill receive the lawyer he wanted. As
set out in this motion and in Mr. Spaziano's previous filing, this
court did precisely that here.
As the court seem to recognize in Hill, lawyers are not fungi-
ble. Mr. Spaziano understands this, even if the Florida Supreme
Court does not. As Mr. Spaziano would prove at an evidentiary
hearing, for the past 12 years, Mr. Mello has come to know more
than Mr. Spaziano's case. Mello came to know, and to believe in,
Mr. Spaziano's innocence. Mr. Spaziano and his family trust Mello,
and they do so for good reasons. The latest temporary stay of exe-
cution may not last - odds are it will not last for long. Another
death warrant will be signed, and it will be carried out. But, in an
odd way, that will not nullify the importance of the stay that re-
sulted from the Herald's coverage, no matter how transitory or
ephemeral that stay proves to have been.
There is something grotesque in this court's (1) manufactur-
ing a doctrine of "effective withdrawal"; (2) misreading the record
[sic]
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[sic] to find that counsel had "effectively withdrawn": and (3) refus-
ing to give counsel any opportunity to respond to the court's doc-
trinal innovation-all to justify removal of Mr. Spaziano's longtime
and trusted lawyer a week before Mr. Spaziano has been scheduled
to be killed by the state. It was Justice Lewis Powell, of all people,
who recognized in Skipper v. South Carolina, that death row prison-
ers are not exactly like other inmates: Condemned people are not
just litigating; they are also preparing for death - especially when
they are on a fifth death warrant, as Mr. Spaziano was when the
Florida Supreme Court "fired" Mr. Mello and forced CCR upon
Mr. Spaziano.
Even when the stays are temporary and even when they do not
result in eventual victory - a life sentence or new trial - this sort of
litigation can buy the inmate time, sometimes as little as five min-
utes and sometimes as much as years. This may not be what lawyers
usually mean when we talk of "winning." But redefinition of the
notion of winning is an important way of coping with a system that
it often indifferent and increasingly hostile.
For the near-dead, a lifetime can be lived in five extra,
snatched minutes; intimacy with death can carry with it a corre-
sponding new intimacy with life; a love of life, and a lust to live.
Paul Monette, writing of people with AIDS, got it exactly right: "I'm
so rapacious of time ... I wander graveyards now like a math quiz
figuring who we've beaten."1"' During that time, new evidence ben-
eficial to the condemned person's case may be found by post-con-
viction counsel and presented in the post-conviction system. Also
during that time, the condemned, like the rest of us, feels joy and
sorrow, has hopes and dreams, grows and changes. In short, they
live their lives. At some moments they are able to take Lambert
Strether's advice in The Ambassadors to live all they can because it is
a mistake not to. 119
Living one's life, even in the close confines of death row, is
always much more than a legal matter. This is particularly so in the
weeks and months prior to a scheduled execution. It is essential
that the human, extralegal needs of the inmates are recognized
and, when necessary, advocated.
Part of the undersigned's job as Mr. Spaziano's lawyer - a
part CCR cannot replicate with a client whom despises the office -
[sic]
118 PAUL MONETrE, New Year's at Lawrence's Grave, in WEST OF YESTERDAY, EAST OF
SUMMER 37 (1994).
119 HENRYJAMES, THE AMBASSADORS (1970).
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[sic]is to provide the nonlegal counseling and support help trans-
form an inmate's appreciation of death from abstract principle to
concrete reality, and so help the inmate - one keeps wanting to
write "patient" - prepare to take care of the unfinished business
of this lifetime. This also places the legal struggle in perspective.
We fight not only scheduled death, but also despair. Our goals are
to ensure that the person he represents knows all hope is not lost,
the battle continues, he will not be abandoned, but also the outlook is
grim and he should be preparing himself to die.
Experienced capital postconvicition litigators know that there
is a self-defensive instinct to distance one's self from a friend who is
about to die. Yet such distancing is the one luxury we cannot per-
mit ourselves to feel. At the very time when virtually everyone else
is distancing himself from our dying(?) clients, we cannot do so,
even for self-protective reasons, especially for self-protective reasons.
They would be able to tell. That brand of disloyalty risks becoming
a self-fulfilling prophecy.
As Mr. Spaziano would prove at an evidentiary hearing, it is
not really - or maybe one means not only - dying at the hands of
the state. It is living the best possible life knowing that the state is
trying to kill you. When one is about to be killed by the state, hope
is both a luxury and a necessity. Erica Goods made the point with
regard to the survivors of the Oklahoma City bombing, but it holds
true as well for my clients. Hope can be like a drug, keeping the
survivors going when the shock and waves of adrenaline are not
enough, protecting them for a few more hours against the oncom-
ing tidal wave of grief. They cling tightly to their illusions. As in
war, hope is critical: without it you die. In court, we defense lawyers
wear the poker face of the war room, slipping into the official lan-
guage designed to keep the actuality of devastation at bay: the mo-
ment when a waiting family was informed of a loved one's
execution is "notification"; crisis counseling for our clients' fami-
lies, and for ourselves, is called "debriefing." Yet the office was hit
not by war but by something that had no ready blueprint for how
to act or what to think. People did the best they could. We think
we understand; they think they understand. For people involved in
this sort of killing, even normal gestures of everyday life can move
far beyond reach. As the hours wind down, and the execution
draws closer, hope cannot last.
V. CONCLUSION
For the moment, Mr. Spaziano is alive; he will likely be dead
[sic]
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[sic] soon - a victim of lies, incompetent counsel, police collusion
and a court system's cowardly reluctance to admit error and re-
verse itself; a victim of a "clemency" board that dispenses mercy
based on polling data and that hears only from those who want
executions carried our more swiftly than ever, who regard all
claims of innocence as equally dubious, who see electrocution of
human beings as the last proof that Florida government can do
something right, after all. The quality of mercy is not strained; it is
vaporized. The quality of justice lives elsewhere.
Joseph Spaziano is not on death row because he is a murderer
or because he is a rapist. He is on death row because he is an Out-
law - president, in absentia, of the Outlaws Motorcycle Brother-
hood, Orlando Chapter.
It is ironic and churlish - although unsurprising - that this
court refuses to permit to be filed the results of the Miami Herald's
investigation into the facts of this case. Such self-imposed igno-
rance is the obtuse equivalent of this court's willingness to allow an
innocent man to be killed based on a secret governmental investi-
gation. Neither Mr. Spaziano nor the undersigned will ever find
the words to express our profound gratitude to the Herald for sav-
ing Joe's life, even if only for a short time. We won't say that the
amount of time doesn't matter, because it does; more time is al-
ways better than less. Still, What mattered most was the fact that
someone had listened to the record in his case, and that someone
had written in down and published it. That, and the fact that the
Herald's stay let him see another Thanksgiving, Christmas and New
Year. That's how we have marked the passage of time over the
years: one holiday season at a time.
And yet.., the Herald's success only underscored my failure as
Joe's lawyer. I've pour my soul into Joe's case, for as long as I've
been a lawyer, and I never succeeded in convincing a single judge
to even consider the evidence of innocence. If I couldn't even per-
suade any court anywhere not to kill my innocent client, then what
was the point? Maybe the "system" is too obtuse to care, or maybe
I'm not just much of a lawyer. Either way, it seems time to quit.
It's far past time, actually. The biggest mistake I made in Joe
Spaziano's case was not going to the Herald in 1995; it was in not
going to the Herald in 1983; it was in playing the polite professional
for longer than the courts deserved; it was trusting the judiciary not
to kill an innocent man.
Either way, Mr. Spaziano is dead. He could be released from
[sic]
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[sic]prison tomorrow, but he's an old man now who spent his life
on death row for crimes he did not commit. He trusted the judges,
in part because I told him he should. He trusted me. I failed. We
failed.
But right now, Mr. Spaziano has a stay. There is a moment
toward the end of Camus' The Plague when, against all expectation,
signs emerge of a slight abatement of the horror. The seasons
slowly changes, but not everyone can adapt. Camus writes: "Plague
had imbued some of them with skepticism so thorough that it was
now a second nature, they had become so allergic to hope in any
form. Thus even when the plague had run its course, they went on
living by its standards. They were, in short, behind the time."
For the moment, as I write these words, Joseph Spaziano has a
stay. He'll probably be executed on the next warrant. Or maybe
he'll be released from prison. In a cockeyed way, it won't matter.
Joe could be freed tomorrow; he could make it to Vermont by De-
cember 30 to be the best man at my wedding; he could teach me to
ride a Harley; he could watch the house while I am on our honey-
moon. He could do all those things. He'd still be a dead man
walking.
At the minimum, Mr. Spaziano's innocence claim ought to be
decided by fair and impartial judges - not by judges who are obvi-
ously sick of Mr. Spaziano, sick of his innocence claim, and sick of
undersigned counsel's attempts to represent his innocent client
zealously, within the bounds of the law and the ethnics of his pro-
fession. Mr. Spaziano moves for recusal of the September 8
majority.
CERTIFICATE OF GOOD FAITH
The undersigned counsel certifies that he is appellate counsel
of record in this cause and that this motion to disqualify judge and
supporting points of authority is made in good faith for the pur-
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XII. THE HAPPY ENDING: THE ORDER MANDATING A
NEW TRIAL
120
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
121 In the
meantime, it became apparent to me that I could no longer act as
Mr. Spaziano's attorney before the Florida Supreme Court. I did
not have the personal resources. Additionally, VLRC lost its fund-
ing on October 1, 1995 and had already indicated to me that it
could no longer assist in Mr. Spaziano's defense.
1 22 I persuaded
Holland and Knight to get involved before the hearing. Finally,
the unreasonableness of its Order became apparent to the court
when even Holland and Knight could not be ready to adequately
defend Mr. Spaziano according to the court's timetable. By sepa-
rate Order dated October 12, 1995,123 the Florida Supreme Court
moved the evidentiary hearing originally scheduled for no later
than September 15, 1995, then moved to no later than November
15, 1995, to no later than January 15, 1996.
On January 22, 1996, following a week-long evidentiary hear-
ing, Seminole County Circuit Judge O.H. Eaton, Jr. issued the fol-
lowing opinion:
[sic]IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
EIGHTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT









120 Florida v. Spaziano, No. 75-430-CFA, slip. op. (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 22, 1996). This
Order has been previously published. See Mello, Postscript-Death and His Lawyers, supra
note 20. This Order and notes 124 and 125 appear in their original form. They have
not been altered in any way, as indicated by the use of [sic] (original on file with the
New York City Law Review).
121 Spaziano v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 722 (1996).
122 Letter from Matthew Lawry, Co-Director, Volunteer Lawyers' Post-Conviction
Defender Organization of Florida, Inc., to Michael Mello, Pro Bono Appellate Coun-
sel (Aug. 25, 1995) (on file with the New York City Law Review).
123 Spaziano v. State, No. 67,929 (Fla. Oct. 12, 1995) (order to extend evidentiary
hearing).
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[sic] ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT AMD SENTENCE
AND
SETTING TRIAL DATE
On September 12, 1995, the Supreme Court of Florida en-
tered an order treating two out-of-time motions for rehearing as a
successive Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.850-3.851 motion based
upon newly discovered evidence of the recantation of the testi-
mony of a significant witness and remanded this case to this court
for consideration of that issue. Spaziano v. State, 660 So.2d 1363
(Fla. 1995). By separate order dated October 12, 1995, the
Supreme Court directed this court to commence an evidentiary
hearing no later than January 15, 1996. The hearing commenced
on January 8, 1995, and was completed on January 15, 1996. At
that time the matter was taken under advisement.
The Issue
The issue to be decided is whether, due to the newly discov-
ered evidence of the recanted testimony of Anthony DiLisio, the
defendant is entitled to a new trial.
The Law of Newly Discovered Evidence and Recanted Testimony
In order to prevail on newly discovered evidence the defend-
ant must prove:
1. the evidence has been discovered since the former trial;
2. the evidence could not have been discovered earlier
through the exercise of due diligence;
3. the evidence is material to the issue;
4. the evidence goes to the merits of the case and not merely
impeachment of the character of a witness;
5. the evidence must not be merely cumulative; and
6. the evidence must be such that it would probably produce a
different result on retrial.
Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911 (Fla. 1992); Henderson v. State, 135 So.
625 (Fla. 1938); Smith v. State, 156 So. 91 (Fla. 1934); Beasley v. State,
315 So.2d 540 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Weeks v. State, 253 So.2d 459
(Fla. 3d DCA 1971).
In determining whether a new trial is warranted due to recan-
tation of a witness's testimony, a trial judge is to examine all the
circumstances of the case, including the testimony of the witnesses
submitted on the issue. Armstrong v. State, 642 So.2d 730 (Fla.
1994); Bell v. State, 90 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1956). Moreover, recanting
[sic]
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[sic] testimony is exceedingly unreliable, and it is the duty of the
court to deny a new trial where it is not satisfied that such testi-
mony is true. Especially is this true where the recantation involves
a confession of perjury. Id. at 705; Henderson v. State, supra.
Findings of Fact
Trial judges are taught to determine the credibility of a wit-
ness and the weight to be given to testimony by considering the
demeanor of the witness; the frankness or lack of frankness of the
witness; the intelligence of the witness; the interest, if any, that the
witness has in the outcome of the case; the means and opportunity
the witness had to know the facts about which the witness testifies;
the ability of the witness to remember the events; and the reasona-
bleness of the testimony considered in light of all of the evidence
in the case. Additionally, trial judges attempt to reconcile any con-
flicts in the evidence without imputing untruthfulness to any wit-
ness. However, if conflicts cannot be reconciled, evidence
unworthy of belief must be rejected in favor of evidence which is
worthy of belief. These principals have been applied here,
although it has not always been easy.
The crucial testimony at the trial of this case in 1976 came
from the mouth of Anthony DiLisio. It was he who provided the
only evidence of the cause of death of the decedent and it was he
who supplied the jury with the evidence connecting this tragic
event to the defendant. Without his testimony, there simply is no
corroborating evidence in the trial record that is sufficient to sus-
tain the verdict - not even any evidence from the medical examiner
who performed the autopsy.
DiLisio now testifies that he did not tell the truth during the
trial and provides a complicated explanation of the events which
led up to his trial testimony. This testimony is credible and is cor-
roborated by other evidence to a significant extent.
DiLisio testified that he and his five siblings lived in a dysfunc-
tional family ruled by his father, Ralph DiLisio, who physically
abused them. 24 DiLisio tried to please his father but he never suc-
ceeded. His father owned a boat dealership known as
[sic]
124 Two of Delisio's sisters testified at the hearing. Neither of them were directly
asked to corroborate the testimony of systematic physical abuse. However, Donna
Yonkin indirectly corroborated the testimony when she related the physical alterca-
tion which occurred when Delisio was arrested for drug possession at his father's resi-
dence. The testimony concerning abuse is accepted as true.
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[sic]Maitland Marine and DiLisio frequented the business as a
young teenager.
Ralph DiLisio started an affair with a younger woman em-
ployee named Keppy who seduced DiLisio when he was fifteen and
with whom he had frequent sexual intercourse for about two and
one half years. His father and Keppy ultimately married. DiLisio
had sex with her for the last time on their wedding day. It was
during this time that DiLisio started using drugs including mari-
juana, hash and alcohol. 25
The defendant worked at the marina and DiLisio knew who he
was. There is a conflict as to just how close their relationship was
but none of the witnesses who testified were able to establish a fast
friendship.
Not suprisingly, Keppy began to have a sexual relationship
with the defendant. Ralph DiLisio found out and became angry.
At some point Keppy accused the defendant of raping her. It was
about that time that Ralph DiLisio asked his son if the defendant
had told him that he mutilated women. DiLisio testified that the
defendant never said anything like that to him. But the idea was
planted in his mind.
DiLisio's mid-teenage years included several brushes with the
law. He ran away from a drug treatment center in a stolen car with
two other juveniles and ended up in Volusia House. It was there
that Detective Abbgy and Martindale, who were investigating the
homicide in this case, approached DiLisio for information. After
being encouraged by his father to cooperate with the police, he
agreed to be hypnotized in order to refresh his memory.
The dectectives induced DiLisio to cooperate by inferring that
his cooperation would get him out of Volusia House and would
result in several serious criminal charges being dropped. They also
supplied him with bits of information prior to the hypnosis session.
He was scared. He went along with the police in an effort to please
them and his father.
After the first hypnosis session was over, DiLisio did not think
the police believed he cooperated. In fact, he "recalled" very little
during the first session. It was then that the police took him to the
scene of the homicide. A second hypnosis session was scheduled
the next day.
[sic]
125 He stated that he tried an animal tranquilizer called T.H.C. but he must have
meant P.C.P. T.H.C. is the active chemical agent in marijuana.
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[sic] Tapes of the sessions are in evidence as are the transcripts.
The hypnotist does not give the listener confidence in his abilities.
The defense experts who testified about the sessions and proce-
dures agreed. One of them gave the hypnotist a "double F" and the
other rated his skill level at "zero." It is plain from the testimony of
these two distinguished experts that the reliability of the procedure
used should be seriously doubted and that the information which
was produced as a result was unreliable. Both experts agreed that
hypnosis cannot improve recall beyond that which can be recalled
through conscious efforts and that is exactly what the hypnotist
thought he could do. It is most likely that the crime scene depicted
by DiLisio is a scene that he created for the purpose of pleasing the
police and his father. One of the experts even pointed out that the
actual crime scene did not match DiLisio's depiction in several ma-
terial respects.
The State called several witnesses in order to attack DiLisio's
testimony and destroy his credibility. Many of these witnesses had
major credibility problems themselves. One of the witnesses, a mur-
derer in the Federal witness protection program, testified that he
and the defendant were in prison together after the defendant was
sentenced to life for rape but before the trial in this case. The
witness heard the defendant express concern over a young boy
whom he had taken to see some dead bodies. The reliability of
that statement is questionable. If the statement was made, it is
likely that the defendant was discussing the testimony he had
learned DiLisio was going to give at trial. That is the only way to
reconcile the testimony with DiLisio's version of the events without
rejecting it as being untruthful.
Another witness, Bill O'Connell, was a counselor at the Volu-
sia House and knew DiLisio while he was there. He stated that
DiLisio was having trouble sleeping and told him that he had taken
the police to a grave site. However, that statement, if made, does
not agree with other credible evidence in the case unless it was
made after DiLisio had developed his testimony for the trial. The
same is true of the statement Annette Jones says DiLisio made to
her and the statement DiLisio says he made to Sandy Vohman.
Conclusions of Law
In the United States of America every person, no matter how
unsavory, is entitled to due process of law and a fair trial. The de-
fendant received neither. The validity of the verdict in this case
[sic]
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[sic]rests upon the testimony of an admitted perjurer who had
every reason to fabricate a story which he hoped would be believed.
The courts of this county should not tolerate the deprivation of life
or liberty under such circumstances. A fair trial requires a determi-
nation of the truth by an informed jury. The verdict of an unin-
formed jury results in an unfair trial. An unfair trial is an unlawful
trial because it produces an illegal result.
The evidence of recantation in this case is newly discovered
evidence which could not have been discovered earlier through
the exercise of due diligence. It is material evidence which goes to
the merits of the case. It is not cumulative evidence and it would
probably produce a different result on retrial. As Justice Kogan
stated in his concurring opinion remanding this case to this court:
Today we are presented with a grossly disturbing scenario: a
man facing imminent execution (a) even though his jury's vote
for life imprisonment would be legally binding today, (b) with
his conviction resting almost entirely on testimony tainted by a
hypnotic procedure this Court has condemned, (c) with the
source of that tainted testimony now swearing on penalty of per-
jury that his testimony was false, and (d) without careful consid-
eration of this newly discovered evidence under the only legal
method available, Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 or 3.851.
Spaziano v. State, supra at 1367. That careful consideration has now
been given and the validity of the Judgment and sentence has been
found to be so questionable that it cannot stand.
IT IS ADJUDGED:
1. The Judgment rendered on January 23, 1976, and the sen-
tence entered on June 4, 1981, are vacated.
2. This case is set for trial during the trial period commencing
March 25, 1996, with docket sounding on March 12, 1996.
ORDERED at Sanford, Seminole County, Florida, this 22nd
day of January, 1996.
/s/
0. H. EATON, JR.
Circuit Judge [sic]
Following the issuance of Judge Eaton's Order, the State of
Florida appealed. The arguments were fully briefed and submitted
to the Florida Supreme Court, and the court heard oral argument
in early December 1996. As of this writing a decision is pending.
It will be said of Mr. Spaziano's new [trial] order: The sys-
1996]
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
tem worked. "In fact, it was the lawyers and reporters who
worked. The legal system did its powerful best to kill." In the
same week thatJoe Spaziano won a new trial, Delaware hanged a
man and Utah executed another man by firing squad.
126
126 Mello, Postscript-Death and His Lawyers, supra note 9, at 950 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 1:259444
